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Public Finance Public Policy

Vörumerki: Macmillan
Vörunúmer: 9781319308094
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Public Finance Public Policy

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Efnisyfirlit

  • About this Book
    • Cover Page
    • Halftitle Page
    • Title Page
    • Copyright Page
    • Dedication
    • About the Author
    • Brief Contents
    • Contents
    • From the Author
    • What’s New in this Edition
    • Presentation and Pedagogy
    • Instructor Resources
    • Acknowledgments
  • Part I Introduction and Background
    • Chapter 1 Why Study Public Finance?
      • 1.1 The Four Questions of Public Finance
        • When Should the Government Intervene in the Economy?
        • Application: Modern Measles Epidemics
        • How Might the Government Intervene?
        • What Is the Effect of Those Interventions on Economic Outcomes?
        • Application: The CBO: Government Scorekeepers
        • Why Do Governments Choose to Intervene in the Way That They Do?
      • 1.2 Why Study Public Finance? Facts on Government in the United States and Around the World
        • The Size and Growth of Government
        • Decentralization
        • Spending, Taxes, Deficits, and Debts
        • Distribution of Spending
        • Distribution of Revenue Sources
        • Regulatory Role of the Government
      • 1.3 The Questions of Public Finance Are Front and Center in Health Care Debates
        • When Should the Government Intervene?
        • How Should the Government Intervene?
        • What Are the Effects of Interventions?
        • Why Governments Do What They Do
      • 1.4 Conclusion
      • Highlights
      • Questions and Problems
      • Advanced Questions
    • Chapter 2 Theoretical Tools of Public Finance
      • 2.1 Constrained Utility Maximization
        • Preferences and Indifference Curves
        • Utility Mapping of Preferences
        • Budget Constraints
        • Putting It All Together: Constrained Choice
        • The Effects of Price Changes: Substitution and Income Effects
      • 2.2 Putting the Tools to Work: TANF and Labor Supply Among Single Mothers
        • Identifying the Budget Constraint
        • The Effect of TANF on the Budget Constraint
      • 2.3 Equilibrium and Social Welfare
        • Demand Curves
        • Supply Curves
        • Equilibrium
        • Social Efficiency
        • Competitive Equilibrium Maximizes Social Efficiency
        • From Social Efficiency to Social Welfare: The Role of Equity
        • Choosing an Equity Criterion
      • 2.4 Welfare Implications of Benefit Reductions: The TANF Example Continued
      • 2.5 Conclusion
      • Highlights
      • Questions and Problems
      • Advanced Questions
      • Appendix to Chapter 2 The Mathematics of Utility Maximization
    • Chapter 3 Empirical Tools of Public Finance
      • 3.1 The Important Distinction Between Correlation and Causality
        • The Problem
      • 3.2 Measuring Causation with Data We’d Like to Have: Randomized Trials
        • Randomized Trials as a Solution
        • The Problem of Bias
        • Randomized Trials of ERT
        • Randomized Trials in the TANF Context
        • Application: The Rise of Randomized Trials in Developing Economies
        • Why We Need to Go Beyond Randomized Trials
      • 3.3 Estimating Causation with Data We Actually Get: Observational Data
        • Time Series Analysis
        • Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis
        • Quasi-Experiments
        • Structural Modeling
      • 3.4 Conclusion
      • Highlights
      • Questions and Problems
      • Advanced Questions
      • Appendix to Chapter 3 Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis
    • Chapter 4 Budget Analysis and Deficit Financing
      • 4.1 Government Budgeting
        • The Budget Deficit in Recent Years
        • The Budget Process
        • Application: Efforts to Control the Deficit
        • State and International Deficit Rules
      • 4.2 Measuring the Budgetary Position of the Government: Alternative Approaches
        • Real Versus Nominal
        • Economic Conditions
        • Cash Versus Capital Accounting
        • Static Versus Dynamic Scoring
      • 4.3 Do Current Debts and Deficits Mean Anything? A Long-Run Perspective
        • Background: Present Discounted Value
        • Application: Present Discounted Value and Interpreting Sports Contracts
        • Why Current Labels May Be Meaningless
        • Measuring Long-Run Government Budgets
        • What Does the U.S. Government Do?
        • Application: The Financial Shenanigans of 2001 and 2018
      • 4.4 Why Do We Care About the Government’s Fiscal Position?
        • Short-Run Versus Long-Run Effects of the Government on the Macroeconomy
        • Background: Savings and Economic Growth
        • The Federal Budget, Interest Rates, and Economic Growth
        • Intergenerational Equity
      • 4.5 Conclusion
      • Highlights
      • Questions and Problems
      • Advanced Questions
  • Part II Externalities and Public Goods
    • Chapter 5 Externalities: Problems and Solutions
      • 5.1 Externality Theory
        • Economics of Negative Production Externalities
        • Negative Consumption Externalities
        • Application: The Externality of SUVs
        • Positive Externalities
      • 5.2 Private-Sector Solutions to Negative Externalities
        • The Solution
        • The Problems with Coasian Solutions
      • 5.3 Public-Sector Remedies for Externalities
        • Corrective Taxation
        • Application: Congestion Pricing
        • Subsidies
        • Regulation
      • 5.4 Distinctions Between Price and Quantity Approaches to Addressing Externalities
        • Basic Model
        • Price Regulation (Taxes) Versus Quantity Regulation in This Model
        • Multiple Plants with Different Reduction Costs
        • Uncertainty About Costs of Reduction
      • 5.5 Conclusion
      • Highlights
      • Questions and Problems
      • Advanced Questions
    • Chapter 6 Externalities in Action: Environmental and Health Externalities
      • 6.1 The Role of Economics in Environmental Regulation: The Case of Particulates
        • History of Particulate Regulation
        • Empirical Evidence: Estimating the Adverse Health Effects of Particulates
        • Has the CAA Been a Success?
      • 6.2 Climate Change
        • Application: The Montreal Protocol
        • The Kyoto Treaty
        • Can Trading Make Environmental Agreements More Cost-Effective?
        • Application: Congress Takes On Climate Change and Fails
        • The Paris Agreement and the Future
      • 6.3 The Economics of Smoking
        • The Externalities of Smoking
      • 6.4 The Economics of Other Addictive Behaviors
        • Drinking
        • Empirical Evidence: The Effect of Legal Drinking at Age 21
        • Illicit Drugs
        • Application: Public Policy Toward Obesity
        • Summary
      • 6.5 Conclusion
      • Highlights
      • Questions and Problems
      • Advanced Questions
    • Chapter 7 Public Goods
      • 7.1 Optimal Provision of Public Goods
        • Optimal Provision of Private Goods
        • Optimal Provision of Public Goods
      • 7.2 Private Provision of Public Goods
        • Private-Sector Underprovision
        • Application: The Free Rider Problem in Practice
        • Can Private Providers Overcome the Free Rider Problem?
        • Application: Business Improvement Districts
        • When Is Private Provision Likely to Overcome the Free Rider Problem?
      • 7.3 Public Provision of Public Goods
        • Empirical Evidence: Measuring Crowd-Out
        • The Right Mix of Public and Private
        • Application: The Good and Bad Sides of Contracting Out
        • Measuring the Costs and Benefits of Public Goods
        • How Can We Measure Preferences for Public Goods?
      • 7.4 Conclusion
      • Highlights
      • Questions and Problems
      • Advanced Questions
      • Appendix to Chapter 7 The Mathematics of Public Goods Provision
    • Chapter 8 Cost-Benefit Analysis
      • 8.1 Measuring the Costs of Public Projects
        • The Example
        • Measuring Current Costs
      • 8.2 Measuring the Benefits of Public Projects
        • Valuing Driving Time Saved
        • Application: The Problems of Contingent Valuation
        • Valuing Saved Lives
        • Empirical Evidence: Valuing Time Savings
        • Application: Valuing Life
        • Empirical Evidence: How Much Does It Cost to Avoid a Traffic Fatality?
        • Discounting Future Benefits
        • Cost-Effectiveness Analysis
      • 8.3 Putting It All Together
        • Other Issues in Cost-Benefit Analysis
      • 8.4 Conclusion
      • Highlights
      • Questions and Problems
      • Advanced Questions
    • Chapter 9 Political Economy
      • 9.1 Unanimous Consent on Public Goods Levels
        • Problems with Lindahl Pricing
      • 9.2 Mechanisms for Aggregating Individual Preferences
        • Application: Direct Democracy in the United States
        • Majority Voting: When It Works
        • Majority Voting: When It Doesn’t Work
        • Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem
        • Restricting Preferences to Solve the Impossibility Problem
        • Median Voter Theory
        • The Potential Inefficiency of the Median Voter Outcome
        • Summary
      • 9.3 Representative Democracy
        • Vote-Maximizing Politicians Represent the Median Voter
        • Assumptions of the Median Voter Model
        • Lobbying
        • Application: Farm Policy in the United States
        • Evidence on the Median Voter Model for Representative Democracy
        • Empirical Evidence: Testing the Median Voter Model
        • Increasing Polarization in American Politics
      • 9.4 Public Choice Theory: The Foundations of Government Failure
        • Size-Maximizing Bureaucracy
        • Leviathan Theory
        • Corruption
        • Application: Government Corruption
        • The Implications of Government Failure
        • Empirical Evidence: Government Failures and Economic Growth
      • 9.5 Conclusion
      • Highlights
      • Questions and Problems
      • Advanced Questions
    • Chapter 10 State and Local Government Expenditures
      • 10.1 Fiscal Federalism in the United States and Abroad
        • Spending and Revenue of State and Local Governments
        • Fiscal Federalism Abroad
      • 10.2 Optimal Fiscal Federalism
        • The Tiebout Model
        • Problems with the Tiebout Model
        • Evidence on the Tiebout Model
        • Optimal Fiscal Federalism
        • Empirical Evidence: Evidence for Capitalization from California’s Proposition 13
      • 10.3 Redistribution Across Communities
        • Should We Care?
        • Application: Barriers to Tiebout and the “Great Divergence”
        • Tools of Redistribution: Grants
        • Redistribution in Action: School Finance Equalization
        • Empirical Evidence: The Flypaper Effect: Here, Gone, and Back Again?
        • Application: School Finance Equalization and Property Tax Limitations in California
      • 10.4 Conclusion
      • Highlights
      • Questions and Problems
      • Advanced Questions
    • Chapter 11 Education
      • 11.1 Why Should the Government Be Involved in Education?
        • Productivity
        • Citizenship
        • Credit Market Failures
        • Failure to Maximize Family Utility
        • Redistribution
      • 11.2 How Is the Government Involved in Education?
        • Free Public Education and Crowding Out
        • Solving the Crowd-Out Problem: Vouchers
        • Problems with Educational Vouchers
        • Vouchers May Increase School Segregation
        • Vouchers May Be an Inefficient and Inequitable Use of Public Resources
      • 11.3 Evidence on Competition in Education Markets
        • Direct Experience with Vouchers
        • Experience with Public School Choice
        • Empirical Evidence: Estimating the Effects of Voucher Programs
        • Experience with Public School Incentives
        • Bottom Line on Vouchers and School Choice
      • 11.4 Measuring the Returns to Education
        • Effects of Education Levels on Productivity
        • Empirical Evidence: Estimating the Return to Education
        • Effects of Education Levels on Other Outcomes
        • The Impact of School Quality
        • Empirical Evidence: Estimating the Effects of School Quality
      • 11.5 The Role of the Government in Higher Education
        • Current Government Role
        • What Is the Market Failure, and How Should It Be Addressed?
        • Application: Addressing Student Loan Debt in the United States
      • 11.6 Conclusion
      • Highlights
      • Questions and Problems
      • Advanced Questions
  • Part III Social Insurance and Redistribution
    • Chapter 12 Social Insurance: The New Function of Government
      • 12.1 What Is Insurance and Why Do Individuals Value It?
        • What Is Insurance?
        • Why Do Individuals Value Insurance?
        • Formalizing This Intuition: Expected Utility Model
      • 12.2 Why Have Social Insurance? Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection
        • Asymmetric Information
        • Example with Full Information
        • Example with Asymmetric Information
        • The Problem of Adverse Selection
        • Does Asymmetric Information Necessarily Lead to Market Failure?
        • Application: Adverse Selection and Health Insurance “Death Spirals”
        • How Does the Government Address Adverse Selection?
      • 12.3 Other Reasons for Government Intervention in Insurance Markets
        • Externalities
        • Administrative Costs
        • Redistribution
        • Paternalism
        • Application: Flood Insurance and the Samaritan’s Dilemma
      • 12.4 Social Insurance Versus Self-Insurance: How Much Consumption Smoothing?
        • Example: Unemployment Insurance
        • Lessons for Consumption-Smoothing Role of Social Insurance
      • 12.5 The Problem with Insurance: Moral Hazard
        • Application: The Problems with Assessing Workers’ Compensation Injuries
        • What Determines Moral Hazard?
        • Moral Hazard Is Multidimensional
        • The Consequences of Moral Hazard
      • 12.6 Putting It All Together: Optimal Social Insurance
      • 12.7 Conclusion
      • Highlights
      • Questions and Problems
      • Advanced Questions
      • Appendix to Chapter 12 Mathematical Models of Expected Utility
    • Chapter 13 Social Security
      • 13.1 What Is Social Security, and How Does It Work?
        • Program Details
        • Application: Why Choose 35 Years?
        • How Does Social Security Work over Time?
        • Application: Ida May Fuller
        • How Does Social Security Redistribute in Practice?
      • 13.2 Consumption-Smoothing Benefits of Social Security
        • Rationales for Social Security
        • Does Social Security Smooth Consumption?
        • Empirical Evidence: Measuring the Crowd-Out Effect of Social Security on Savings
      • 13.3 Social Security and Retirement
        • Theory
        • Evidence
        • Application: Implicit Social Security Taxes and Retirement Behavior
        • Implications
      • 13.4 Social Security Reform
        • Reform Round I: The Greenspan Commission
        • Application: The Social Security Trust Fund and National Savings
        • Incremental Reforms
        • Application: Early Entitlements: Liquidity Versus Behavioral Biases
        • Fundamental Reform: Privatization
        • Application: Company Stock in 401(k) Plans
        • Application: Mixed Proposals for Social Security Reform
      • 13.5 Conclusion
      • Highlights
      • Questions and Problems
      • Advanced Questions
    • Chapter 14 Unemployment Insurance, Disability Insurance, and Workers’ Compensation
      • 14.1 Institutional Features of Unemployment Insurance, Disability Insurance, and Workers’ Compensation
        • Institutional Features of Unemployment Insurance
        • Institutional Features of Disability Insurance
        • Institutional Features of Workers’ Compensation
        • Comparison of the Features of UI, DI, and WC
        • Application: The Duration of Social Insurance Benefits Around the World
      • 14.2 Consumption-Smoothing Benefits of Social Insurance Programs
      • 14.3 Moral Hazard Effects of Social Insurance Programs
        • Moral Hazard Effects of Unemployment Insurance
        • Empirical Evidence: Moral Hazard Effects of Unemployment Insurance
        • Evidence for Moral Hazard in DI
        • Empirical Evidence: Disability Insurance Screening and Labor Supply
        • Evidence for Moral Hazard in WC
        • Empirical Evidence: Moral Hazard Effects of Workers’ Compensation
      • 14.4 The Costs and Benefits of Social Insurance to Firms
        • The Effects of Partial Experience Rating in UI on Layoffs
        • The “Benefits” of Partial Experience Rating
        • Application: The “Cash Cow” of Partial Experience Rating
        • Workers’ Compensation and Firms
      • 14.5 Implications for Program Reform
        • Benefits Generosity
        • Targeting
        • Experience Rating
        • Worker Self-Insurance?
        • Application: Reforming UI
      • 14.6 Conclusion
      • Highlights
      • Questions and Problems
      • Advanced Questions
      • Appendix to Chapter 14 Advanced Quasi-Experimental Analysis
    • Chapter 15 Health Insurance I: Health Economics and Private Health Insurance
      • 15.1 An Overview of Health Care in the United States
        • Application: Finding the Inefficiency in U.S. Health Care
        • How Health Insurance Works: The Basics
        • Private Insurance
        • Medicare
        • Medicaid
        • TRICARE/CHAMPVA
        • The Uninsured
        • Empirical Evidence: Health Insurance and Mobility
      • 15.2 How Generous Should Insurance Be to Patients?
        • Consumption-Smoothing Benefits of Health Insurance for Patients
        • Moral Hazard Costs of Health Insurance for Patients
        • How Elastic Is the Demand for Medical Care? The RAND Health Insurance Experiment
        • Empirical Evidence: Estimating the Elasticity of Demand for Medical Care
        • Optimal Health Insurance
        • Application: Health Savings Accounts
      • 15.3 How Generous Should Insurance Be to Medical Providers?
        • Managed Care and Prospective Reimbursement
        • The Impacts of Managed Care
        • How Should Providers Be Reimbursed?
      • 15.4 Conclusion
      • Highlights
      • Questions and Problems
      • Advanced Questions
    • Chapter 16 Health Insurance II: Medicare, Medicaid, and Health Care Reform
      • 16.1 The Medicaid Program for Low-Income Families
        • How Medicaid Works
        • Who Is Eligible for Medicaid?
        • What Health Services Does Medicaid Cover?
        • How Do Providers Get Paid?
      • 16.2 What Are the Benefits of the Medicaid Program?
        • Does Medicaid Provide Financial Protection?
        • Does Medicaid Improve Health?
        • How Does Medicaid Affect Health? Evidence
        • Empirical Evidence: Using State Medicaid Expansions to Estimate Program Effects
      • 16.3 The Medicare Program
        • How Medicare Works
        • Application: The Medicare Prescription Drug Debate
      • 16.4 What Are the Effects of the Medicare Program?
        • The Prospective Payment System
        • Problems with PPS
        • Empirical Evidence: Short Stays in Long-Term Care Hospitals
        • Lesson: The Difficulty of Partial Reform
        • Medicare Managed Care
        • Should Medicare Move to a Full-Choice Plan? Premium Support
        • Application: A Premium Support System for Medicare
        • Gaps in Medicare Coverage
      • 16.5 Long-Term Care
        • Financing Long-Term Care
      • 16.6 Health Care Reform and the ACA
        • The Historical Impasse
        • The Massachusetts Experiment with Incremental Universalism
        • The Affordable Care Act
        • Application: Rising Health Care Costs and Cost Control Efforts in the ACA
        • Early Evidence on the Effects of the ACA
        • The ACA Runs into Trouble
      • 16.7 Conclusion
      • Highlights
      • Questions and Problems
      • Advanced Questions
    • Chapter 17 Income Distribution and Welfare Programs
      • 17.1 Facts on Income Distribution in the United States
        • Relative Income Inequality
        • Absolute Deprivation and Poverty Rates
        • Application: Problems in Poverty Line Measurement
        • What Matters—Relative or Absolute Deprivation?
      • 17.2 Welfare Policy in the United States
        • Cash Welfare Programs
        • In-Kind Programs
      • 17.3 The Moral Hazard Costs of Welfare Policy
        • Moral Hazard Effects of a Means-Tested Transfer System
        • Solving Moral Hazard by Lowering the Benefit Reduction Rate
        • The “Iron Triangle” of Redistributive Programs
      • 17.4 Reducing the Moral Hazard of Welfare
        • Moving to Categorical Welfare Payments
        • Using “Ordeal Mechanisms”
        • Application: An Example of Ordeal Mechanisms
        • Increasing Outside Options
        • Empirical Evidence: The Canadian Self-Sufficiency Project
        • Empirical Evidence: Child Care, Preschool, and Child Outcomes
        • Application: Evaluating the 1996 Welfare Reform
      • 17.5 Universal Basic Income?
        • Empirical Evidence: The Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend and Labor Supply
      • 17.6 Conclusion
      • Highlights
      • Questions and Problems
      • Advanced Questions
  • Part IV Taxation in Theory and Practice
    • Chapter 18 Taxation: How It Works and What It Means
      • 18.1 Types of Taxation
        • Taxes on Earnings
        • Taxes on Individual Income
        • Taxes on Corporate Income
        • Taxes on Wealth
        • Taxes on Consumption
        • Taxation Around the World
      • 18.2 Structure of the Individual Income Tax in the United States
        • Computing the Tax Base
        • Tax Rates and Taxes Paid
      • 18.3 Measuring the Fairness of Tax Systems
        • Average and Marginal Tax Rates
        • Vertical and Horizontal Equity
        • Measuring Vertical Equity
        • Application: The Political Process of Measuring Tax Fairness
      • 18.4 Defining the Income Tax Base
        • The Haig-Simons Comprehensive Income Definition
        • Deviations due to Ability-to-Pay Considerations
        • Deviations due to Costs of Earning Income
        • Application: What Are Appropriate Business Deductions?
      • 18.5 Externality/Public Goods Rationales for Deviating from Haig-Simons
        • Charitable Giving
        • Spending Crowd-Out Versus Tax Subsidy Crowd-In
        • Consumer Sovereignty Versus Imperfect Information
        • Housing
        • Empirical Evidence: The Social Benefits of Homeownership
        • Tax Deductions Versus Tax Credits
        • Application: The Refundability Debate
        • Bottom Line: Tax Expenditures
        • Application: A Tax Break for Olympians?
      • 18.6 The Appropriate Unit of Taxation
        • The Problem of the “Marriage Tax”
        • Marriage Taxes in Practice
      • 18.7 Conclusion
      • Highlights
      • Questions and Problems
      • Advanced Questions
    • Chapter 19 The Equity Implications of Taxation: Tax Incidence
      • 19.1 The Three Rules of Tax Incidence
        • The Statutory Burden of a Tax Does Not Describe Who Really Bears the Tax
        • The Side of the Market on Which the Tax Is Imposed Is Irrelevant to the Distribution of the Tax Burdens
        • Parties with Inelastic Supply or Demand Bear Taxes; Parties with Elastic Supply or Demand Avoid Them
        • Reminder: Tax Incidence Is About Prices, Not Quantities
      • 19.2 Tax Incidence Extensions
        • Tax Incidence in Factor Markets
        • Tax Incidence in Imperfectly Competitive Markets
      • 19.3 General Equilibrium Tax Incidence
        • Effects of a Restaurant Tax: A General Equilibrium Example
        • Issues to Consider in General Equilibrium Incidence Analysis
      • 19.4 The Incidence of Taxation in the United States
        • Empirical Evidence: The Incidence of Taxation: Real-World Complications
        • CBO/TPC Incidence Assumptions
        • Results of CBO/TPC Incidence Analysis
        • Current Versus Lifetime Income Incidence
      • 19.5 Conclusion
      • Highlights
      • Questions and Problems
      • Advanced Questions
      • Appendix to Chapter 19 The Mathematics of Tax Incidence
    • Chapter 20 Tax Inefficiencies and Their Implications for Optimal Taxation
      • 20.1 Taxation and Economic Efficiency
        • Graphical Approach
        • Elasticities Determine Tax Inefficiency
        • Empirical Evidence: The Window Tax
        • Application: Tax Avoidance in Practice
        • Determinants of Deadweight Loss
        • Deadweight Loss and the Design of Efficient Tax Systems
        • Application: Misperceived Taxes
      • 20.2 Optimal Commodity Taxation
        • Ramsey Taxation: The Theory of Optimal Commodity Taxation
        • Inverse Elasticity Rule
        • Equity Implications of the Ramsey Model
        • Application: Price Reform in Pakistan
      • 20.3 Optimal Income Taxes
        • A Simple Example
        • General Model with Behavioral Effects
        • An Example
      • 20.4 Tax-Benefit Linkages and the Financing of Social Insurance Programs
        • The Model
        • Issues Raised by Tax-Benefit Linkage Analysis
        • Empirical Evidence: A Group-Specific Employer Mandate
      • 20.5 Conclusion
      • Highlights
      • Questions and Problems
      • Advanced Questions
      • Appendix to Chapter 20 The Mathematics of Optimal Taxation
    • Chapter 21 Taxes on Labor Supply
      • 21.1 Taxation and Labor Supply—Theory
        • Basic Theory
        • Limitations of the Theory: Constraints on Hours Worked and Overtime Pay Rules
      • 21.2 Taxation and Labor Supply—Evidence
        • Limitations of Existing Studies
        • Empirical Evidence: Estimating the Elasticity of Labor Supply
      • 21.3 Tax Policy to Promote Labor Supply: The Earned Income Tax Credit
        • Background on the EITC
        • Impact of EITC on Labor Supply: Theory
        • Impact of EITC on Labor Supply: Evidence
        • Empirical Evidence: The Effect of the EITC on Single-Mother Labor Supply
        • Summary of the Evidence
        • Application: EITC Reform
      • 21.4 The Tax Treatment of Child Care and Its Impact on Labor Supply
        • The Tax Treatment of Child Care
        • Empirical Evidence: The Effect of Child Care Costs on Maternal Labor Supply
        • Options for Resolving Tax Wedges
        • Comparing the Options
      • 21.5 Conclusion
      • Highlights
      • Questions and Problems
      • Advanced Questions
    • Chapter 22 Taxes on Savings
      • 22.1 Taxation and Savings—Theory and Evidence
        • Traditional Theory
        • Evidence: How Does the After-Tax Interest Rate Affect Savings?
        • Inflation and the Taxation of Savings
      • 22.2 Alternative Models of Savings
        • Precautionary Savings Models
        • Self-Control Models
        • Empirical Evidence: Social Insurance and Personal Savings
      • 22.3 Tax Incentives for Retirement Savings
        • Available Tax Subsidies for Retirement Savings
        • Theoretical Effects of Tax-Subsidized Retirement Savings
        • Application: The Roth IRA
        • Implications of Alternative Models
        • Private Versus National Savings
        • Evidence on Tax Incentives and Savings
        • Empirical Evidence: Estimating the Impact of Tax Incentives for Savings on Savings Behavior
      • 22.4 Conclusion
      • Highlights
      • Questions and Problems
      • Advanced Questions
    • Chapter 23 Taxes on Risk Taking and Wealth
      • 23.1 Taxation and Risk Taking
        • Basic Financial Investment Model
        • Real-World Complications
        • Evidence on Taxation and Risk Taking
        • Labor Investment Applications
      • 23.2 Capital Gains Taxation
        • Current Tax Treatment of Capital Gains
        • What Are the Arguments for Tax Preferences for Capital Gains?
        • What Are the Arguments Against Tax Preferences for Capital Gains?
        • Application: Capital Gains Taxation of “Carried Interest”
      • 23.3 Transfer Taxation
        • Why Tax Wealth? Arguments for the Estate Tax
        • Arguments Against the Estate Tax
      • 23.4 Property Taxation
        • Who Bears the Property Tax?
        • Types of Property Taxation
        • Application: Property Tax Breaks to Businesses
      • 23.5 Conclusion
      • Highlights
      • Questions and Problems
      • Advanced Questions
    • Chapter 24 Taxation of Business Income
      • 24.1 What Are Corporations, and Why Do We Tax Them?
        • Ownership Versus Control
        • Firm Financing
        • Why Do We Have a Corporate Tax?
      • 24.2 The Structure of the Corporate Tax
        • Revenues
        • Expenses
        • Application: What Is Economic Depreciation? The Case of Personal Computers
        • Corporate Tax Rate
        • Tax Credits
      • 24.3 The Incidence of the Corporate Tax
        • Empirical Evidence: Corporate Taxation and Wages
      • 24.4 The Consequences of the Corporate Tax for Investment
        • Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Tax and Investment Decisions
        • Negative Effective Tax Rates
        • Policy Implications of the Impact of the Corporate Tax on Investment
        • Empirical Evidence: Accelerated Depreciation and Investment
      • 24.5 Treatment of International Corporate Income
        • How to Tax International Income
        • Application: The A(pple) B(urger King) C(aterpillar)s of Avoiding Corporate Taxes on International Income
        • Global Versus Territorial Taxation
        • Application: The 2017 Tax Reform and Corporate Tax Wedges
      • 24.6 The Consequences of the Corporate Tax for Financing
        • The Impact of Taxes on Financing
        • Why Not All Debt?
        • Empirical Evidence: How Do Corporate Taxes Affect a Firm’s Financial Structure?
        • The Dividend Paradox
        • How Should Dividends Be Taxed?
        • Application: The 2003 Dividend Tax Cut
        • Corporate Tax Integration
      • 24.7 Conclusion
      • Highlights
      • Questions and Problems
      • Advanced Questions
    • Chapter 25 Fundamental Tax Reform and Consumption Taxation
      • 25.1 Why Fundamental Tax Reform?
        • Improving Tax Compliance
        • Application: Tax Evasion
        • Empirical Evidence: What Determines Tax Compliance?
        • Application: The 1997 IRS Hearings and Their Fallout for Tax Collection
        • Making the Tax Code Simpler
        • Improving Tax Efficiency
        • Summary: The Benefits of Fundamental Tax Reform
      • 25.2 The Politics and Economics of Tax Reform
        • Political Pressures for a Complicated Tax Code
        • Economic Pressures Against Broadening the Tax Base
        • Application: Grandfathering in Virginia
        • The Conundrum
        • Application: TRA 86 and Tax Shelters
      • 25.3 Consumption Taxation
        • Why Might Consumption Make a Better Tax Base?
        • Why Might Consumption Be a Worse Tax Base?
        • Designing a Consumption Tax
        • Backing into Consumption Taxation: Cash-Flow Taxation
      • 25.4 The Flat Tax
        • Advantages of a Flat Tax
        • Problems with the Flat Tax
      • 25.5 Conclusion
      • Highlights
      • Questions and Problems
      • Advanced Questions
  • Notes
  • Glossary
  • References
  • Index
  • Back Cover

UM RAFBÆKUR Á HEIMKAUP.IS

Bókahillan þín er þitt svæði og þar eru bækurnar þínar geymdar. Þú kemst í bókahilluna þína hvar og hvenær sem er í tölvu eða snjalltæki. Einfalt og þægilegt!

Rafbók til eignar
Rafbók til eignar þarf að hlaða niður á þau tæki sem þú vilt nota innan eins árs frá því bókin er keypt.

Þú kemst í bækurnar hvar sem er
Þú getur nálgast allar raf(skóla)bækurnar þínar á einu augabragði, hvar og hvenær sem er í bókahillunni þinni. Engin taska, enginn kyndill og ekkert vesen (hvað þá yfirvigt).

Auðvelt að fletta og leita
Þú getur flakkað milli síðna og kafla eins og þér hentar best og farið beint í ákveðna kafla úr efnisyfirlitinu. Í leitinni finnur þú orð, kafla eða síður í einum smelli.

Glósur og yfirstrikanir
Þú getur auðkennt textabrot með mismunandi litum og skrifað glósur að vild í rafbókina. Þú getur jafnvel séð glósur og yfirstrikanir hjá bekkjarsystkinum og kennara ef þeir leyfa það. Allt á einum stað.

Hvað viltu sjá? / Þú ræður hvernig síðan lítur út
Þú lagar síðuna að þínum þörfum. Stækkaðu eða minnkaðu myndir og texta með multi-level zoom til að sjá síðuna eins og þér hentar best í þínu námi.



Fleiri góðir kostir
- Þú getur prentað síður úr bókinni (innan þeirra marka sem útgefandinn setur)
- Möguleiki á tengingu við annað stafrænt og gagnvirkt efni, svo sem myndbönd eða spurningar úr efninu
- Auðvelt að afrita og líma efni/texta fyrir t.d. heimaverkefni eða ritgerðir
- Styður tækni sem hjálpar nemendum með sjón- eða heyrnarskerðingu
Eiginleikar
Vörumerki: Macmillan
Vörunúmer: 9781319308094
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