Efnisyfirlit

• Title
• Copyright
• Brief Contents
• Contents
• Preface
• PART 1 Introduction and Theory
  • CHAPTER 1 Overview
    • Models
      • Price Theory
      • Transaction Costs
      • Game Theory
      • Contestable Markets
    • Organization
      • Basic Theory
      • Market Structures
      • Business Practices: Strategies and Conduct
      • Information, Advertising, and Disclosure
      • Dynamic Models and Market Clearing
      • Government Policies and Their Effects
  • CHAPTER 2 The Firm and Costs
    • The Firm
      • The Objective of a Firm
      • Ownership and Control
    • Mergers and Acquisitions
      • Reasons for Mergers and Acquisitions
      • Merger Activity in the United States
      • Merger Activities in Other Countries
      • Empirical Evidence on the Efficiency and Profitability of Mergers
    • Cost Concepts
      • Types of Costs
      • Cost Concepts
    • Economies of Scale
      • Reasons for Economies of Scale
      • Total Costs Determine Scale Economies
      • A Measure of Scale Economies
    • Empirical Studies of Cost Curves
      • Economies of Scale in Total Manufacturing Costs
      • Survivorship Studies
    • Cost Concepts for Multiproduct Firms
      • Adaptation of Traditional Cost Concepts for a Multiproduct Firm
      • Economies of Scope
      • Economies of Scale and Economies of Scope
      • Specialization in Manufacturing
      • An Example of an Industry with Economies of Scope
    • Summary
      • Problems
      • Suggested Readings
    • APPENDIX 2A Cost Concepts for a Multiproduct Firm
    • EXAMPLE 2.1 Value of Limited Liability
    • EXAMPLE 2.2 Conflicts of Interest Between Managers and Shareholders
    • EXAMPLE 2.3 Specialization of Labor
    • EXAMPLE 2.4 Indiana Libraries
    • EXAMPLE 2.5 The Baking Industry
    • EXAMPLE 2.6 Electricity Minimum Efficient Scale and Scope
• PART 2 Market Structures
  • CHAPTER 3 Competition
    • Perfect Competition
      • Assumptions
      • The Behavior of a Single Firm
      • The Competitive Market
    • Elasticities and the Residual Demand Curve
      • Elasticities of Demand and Supply
      • The Residual Demand Curve of Price Takers
    • Efficiency and Welfare
      • Efficiency
      • Welfare
    • Entry and Exit
      • Restrictions on Entry
      • Competition with Few Firms—Contestability
      • Definition of Barriers to Entry
      • Identifying Barriers to Entry
      • The Size of Entry Barriers by Industry
    • Externalities
    • Limitations of Perfect Competition
    • The Many Meanings of Competition
    • Summary
      • Problems
    • EXAMPLE 3.1 Are Farmers Price Takers?
    • EXAMPLE 3.2 Restrictions on Entry Across Countries
    • EXAMPLE 3.3 FTC Opposes Internet Bans That Harm Competition
    • EXAMPLE 3.4 Increasing Congestion
  • CHAPTER 4 Monopolies, Monopsonies, and Dominant Firms
    • Monopoly Behavior
      • Profit Maximization
      • Market and Monopoly Power
      • The Incentive for Efficient Operation
      • Monopoly Behavior over Time
    • The Costs and Benefits of Monopoly
      • The Deadweight Loss of Monopoly
      • Rent-Seeking Behavior
      • Monopoly Profits and Deadweight Loss Vary with the Elasticity of Demand
      • The Benefits of Monopoly
    • Creating and Maintaining a Monopoly
      • Knowledge Advantage
      • Government-Created Monopolies
      • Natural Monopoly
    • Profits and Monopoly
      • Is Any Firm That Earns a Positive Profit a Monopoly?
      • Does a Monopoly Always Earn a Positive Profit?
      • Are Monopoly Mergers to Eliminate Short-Run Losses Desirable?
    • Monopsony
    • Dominant Firm with a Competitive Fringe
      • Why Some Firms Are Dominant
      • The No-Entry Model
      • The Dominant Firm–Competitive Fringe Equilibrium
      • A Model with Free, Instantaneous Entry
    • Summary
      • Problems
      • Suggested Readings
    • EXAMPLE 4.1 Monopoly Newspaper Ad Prices
    • EXAMPLE 4.2 Monopolizing by Merging
    • EXAMPLE 4.3 Controlling a Key Ingredient
    • EXAMPLE 4.4 Preventing Imitation—Cat Got Your Tongue?
    • EXAMPLE 4.5 Protecting a Monopoly
    • EXAMPLE 4.6 EU Allows Merger to Eliminate Losses
    • EXAMPLE 4.7 Priest Monopsony
    • EXAMPLE 4.8 Price Umbrella
    • EXAMPLE 4.9 China Tobacco Monopoly to Become a Dominant Firm
  • CHAPTER 5 Cartels
    • Why Cartels Form
    • Creating and Enforcing the Cartel
      • Factors That Facilitate the Formation of Cartels
      • Enforcing a Cartel Agreement
      • Cartels and Price Wars
    • Consumers Gain as Cartels Fail
    • Price-Fixing Laws
    • Summary
      • Problems
      • Suggested Readings
    • APPENDIX 5A The Effects of Cartel Size
    • EXAMPLE 5.1 An Electrifying Conspiracy
    • EXAMPLE 5.2 The Viability of Commodity Cartels
    • EXAMPLE 5.3 Concrete Example of Government Aided Collusion
    • EXAMPLE 5.4 Relieving the Headache of Running a Cartel
    • EXAMPLE 5.5 Vitamins Cartel
    • EXAMPLE 5.6 How Consumers Were Railroaded
    • EXAMPLE 5.7 The Social Costs of Cartelization
    • EXAMPLE 5.8 Prosecuting Global Cartels
  • CHAPTER 6 Oligopoly
    • Game Theory
    • Single-Period Oligopoly Models
      • Nash Equilibrium
      • The Cournot Model
      • The Bertrand Model
      • The Stackelberg Leader-Follower Model
      • A Comparison of the Major Oligopoly Models
    • Multiperiod Games
      • Single-Period Prisoners’ Dilemma Game
      • Infinitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma Game
      • Types of Equilibria in Multiperiod Games
    • Experimental Evidence on Oligopoly Models
    • Summary
      • Problems
      • Suggested Readings
    • APPENDIX 6A A Mathematical Derivation of Cournot and Stackelberg Equilibria
    • APPENDIX 6B Mixed Strategies
    • EXAMPLE 6.1 Do Birds of a Feather Cournot- Flock Together?
    • EXAMPLE 6.2 Oligopoly Welfare Losses
    • EXAMPLE 6.3 Mergers in a Cournot Economy
    • EXAMPLE 6.4 Roller Coaster Gasoline Pricing
    • EXAMPLE 6.5 Copying Pricing
    • EXAMPLE 6.6 Car Wars
  • CHAPTER 7 Product Differentiation and Monopolistic Competition
    • Differentiated Products
      • The Effect of Differentiation on a Firm’s Demand Curve
      • Preferences for Characteristics of Products
    • The Representative Consumer Model
      • A Representative Consumer Model with Undifferentiated Products
      • A Representative Consumer Model with Differentiated Products
      • Conclusions About Representative Consumer Models
    • Location Models
      • Hotelling’s Location Model
      • Salop’s Circle Model
    • Hybrid Models
    • Estimation of Differentiated Goods Models
    • Summary
      • Problems
      • Suggested Readings
    • APPENDIX 7A Welfare in a Monopolistic Competition Model with Homogeneous Products
    • APPENDIX 7B Welfare in a Monopolistic Competition Model with Differentiated Products
    • EXAMPLE 7.1 All Water Is Not the Same
    • EXAMPLE 7.2 Entry Lowers Prices
    • EXAMPLE 7.3 The Jeans Market
    • EXAMPLE 7.4 A Serial Problem
    • EXAMPLE 7.5 Combining Beers
    • EXAMPLE 7.6 Value of Minivans
  • CHAPTER 8 Industry Structure and Performance
    • Theories of Price Markups and Profits
    • Structure-Conduct-Performance
      • Measures of Market Performance
      • Rates of Return
      • Price-Cost Margins
      • Measures of Market Structure
      • The Relationship of Structure to Performance
    • Modern Structure-Conduct-Performance Analysis
      • Theory
      • Empirical Research
      • Modern Approaches to Measuring Performance
      • Static Studies
    • Summary
      • Problems
    • APPENDIX 8A Relationship Between the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and the Price-Cost Margin
    • APPENDIX 8B Identifying Market Power
    • EXAMPLE 8.1 Supermarkets and Concentration
    • EXAMPLE 8.2 How Sweet It Is
• PART 3 Business Practices: Strategies and Conduct
  • CHAPTER 9 Price Discrimination
    • Nonuniform Pricing
    • Incentive and Conditions for Price Discrimination
      • Profit Motive for Price Discrimination
      • Conditions for Price Discrimination
      • Resales
    • Types of Price Discrimination
      • Perfect Price Discrimination
      • Each Consumer Buys More Than One Unit
      • Different Prices to Different Groups
      • Other Methods of Third-Degree Price Discrimination
    • Welfare Effects of Price Discrimination
    • Summary
      • Problems
      • Suggested Readings
    • APPENDIX 9A An Example of Price Discrimination: Agricultural Marketing Orders
    • EXAMPLE 9.1 Coupons
    • EXAMPLE 9.2 Thank You, Doctor
    • EXAMPLE 9.3 Halting Drug Resales from Canada
    • EXAMPLE 9.4 Vertical Integration as a Means of Price Discrimination: Alcoa Shows Its True Metal
    • EXAMPLE 9.5 A Discriminating Labor Union
    • EXAMPLE 9.6 Does Competition Always Lower Price?
  • CHAPTER 10 Advanced Topics in Pricing
    • Nonlinear Pricing
      • A Single Two-Part Tariff
      • Two Two-Part Tariffs
    • Tie-in Sales
      • General Justifications for Tie-in Sales
      • Tie-in Sales as a Method of Price Discrimination
      • Package Tie-in Sales of Independent Products
      • Interrelated Demands
    • Quality Choice
    • Other Methods of Nonlinear Pricing
      • Minimum Quantities and Quantity Discounts
      • Selection of Price Schedules
      • Premium for Priority
      • Auctions
    • Summary
      • Problems
    • APPENDIX 10A The Optimal Two-Part Tariff
    • APPENDIX 10B Nonlinear Pricing with an Example
    • EXAMPLE 10.1 Football Tariffs
    • EXAMPLE 10.2 You Auto Save from Tie-in Sales
    • EXAMPLE 10.3 Stuck Holding the Bag
    • EXAMPLE 10.4 Tied to TV
    • EXAMPLE 10.5 Not Too Suite—Mixed Bundling
    • EXAMPLE 10.6 Price Discriminating on eBay
  • CHAPTER 11 Strategic Behavior
    • Strategic Behavior Defined
    • Noncooperative Strategic Behavior
      • Predatory Pricing
      • Limit Pricing
      • Investments to Lower Production Costs
      • Raising Rivals’ Costs
      • Welfare Implications and the Role of the Courts
    • Cooperative Strategic Behavior
      • Practices That Facilitate Collusion
      • Cooperative Strategic Behavior and the Role of the Courts
    • Summary
      • Problems
      • Suggested Readings
    • APPENDIX 11A: The Strategic Use of Tie-in Sales and Product Compatibility to Create or Maintain Mark
    • EXAMPLE 11.1 Supreme Court Says Alleged Predation Must Be Credible
    • EXAMPLE 11.2 Evidence of Predatory Pricing in Tobacco
    • EXAMPLE 11.3 The Shrinking Share of Dominant Firms
    • EXAMPLE 11.4 And Only a Smile Remained
    • EXAMPLE 11.5 Strategic Behavior and Rapid Technological Change: The Microsoft Case
    • EXAMPLE 11.6 Value of Preventing Entry
    • EXAMPLE 11.7 The FTC versus Ethyl et al.
    • EXAMPLE 11.8 Information Exchanges: The Hardwood Case
  • CHAPTER 12 Vertical Integration and Vertical Restrictions
    • The Reasons for and Against Vertical Integration
      • Integration to Lower Transaction Costs
      • Integration to Assure Supply
      • Integration to Eliminate Externalities
      • Integration to Avoid Government Intervention
      • Integration to Increase Monopoly Profits
      • Integration to Eliminate Market Power
    • The Life Cycle of a Firm
    • Vertical Restrictions
      • Vertical Restrictions Used to Solve Problems in Distribution
      • The Effects of Vertical Restrictions
      • Banning Vertical Restrictions
    • Franchising
    • Empirical Evidence
      • Evidence on Vertical Integration
      • Evidence on Vertical Restrictions
    • Summary
      • Problems
      • Suggested Readings
    • EXAMPLE 12.1 Outsourcing
    • EXAMPLE 12.2 Preventing Holdups
    • EXAMPLE 12.3 Own Your Own Steel Mill
    • EXAMPLE 12.4 Double Markup
    • EXAMPLE 12.5 Blockbuster’s Solution to the Double Marginalization Problem
    • EXAMPLE 12.6 Free Riding on the Web
    • EXAMPLE 12.7 Brewing Trouble: Restricting Vertical Integration in Alcoholic Beverage Industries
• PART 4 Information, Advertising, and Disclosure
  • CHAPTER 13 Information
    • Why Information Is Limited
    • Limited Information About Quality
      • The Market for “Lemons”
      • Solving the Problem: Equal Information
      • Evidence on Lemons Markets
    • Limited Information About Price
      • The Tourist-Trap Model
      • ★The Tourists-and-Natives Model
    • Providing Consumer Information Lowers Price
      • How Information Lowers Prices
      • An Example: Grocery Store Information Programs
    • Summary
      • Problems
      • Suggested Readings
    • APPENDIX 13A Market Shares in the Tourists-and- Natives Model
    • EXAMPLE 13.1 Genetically Modified Organisms: Do Consumers Not Care or Not Read?
    • EXAMPLE 13.2 Understanding Consumer Information
    • EXAMPLE 13.3 Counterfeit Halal Meat
    • EXAMPLE 13.4 Certifying Thoroughbreds
    • EXAMPLE 13.5 Price Dispersion and Search Costs in the Talmud
    • EXAMPLE 13.6 Price Dispersion
    • EXAMPLE 13.7 Tourist Cameras
  • CHAPTER 14 Advertising and Disclosure
    • Information and Advertising
      • Promotions
      • “Search” Versus “Experience” Goods
      • Informational Versus Persuasive Advertising
      • Profit-Maximizing Advertising
    • Effects of Advertising on Welfare
      • Price Advertising Increases Welfare
      • Advertising to Solve the Lemons Problem
      • When Advertising Is Excessive
    • False Advertising
      • Limits to Lying
      • Antifraud Laws
      • Disclosure Laws
    • Summary
      • Problems
      • Suggested Readings
    • APPENDIX 14A Profit-Maximizing Advertising
    • EXAMPLE 14.1 Branding and Labeling
    • EXAMPLE 14.2 Celebrity Endorsements
    • EXAMPLE 14.3 Milk Advertising
    • EXAMPLE 14.4 Social Gain from Price Advertising
    • EXAMPLE 14.5 Welfare Effects of Restricting Alcohol Ads
    • EXAMPLE 14.6 Restaurants Make the Grade
• PART 5 Dynamic Models and Market Clearing
  • CHAPTER 15 Decision Making Over Time: Durability
    • How Long Should a Durable Good Last?
      • Competitive Firm’s Choice of Durability
      • The Monopoly’s Choice of Durability
      • Costly Installation and Maintenance
    • Renting Versus Selling by a Monopoly
      • Resale Market
      • ★Consumers’ Expectations Constrain the Monopoly
    • Summary
      • Problems
      • Suggested Readings
    • APPENDIX 15A Multiperiod Durable Goods Monopoly
    • EXAMPLE 15.1 United Shoe
    • EXAMPLE 15.2 The Importance of Used Goods
    • EXAMPLE 15.3 The Alcoa Case: Secondhand Economics
    • EXAMPLE 15.4 Leasing Under Adverse Selection
    • EXAMPLE 15.5 Sales Versus Rentals
    • EXAMPLE 15.6 Lowering the Resale Value of Used Textbooks
  • CHAPTER 16 Patents and Technological Change
    • Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks
      • Patents
      • Copyrights
      • Trademarks
      • Distinctions Between Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks
    • Incentives for Inventions Are Needed
      • Imitation Discourages Research
      • Patents Encourage Research
      • Patents Encourage Disclosure
    • ★Patents, Prizes, Research Contracts, and Joint Ventures
      • Determining the Optimal Number of Firms
      • No Government Incentives
      • Government-Financed Research
      • Prizes
      • Relaxing Antitrust Laws: Joint Ventures
      • Patents
      • Government Uncertainty
      • Patent Holders May Manufacture or License
      • Eliminating Patents
    • Market Structure
      • Market Structure Without a Patent Race
      • Optimal Timing of Innovations
      • Monopolies in Patent Races
    • Summary
      • Problems
      • Suggested Readings
    • EXAMPLE 16.1 Piracy
    • EXAMPLE 16.2 Patents Versus Trade Secrets
    • EXAMPLE 16.3 Monkey See, Monkey Do
    • EXAMPLE 16.4 Joint Public-Private R&D
    • EXAMPLE 16.5 Prizes
    • EXAMPLE 16.6 Mickey Mouse Legislation
    • EXAMPLE 16.7 European Patents
    • EXAMPLE 16.8 Patent Thicket
  • CHAPTER 17 How Markets Clear: Theory and Facts
    • How Markets Clear: Three Simple Theories
      • Competition
      • Oligopoly Models
      • Monopoly
    • Empirical Evidence on the Role of Price in Allocating Goods
      • The Rigidity of Prices
      • Movements in Prices and Price-Cost Margins over the Business Cycle
    • Explaining the Evidence
      • Extensions to the Simple Theory: The Introduction of Time
      • Fixed Costs of Changing Price
      • Implications of an Unchanging Price for Inventories
      • Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard
      • Toward a General Theory of Allocation
    • Market Structure Is More Than Concentration
      • Produce-to-Order Versus Produce-to-Stock
      • Transmission of Shocks in Industries with Fixed Prices
    • Summary
      • Problems
    • EXAMPLE 17.1 Price Rigidity—It’s the Real Thing
    • EXAMPLE 17.2 How Much Is That Turkey in the Window?
    • EXAMPLE 17.3 The Cost of Changing Prices
    • EXAMPLE 17.4 Creating Futures Markets
    • EXAMPLE 17.5 Oh Say Does That Star-Spangled Banner Yet Fly?
• PART 6 Government Policies and Their Effects
  • CHAPTER 18 International Trade
    • Reasons for Trade Between Countries
      • Comparative Advantage
      • Intra-Industry Trade in Differentiated Products
      • Free Riding, International Price Differences, and Gray Markets
      • Dumping
    • Tariffs, Subsidies, and Quotas
      • Competition
      • Creating and Battling Monopolies
      • Strategic Trade Policy
      • Industries with Positive Externalities
      • Empirical Evidence on Intervention in International Trade
    • Summary
      • Problems
    • APPENDIX 18A Derivation of the Optimal Subsidy
    • EXAMPLE 18.1 Gray Markets
    • EXAMPLE 18.2 Timber Wars and Retaliation
    • EXAMPLE 18.3 Foreign Doctors
    • EXAMPLE 18.4 Being Taken for a Ride: Japanese Cars
    • EXAMPLE 18.5 Wide-Body Aircraft
    • EXAMPLE 18.6 Steeling from U.S. Consumers
  • CHAPTER 19 Antitrust Laws and Policy
    • The Antitrust Laws and Their Purposes
      • Antitrust Statutes
      • Enforcement
      • Goals of the Antitrust Laws
      • Who May Sue?
      • Economic Theory of Damages
      • The Use of U.S. Antitrust Laws
      • Private Litigation
    • Market Power and the Definition of Markets
      • Market Power
      • Market Definition
    • Cooperation Among Competitors
      • Price-Fixing and Output Agreements
      • Not All Agreements Among Competitors Are Illegal
      • Information Exchanges Among Competitors
      • Oligopoly Behavior
      • Mergers
    • Exclusionary Actions and Other Strategic Behavior
      • Competition Between Rivals
      • Competitive Behavior Deemed Undesirable by the Court
      • Vertical Arrangements Between Firms
    • Price Discrimination
      • Price Discrimination Under Robinson-Patman
      • Tie-in Sales
    • Effects of Antitrust Laws on the Organization of Unregulated and Regulated Firms
    • Summary
      • Problems
      • Suggested Readings
    • EXAMPLE 19.1 Using the Government to Create Market Power: Misuse of the Orange Book
    • EXAMPLE 19.2 Conflict Between European and U.S. Antitrust Authorities: GE-Honeywell
    • EXAMPLE 19.3 The Merger Guidelines
    • EXAMPLE 19.4 Antitrust Laws in Other Countries
    • EXAMPLE 19.5 Colleges and Antitrust: Does Your School Belong to a Cartel?
    • EXAMPLE 19.6 The FTC Plays with Toys ‘R’ Us
  • CHAPTER 20 Regulation and Deregulation
    • The Objectives of Regulators
      • Market Inefficiencies
      • Correcting Market Inefficiencies
      • Capture Theory and Interest-Group Theory
    • Making Monopolies More Competitive
      • Government Ownership
      • Privatizing
      • Franchise Bidding
      • Price Controls
    • ★Rate-of-Return Regulation
      • Quality Effects
    • Making Competitive Industries More Monopolistic
      • Limiting Entry
      • Agricultural Regulations: Price Supports and Quantity Controls
    • Deregulation
      • Airlines
      • Ground Transportation
    • Summary
      • Problems
      • Suggested Readings
    • EXAMPLE 20.1 Pizza Protection
    • EXAMPLE 20.2 Cross-Subsidization
    • EXAMPLE 20.3 Legal Monopolies
    • EXAMPLE 20.4 Public, Monopolistic, and Competitive Refuse Collection
    • EXAMPLE 20.5 Rent Control
    • EXAMPLE 20.6 Brewing Trouble
    • EXAMPLE 20.7 Deregulating Electricity: California in Shock
    • EXAMPLE 20.8 International and U.S. Deregulation in Telecommunications
    • EXAMPLE 20.9 European Deregulation of Airlines
• Bibliography
• Glossary
• Answers to Odd-Numbered Problems
  • Chapter 2
  • Chapter 3
  • Chapter 4
  • Chapter 5
  • Chapter 6
  • Chapter 7
  • Chapter 8
  • Chapter 9
  • Chapter 10
  • Chapter 11
  • Chapter 12
  • Chapter 13
  • Chapter 14
  • Chapter 15
  • Chapter 16
  • Chapter 17
  • Chapter 18
  • Chapter 19
  • Chapter 20
• Legal Case Index
• Author Index
• Subject Index

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