Efnisyfirlit

• Economic Approaches to Organizations
• Economic Approaches to Organizations
• Contents
• Preface
• Publisher’s acknowledgements
• Part I Foundations
  • 1 Markets and organizations
    • 1.1 The economic problem
    • 1.2 The division of labour
    • 1.3 Specialization
    • 1.4 Coordination
    • 1.5 Markets and organizations
    • 1.6 Information
    • 1.7 The environment and institutions
    • 1.8 Historical perspective
    • 1.9 Summary: the conceptual framework of this book
    • 1.10 Outline of the book
    • Questions
    • Note
  • 2 Markets
    • 2.1 Introduction
    • 2.2 Market interaction: analysis of demand and supply
    • 2.3 Decision-making by consumers
    • 2.4 Decision-making by producers
    • 2.5 Market coordination
    • 2.6 The paradox of profits
    • 2.7 Competitive markets
    • 2.8 The main assumptions underlying standard microeconomic theory
    • 2.9 Summary: how according to standard microeconomic theory economic decisions are coordinated by the market
    • Questions
  • 3 Organizations
    • 3.1 The world of organizations
    • 3.2 Organizational coordination
    • 3.3 Types of organizations
    • 3.4 Organizational markets
    • 3.5 Organized markets
    • 3.6 The rise of the Internet and the digitization of organizations
    • 3.7 Digital platforms: a new coordination mechanism
    • 3.8 The Platform Organization
    • 3.9 Summary: how organizations achieve coordination
    • Questions
    • Notes
  • 4 Information
    • 4.1 Coordination and information
    • 4.2 Hidden information
    • 4.3 Hidden action
    • 4.4 The value of information
    • 4.5 Information as an economic good
    • 4.6 Summary: information problems for markets and organizations
    • Questions
    • Notes
  • 5 Game theory
    • 5.1 Introduction
    • 5.2 The prisoner’s dilemma
    • 5.3 Coordination games
      • 5.3.1 Choosing an industry standard
      • 5.3.2 Pure coordination
    • 5.4 The entry game
    • 5.5 The iterated prisoner’s dilemma
    • 5.6 Auctions
    • 5.7 Evolutionary game theory
    • 5.8 Summary: insights from game theory
    • Questions
  • 6 Econs and humans
    • 6.1 Introduction
    • 6.2 The social domain versus the economic domain
    • 6.3 Economic, social and moral man: bounds on self-interest
      • 6.3.1 The ultimatum game
      • 6.3.2 The prisoner’s dilemma
      • 6.3.3 The public goods game
      • 6.3.4 Collaborative commons
    • 6.4 Bounds on rationality
      • 6.4.1 Availability
      • 6.4.2 Anchoring
      • 6.4.3 Representativeness
      • 6.4.4 Framing
      • 6.4.5 Mental accounting
      • 6.4.6 The endowment effect
    • 6.5 Prospect theory
    • 6.6 Summary: behavioural economics
    • Questions
• Part II Economic Approaches
  • 7 Behavioural theory of the firm
    • 7.1 Introduction
    • 7.2 The firm as a coalition of participants
    • 7.3 Organizational goals
      • 7.3.1 Bargaining and organizational slack
      • 7.3.2 Operational subgoals
    • 7.4 Organizational expectations
    • 7.5 Organizational choice
    • 7.6 From bounded rationality to behavioural economics
    • 7.7 Summary: goals and decision-making within the firm in behavioural theory
    • Questions
    • Note
  • 8 Agency theory
    • 8.1 Introduction
    • 8.2 Separation of ownership and control
    • 8.3 Managerial behaviour and ownership structure
      • 8.3.1 Managerial behaviour and ownership structure in a world with certainty and symmetrical information
      • 8.3.2 Monitoring and bonding
    • 8.4 Entrepreneurial firms and team production
    • 8.5 The firm as a nexus of contracts
    • 8.6 Theory of principal and agent
      • 8.6.1 The principal can observe the agent’s behaviour (symmetrical information)
        • The set of Pareto-optimal solutions
      • 8.6.2 The principal cannot observe the agent’s level of effort (asymmetrical information)
        • First-best and second-best solutions
      • 8.6.3 The principal can observe a signal concerning the agent’s level of effort
      • 8.6.4 Extending the model
        • One principal and several agents
        • Several periods
    • 8.7 Applying agency theory
      • 8.7.1 The CEO as agent of the shareholders
      • 8.7.2 The CEO and managers of business units
    • 8.8 Summary: agency relations between owners, managers and employees
    • Questions
    • Note
  • 9 Transaction cost economics
    • 9.1 Introduction
    • 9.2 Behavioural assumptions: bounded rationality and opportunism
      • 9.2.1 Bounded rationality
      • 9.2.2 Opportunism
      • 9.2.3 Atmosphere
      • 9.2.4 The fundamental transformation
    • 9.3 Dimensions of transactions
      • 9.3.1 Asset specificity
      • 9.3.2 Uncertainty/complexity
      • 9.3.3 Frequency
      • 9.3.4 Competition between organizational forms
    • 9.4 Peer groups
      • 9.4.1 Advantages of peer groups
      • 9.4.2 Limitations of peer groups
    • 9.5 Simple hierarchies
      • 9.5.1 Team production
      • 9.5.2 Economies of communication and decision-making
      • 9.5.3 Monitoring
    • 9.6 Multistage hierarchies: U-form and M-form enterprises
    • 9.7 Organizational markets
      • 9.7.1 Markets for intermediate goods and services
      • 9.7.2 Internal labour markets
      • 9.7.3 Internal capital market
    • 9.8 Digitization and transaction costs
    • 9.9 Markets and organizations: are these all there is?
      • 9.9.1 Hybrid forms
        • 9.9.1.1 Joint ventures
        • 9.9.1.2 Franchising
        • 9.9.1.3 Co-makership
      • 9.9.2 Markets, bureaucracies and clans
      • 9.9.3 The role of trust
      • 9.9.4 Impersonal trust: institutions and reputation
    • 9.10 Governance in a three-level schema
    • 9.11 Summary: effect of transaction costs on choosing between markets and organizations and organizational forms
    • Questions
    • Notes
  • 10 Economic contributions to business/competitive strategy
    • 10.1 Introduction
    • 10.2 Industry analysis
    • 10.3 Competitor analysis
    • 10.4 Competitive strategy
    • 10.5 Resource-based view of the firm
    • 10.6 Dynamic capabilities
    • 10.7 Move and counter move
      • 10.7.1 The ice-cream-selling industry
      • 10.7.2 Number of ice-cream stands
      • 10.7.3 Commitment
      • 10.7.4 Lessons from the ice-cream example
      • 10.7.5 Spatial competition
      • 10.7.6 Product competition
      • 10.7.7 First mover advantages
      • 10.7.8 Moving lessons
    • 10.8 Summary: how economic analysis can contribute to the formulation of competitive strategies
    • Questions
    • Note
  • 11 Economic contributions to corporate strategy
    • 11.1 Introduction
    • 11.2 Unrelated diversification
      • 11.2.1 Attract capital and allocate capital to business units
      • 11.2.2 Appoint, evaluate and reward business unit managers
      • 11.2.3 Offer advice
      • 11.2.4 Provide functions and services
      • 11.2.5 Performance management
      • 11.2.6 Portfolio management
    • 11.3 Related diversification
    • 11.4 Horizontal multi-nationalization
      • 11.4.1 Economies of scale
      • 11.4.2 Dynamic capabilities
      • 11.4.3 Summary
    • 11.5 Vertical integration
      • 11.5.1 Technological interdependence
      • 11.5.2 Critical dimensions of transactions
        • Case 1: Asset specificity low on both sides, uncertainty/complexity low
        • Case 2: Asset specificity high on both sides, uncertainty/complexity low
        • Case 3: Asset specificity high on one side, uncertainty/complexity low
        • Case 4: Asset specificity low on both sides, uncertainty/complexity high
        • Case 5: Asset specificity high on both sides, uncertainty/complexity high
        • Case 6: Asset specificity high for one party and low for the other, uncertainty/complexity high
    • 11.6 Summary
    • Questions
    • Notes
  • 12 Evolutionary approaches to organizations
    • 12.1 Introduction
    • 12.2 Giraffes
    • 12.3 Organizations and giraffes
    • 12.4 Organizational ecology
    • 12.5 An evolutionary theory of economic change
    • 12.6 Comparison
    • 12.7 The evolution of dynamic capabilities
    • 12.8 Further developments
    • 12.9 Summary: the evolutionary perspective
    • Questions
    • Notes
  • 13 All in the family
    • 13.1 Introduction
    • 13.2 The basic conceptual framework
    • 13.3 Family resemblances
      • 13.3.1 Organizations and markets
      • 13.3.2 Efficiency
      • 13.3.3 Information
    • 13.4 Family differences
      • 13.4.1 Process versus content approaches
      • 13.4.2 Static versus dynamic approaches
      • 13.4.3 Levels of analysis
    • 13.5 Summary: all in the family?
    • 13.6 Organizations as complex, adaptive systems
      • 13.6.1 From standard economics to complexity economics
      • 13.6.2 The complexity approach to organizations
      • 13.6.3 Organizations as complex, adaptive systems
      • 13.6.4 Coevolution and adaptation: the ultimate organizational challenge.
    • Questions
    • Notes
• Bibliography
• Index
  • A
  • B
  • C
  • D
  • E
  • F
  • G
  • H
  • I
  • J
  • L
  • M
  • N
  • O
  • P
  • Q
  • R
  • S
  • T
  • U
  • V
  • W

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