Efnisyfirlit

• Intermediate Microeconomics, 9e
  • Title Page
  • Copyright
  • Dedication
  • Contents
  • Preface
• 1. The Market
  • 1.1 Constructing a Model
  • 1.2 Optimization and Equilibrium
  • 1.3 The Demand Curve
  • 1.4 The Supply Curve
  • 1.5 Market Equilibrium
  • 1.6 Comparative Statics
  • 1.7 Other Ways to Allocate Apartments
    • The Discriminating Monopolist
    • The Ordinary Monopolist
    • Rent Control
  • 1.8 Which Way Is Best?
  • 1.9 Pareto Efficiency
  • 1.10 Comparing Ways to Allocate Apartments
  • 1.11 Equilibrium in the Long Run
  • Summary
  • Review Questions
• 2. Budget Constraint
  • 2.1 The Budget Constraint
  • 2.2 Two Goods Are Often Enough
  • 2.3 Properties of the Budget Set
  • 2.4 How the Budget Line Changes
  • 2.5 The Numeraire
  • 2.6 Taxes, Subsidies, and Rationing
    • Example: The Food Stamp Program
  • 2.7 Budget Line Changes
  • Summary
  • Review Questions
• 3. Preferences
  • 3.1 Consumer Preferences
  • 3.2 Assumptions about Preferences
  • 3.3 Indifference Curves
  • 3.4 Examples of Preferences
    • Perfect Substitutes
    • Perfect Complements
    • Bads
    • Neutrals
    • Satiation
    • Discrete Goods
  • 3.5 Well-Behaved Preferences
  • 3.6 The Marginal Rate of Substitution
  • 3.7 Other Interpretations of the MRS
  • 3.8 Behavior of the MRS
  • Summary
  • Review Questions
• 4. Utility
  • 4.1 Cardinal Utility
  • 4.2 Constructing a Utility Function
  • 4.3 Some Examples of Utility Functions
    • Example: Indifference Curves from Utility
    • Perfect Substitutes
    • Perfect Complements
    • Quasilinear Preferences
    • Cobb-Douglas Preferences
  • 4.4 Marginal Utility
  • 4.5 Marginal Utility and MRS
  • 4.6 Utility for Commuting
  • Summary
  • Review Questions
  • Appendix
    • Example: Cobb-Douglas Preferences
• 5. Choice
  • 5.1 Optimal Choice
  • 5.2 Consumer Demand
  • 5.3 Some Examples
    • Perfect Substitutes
    • Perfect Complements
    • Neutrals and Bads
    • Discrete Goods
    • Concave Preferences
    • Cobb-Douglas Preferences
  • 5.4 Estimating Utility Functions
  • 5.5 Implications of the MRS Condition
  • 5.6 Choosing Taxes
  • Summary
  • Review Questions
  • Appendix
    • Example: Cobb-Douglas Demand Functions
• 6. Demand
  • 6.1 Normal and Inferior Goods
  • 6.2 Income Offer Curves and Engel Curves
  • 6.3 Some Examples
    • Perfect Substitutes
    • Perfect Complements
    • Cobb-Douglas Preferences
    • Homothetic Preferences
    • Quasilinear Preferences
  • 6.4 Ordinary Goods and Giffen Goods
  • 6.5 The Price Offer Curve and the Demand Curve
  • 6.6 Some Examples
    • Perfect Substitutes
    • Perfect Complements
    • A Discrete Good
  • 6.7 Substitutes and Complements
  • 6.8 The Inverse Demand Function
  • Summary
  • Review Questions
  • Appendix
• 7. Revealed Preference
  • 7.1 The Idea of Revealed Preference
  • 7.2 From Revealed Preference to Preference
  • 7.3 Recovering Preferences
  • 7.4 The Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference
  • 7.5 Checking WARP
  • 7.6 The Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference
  • 7.7 How to Check SARP
  • 7.8 Index Numbers
  • 7.9 Price Indices
    • EXAMPLE: Indexing Social Security Payments
  • Summary
  • Review Questions
• 8. Slutsky Equation
  • 8.1 The Substitution Effect
    • EXAMPLE: Calculating the Substitution Effect
  • 8.2 The Income Effect
    • EXAMPLE: Calculating the Income Effect
  • 8.3 Sign of the Substitution Effect
  • 8.4 The Total Change in Demand
  • 8.5 Rates of Change
  • 8.6 The Law of Demand
  • 8.7 Examples of Income and Substitution Effects
    • Example: Rebating a Tax
    • Example: Voluntary Real Time Pricing
  • 8.8 Another Substitution Effect
  • 8.9 Compensated Demand Curves
  • Summary
  • Review Questions
  • Appendix
    • Example: Rebating a Small Tax
• 9. Buying and Selling
  • 9.1 Net and Gross Demands
  • 9.2 The Budget Constraint
  • 9.3 Changing the Endowment
  • 9.4 Price Changes
  • 9.5 Offer Curves and Demand Curves
  • 9.6 The Slutsky Equation Revisited
  • 9.7 Use of the Slutsky Equation
    • Example: Calculating the Endowment Income Effect
  • 9.8 Labor Supply
    • The Budget Constraint
  • 9.9 Comparative Statics of Labor Supply
    • Example: Overtime and the Supply of Labor
  • Summary
  • Review Questions
  • Appendix
• 10. Intertemporal Choice
  • 10.1 The Budget Constraint
  • 10.2 Preferences for Consumption
  • 10.3 Comparative Statics
  • 10.4 The Slutsky Equation and Intertemporal Choice
  • 10.5 Inflation
  • 10.6 Present Value: A Closer Look
  • 10.7 Analyzing Present Value for Several Periods
  • 10.8 Use of Present Value
    • Example: Valuing a Stream of Payments
    • Example: The True Cost of a Credit Card
    • Example: Extending Copyright
  • 10.9 Bonds
    • Example: Installment Loans
  • 10.10 Taxes
    • EXAMPLE: Scholarships and Savings
  • 10.11 Choice of the Interest Rate
  • Summary
  • Review Questions
• 11. Asset Markets
  • 11.1 Rates of Return
  • 11.2 Arbitrage and Present Value
  • 11.3 Adjustments for Differences among Assets
  • 11.4 Assets with Consumption Returns
  • 11.5 Taxation of Asset Returns
  • 11.6 Market Bubbles
  • 11.7 Applications
    • Depletable Resources
    • When to Cut a Forest
    • Example: Gasoline Prices during the Gulf War
  • 11.8 Financial Institutions
  • Summary
  • Review Questions
  • Appendix
• 12. Uncertainty
  • 12.1 Contingent Consumption
    • Example: Catastrophe Bonds
  • 12.2 Utility Functions and Probabilities
    • Example: Some Examples of Utility Functions
  • 12.3 Expected Utility
  • 12.4 Why Expected Utility Is Reasonable
  • 12.5 Risk Aversion
    • Example: The Demand for Insurance
  • 12.6 Diversification
  • 12.7 Risk Spreading
  • 12.8 Role of the Stock Market
  • Summary
  • Review Questions
  • Appendix
    • Example: The Effect of Taxation on Investment in Risky Assets
• 13. Risky Assets
  • 13.1 Mean-Variance Utility
  • 13.2 Measuring Risk
  • 13.3 Counterparty Risk
  • 13.4 Equilibrium in a Market for Risky Assets
  • 13.5 How Returns Adjust
    • EXAMPLE: Value at Risk
    • EXAMPLE: Ranking Mutual Funds
  • Summary
  • Review Questions
• 14. Consumer’s Surplus
  • 14.1 Demand for a Discrete Good
  • 14.2 Constructing Utility from Demand
  • 14.3 Other Interpretations of Consumer’s Surplus
  • 14.4 From Consumer’s Surplus to Consumers’ Surplus
  • 14.5 Approximating a Continuous Demand
  • 14.6 Quasilinear Utility
  • 14.7 Interpreting the Change in Consumer’s Surplus
    • Example: The Change in Consumer’s Surplus
  • 14.8 Compensating and Equivalent Variation
    • Example: Compensating and Equivalent Variations
    • Example: Compensating and Equivalent Variation for Quasilinear Preferences
  • 14.9 Producer’s Surplus
  • 14.10 Benefit-Cost Analysis
    • Rationing
  • 14.11 Calculating Gains and Losses
  • Summary
  • Review Questions
  • Appendix
    • Example: A Few Demand Functions
    • Example: CV, EV, and Consumer's Surplus
• 15. Market Demand
  • 15.1 From Individual to Market Demand
  • 15.2 The Inverse Demand Function
    • Example: Adding Up “Linear” Demand Curves
  • 15.3 Discrete Goods
  • 15.4 The Extensive and the Intensive Margin
  • 15.5 Elasticity
    • Example: The Elasticity of a Linear Demand Curve
  • 15.6 Elasticity and Demand
  • 15.7 Elasticity and Revenue
    • Example: Strikes and Profits
  • 15.8 Constant Elasticity Demands
  • 15.9 Elasticity and Marginal Revenue
    • Example: Setting a Price
  • 15.10 Marginal Revenue Curves
  • 15.11 Income Elasticity
  • Summary
  • Review Questions
  • Appendix
    • Example: The Laffer Curve
    • Example: Another Expression for Elasticity
• 16. Equilibrium
  • 16.1 Supply
  • 16.2 Market Equilibrium
  • 16.3 Two Special Cases
  • 16.4 Inverse Demand and Supply Curves
    • Example: Equilibrium with Linear Curves
  • 16.5 Comparative Statics
    • Example: Shifting Both Curves
  • 16.6 Taxes
    • Example: Taxation with Linear Demand and Supply
  • 16.7 Passing Along a Tax
  • 16.8 The Deadweight Loss of a Tax
    • Example: The Market for Loans
    • Example: Food Subsidies
    • Example: Subsidies in Iraq
  • 16.9 Pareto Efficiency
    • EXAMPLE: Waiting in Line
  • Summary
  • Review Questions
• 17. Measurement
  • 17.1 Summarize data
    • Example: Simpson’s paradox
  • 17.2 Test
  • 17.3 Estimating demand using experimental data
  • 17.4 Effect of treatment
  • 17.5 Estimating demand using observational data
    • Functional form
    • Statistical model
    • Estimation
  • 17.6 Identification
  • 17.7 What can go wrong?
  • 17.8 Policy evaluation
    • Example: Crime and police
  • Summary
  • Review Questions
• 18. Auctions
  • 18.1 Classification of Auctions
    • Bidding Rules
  • 18.2 Auction Design
    • Example: Goethe’s auction
  • 18.3 Other Auction Forms
    • Example: Late Bidding on eBay
  • 18.4 Position Auctions
    • Two Bidders
    • More Than Two Bidders
    • Quality Scores
  • 18.5 Should you advertise on your brand?
  • 18.6 Auction revenue and number of bidders
  • 18.7 Problems with Auctions
    • Example: Taking Bids Off the Wall
  • 18.8 The Winner’s Curse
  • 18.9 Stable Marriage Problem
  • 18.10 Mechanism Design
  • Summary
  • Review Questions
• 19. Technology
  • 19.1 Inputs and Outputs
  • 19.2 Describing Technological Constraints
  • 19.3 Examples of Technology
    • Fixed Proportions
    • Perfect Substitutes
    • Cobb-Douglas
  • 19.4 Properties of Technology
  • 19.5 The Marginal Product
  • 19.6 The Technical Rate of Substitution
  • 19.7 Diminishing Marginal Product
  • 19.8 Diminishing Technical Rate of Substitution
  • 19.9 The Long Run and the Short Run
  • 19.10 Returns to Scale
    • Example: Datacenters
    • Example: Copy Exactly!
  • Summary
  • Review Questions
• 20. Profit Maximization
  • 20.1 Profits
  • 20.2 The Organization of Firms
  • 20.3 Profits and Stock Market Value
  • 20.4 The Boundaries of the Firm
  • 20.5 Fixed and Variable Factors
  • 20.6 Short-Run Profit Maximization
  • 20.7 Comparative Statics
  • 20.8 Profit Maximization in the Long Run
  • 20.9 Inverse Factor Demand Curves
  • 20.10 Profit Maximization and Returns to Scale
  • 20.11 Revealed Profitability
    • Example: How Do Farmers React to Price Supports?
  • 20.12 Cost Minimization
  • Summary
  • Review Questions
  • Appendix
• 21. Cost Minimization
  • 21.1 Cost Minimization
    • Example: Minimizing Costs for Specific Technologies
  • 21.2 Revealed Cost Minimization
  • 21.3 Returns to Scale and the Cost Function
  • 21.4 Long-Run and Short-Run Costs
  • 21.5 Fixed and Quasi-Fixed Costs
  • 21.6 Sunk Costs
  • Summary
  • Review Questions
  • Appendix
• 22. Cost Curves
  • 22.1 Average Costs
  • 22.2 Marginal Costs
  • 22.3 Marginal Costs and Variable Costs
    • Example: Specific Cost Curves
    • Example: Marginal Cost Curves for Two Plants
  • 22.4 Cost Curves for Online Auctions
  • 22.5 Long-Run Costs
  • 22.6 Discrete Levels of Plant Size
  • 22.7 Long-Run Marginal Costs
  • Summary
  • Review Questions
  • Appendix
• 23. Firm Supply
  • 23.1 Market Environments
  • 23.2 Pure Competition
  • 23.3 The Supply Decision of a Competitive Firm
  • 23.4 An Exception
  • 23.5 Another Exception
    • Example: Pricing Operating Systems
  • 23.6 The Inverse Supply Function
  • 23.7 Profits and Producer’s Surplus
    • Example: The Supply Curve for a Specific Cost Function
  • 23.8 The Long-Run Supply Curve of a Firm
  • 23.9 Long-Run Constant Average Costs
  • Summary
  • Review Questions
  • Appendix
• 24. Industry Supply
  • 24.1 Short-Run Industry Supply
  • 24.2 Industry Equilibrium in the Short Run
  • 24.3 Industry Equilibrium in the Long Run
  • 24.4 The Long-Run Supply Curve
    • Example: Taxation in the Long Run and in the Short Run
  • 24.5 The Meaning of Zero Profits
  • 24.6 Fixed Factors and Economic Rent
    • Example: Taxi Licenses in New York City
  • 24.7 Economic Rent
  • 24.8 Rental Rates and Prices
    • Example: Liquor Licenses
  • 24.9 The Politics of Rent
    • Example: Farming the Government
  • 24.10 Energy Policy
    • Two-Tiered Oil Pricing
    • Price Controls
    • The Entitlement Program
  • 24.11 Carbon Tax Versus Cap and Trade
    • Optimal Production of Emissions
    • A Carbon Tax
    • Cap and Trade
  • Summary
  • Review Questions
• 25. Monopoly
  • 25.1 Maximizing Profits
  • 25.2 Linear Demand Curve and Monopoly
  • 25.3 Markup Pricing
    • Example: The Impact of Taxes on a Monopolist
  • 25.4 Inefficiency of Monopoly
  • 25.5 Deadweight Loss of Monopoly
    • Example: The Optimal Life of a Patent
    • Example: Patent Thickets
    • Example: Managing the Supply of Potatoes
  • 25.6 Natural Monopoly
  • 25.7 What Causes Monopolies?
    • Example: Diamonds Are Forever
    • Example: Pooling in Auction Markets
    • Example: Price Fixing in Computer Memory Markets
  • Summary
  • Review Questions
  • Appendix
• 26. Monopoly Behavior
  • 26.1 Price Discrimination
  • 26.2 First-Degree Price Discrimination
    • Example: First-degree Price Discrimination in Practice
  • 26.3 Second-Degree Price Discrimination
    • Example: Price Discrimination in Airfares
    • Example: Prescription Drug Prices
  • 26.4 Third-Degree Price Discrimination
    • Example: Linear Demand Curves
    • Example: Calculating Optimal Price Discrimination
    • Example: Price Discrimination in Academic Journals
  • 26.5 Bundling
    • Example: Software Suites
  • 26.6 Two-Part Tariffs
  • 26.7 Monopolistic Competition
  • 26.8 A Location Model of Product Differentiation
  • 26.9 Product Differentiation
  • 26.10 More Vendors
  • Summary
  • Review Questions
• 27. Factor Markets
  • 27.1 Monopoly in the Output Market
  • 27.2 Monopsony
    • Example: The Minimum Wage
  • 27.3 Upstream and Downstream Monopolies
  • Summary
  • Review Questions
  • Appendix
• 28. Oligopoly
  • 28.1 Choosing a Strategy
    • Example: Pricing Matching
  • 28.2 Quantity Leadership
    • The Follower’s Problem
    • The Leader’s Problem
  • 28.3 Price Leadership
  • 28.4 Comparing Price Leadership and Quantity Leadership
  • 28.5 Simultaneous Quantity Setting
  • 28.6 An Example of Cournot Equilibrium
  • 28.7 Adjustment to Equilibrium
  • 28.8 Many Firms in Cournot Equilibrium
  • 28.9 Simultaneous Price Setting
  • 28.10 Collusion
  • 28.11 Punishment Strategies
    • Example: Price Matching and Competition
    • Example: Voluntary Export Restraints
  • 28.12 Comparison of the Solutions
  • Summary
  • Review Questions
• 29. Game Theory
  • 29.1 The Payoff Matrix of a Game
  • 29.2 Nash Equilibrium
  • 29.3 Mixed Strategies
    • Example: Rock Paper Scissors
  • 29.4 The Prisoner’s Dilemma
  • 29.5 Repeated Games
  • 29.6 Enforcing a Cartel
    • Example: Tit for Tat in Airline Pricing
  • 29.7 Sequential Games
  • 29.8 A Game of Entry Deterrence
  • Summary
  • Review Questions
• 30. Game Applications
  • 30.1 Best Response Curves
  • 30.2 Mixed Strategies
  • 30.3 Games of Coordination
    • Battle of the Sexes
    • Prisoner’s Dilemma
    • Assurance Games
    • Chicken
    • How to Coordinate
  • 30.4 Games of Competition
  • 30.5 Games of Coexistence
  • 30.6 Games of Commitment
    • The Frog and the Scorpion
    • The Kindly Kidnapper
    • When Strength Is Weakness
    • Savings and Social Security
    • Example: Dynamic inefficiency of price discrimination
    • Hold Up
    • The Ultimatum Game
  • 30.7 Bargaining
    • The Ultimatum Game
  • Summary
  • Review Questions
• 31. Behavioral Economics
  • 31.1 Framing Effects in Consumer Choice
    • The Disease Dilemma
    • Anchoring Effects
    • Bracketing
    • Too Much Choice
    • Constructed Preferences
  • 31.2 Uncertainty
    • Law of Small Numbers
    • Asset Integration and Loss Aversion
  • 31.3 Time
    • Discounting
    • Self-control
    • Example: Overconfidence
  • 31.4 Strategic Interaction and Social Norms
    • Ultimatum Game
    • Fairness
  • 31.5 Assessment of Behavioral Economics
  • Summary
  • Review Questions
• 32. Exchange
  • 32.1 The Edgeworth Box
  • 32.2 Trade
  • 32.3 Pareto Efficient Allocations
  • 32.4 Market Trade
  • 32.5 The Algebra of Equilibrium
  • 32.6 Walras’ Law
  • 32.7 Relative Prices
    • Example: An Algebraic Example of Equilibrium
  • 32.8 The Existence of Equilibrium
  • 32.9 Equilibrium and Efficiency
  • 32.10 The Algebra of Efficiency
    • Example: Monopoly in the Edgeworth Box
  • 32.11 Efficiency and Equilibrium
  • 32.12 Implications of the First Welfare Theorem
  • 32.13 Implications of the Second Welfare Theorem
  • Summary
  • Review Questions
  • Appendix
• 33. Production
  • 33.1 The Robinson Crusoe Economy
  • 33.2 Crusoe, Inc.
  • 33.3 The Firm
  • 33.4 Robinson’s Problem
  • 33.5 Putting Them Together
  • 33.6 Different Technologies
  • 33.7 Production and the First Welfare Theorem
  • 33.8 Production and the Second Welfare Theorem
  • 33.9 Production Possibilities
  • 33.10 Comparative Advantage
  • 33.11 Pareto Efficiency
  • 33.12 Castaways, Inc.
  • 33.13 Robinson and Friday as Consumers
  • 33.14 Decentralized Resource Allocation
  • Summary
  • Review Questions
  • Appendix
• 34. Welfare
  • 34.1 Aggregation of Preferences
  • 34.2 Social Welfare Functions
  • 34.3 Welfare Maximization
  • 34.4 Individualistic Social Welfare Functions
  • 34.5 Fair Allocations
  • 34.6 Envy and Equity
  • Summary
  • Review Questions
  • Appendix
• 35. Externalities
  • 35.1 Smokers and Nonsmokers
  • 35.2 Quasilinear Preferences and the Coase Theorem
  • 35.3 Production Externalities
    • Example: Pollution Vouchers
  • 35.4 Interpretation of the Conditions
  • 35.5 Market Signals
    • Example: Bees and Almonds
  • 35.6 The Tragedy of the Commons
    • Example: Overfishing
    • Example: New England Lobsters
  • 35.7 Automobile Pollution
  • Summary
  • Review Questions
• 36. Information Technology
  • 36.1 Systems Competition
  • 36.2 The Problem of Complements
    • Relationships among Complementors
    • Example: Apple’s iPod and iTunes
    • Example: Who Makes an iPod?
    • Example: AdWords and AdSense
  • 36.3 Lock-In
    • A Model of Competition with Switching Costs
    • Example: Online Bill Payment
    • Example: Number Portability on Cell Phones
  • 36.4 Network Externalities
  • 36.5 Markets with Network Externalities
  • 36.6 Market Dynamics
    • Example: Network Externalities in Computer Software
  • 36.7 Implications of Network Externalities
    • Example: The Yellow Pages
    • Example: Radio Ads
  • 36.8 Two-sided Markets
    • A Model of Two-sided Markets
  • 36.9 Rights Management
    • Example: Video Rental
  • 36.10 Sharing Intellectual Property
    • Example: Online Two-sided Markets
  • Summary
  • Review Questions
• 37. Public Goods
  • 37.1 When to Provide a Public Good?
  • 37.2 Private Provision of the Public Good
  • 37.3 Free Riding
  • 37.4 Different Levels of the Public Good
  • 37.5 Quasilinear Preferences and Public Goods
    • EXAMPLE: Pollution Revisited
  • 37.6 The Free Rider Problem
  • 37.7 Comparison to Private Goods
  • 37.8 Voting
    • Example: Agenda Manipulation
  • 37.9 The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism
    • Groves Mechanism
    • The VCG Mechanism
  • 37.10 Examples of VCG
    • Vickrey Auction
    • Clarke-Groves Mechanism
  • 37.11 Problems with the VCG
  • Summary
  • Review Questions
  • Appendix
• 38. Asymmetric Information
  • 38.1 The Market for Lemons
  • 38.2 Quality Choice
    • Choosing the Quality
  • 38.3 Adverse Selection
  • 38.4 Moral Hazard
  • 38.5 Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
  • 38.6 Signaling
    • Example: The Sheepskin Effect
  • 38.7 Incentives
    • Example: Voting Rights in the Corporation
    • Example: Chinese Economic Reforms
  • 38.8 Asymmetric Information
    • Example: Monitoring Costs
    • Example: The Grameen Bank
  • Summary
  • Review Questions
• Mathematical Appendix
  • A.1 Functions
  • A.2 Graphs
  • A.3 Properties of Functions
  • A.4 Inverse Functions
  • A.5 Equations and Identities
  • A.6 Linear Functions
  • A.7 Changes and Rates of Change
  • A.8 Slopes and Intercepts
  • A.9 Absolute Values and Logarithms
  • A.10 Derivatives
  • A.11 Second Derivatives
  • A.12 The Product Rule and the Chain Rule
  • A.13 Partial Derivatives
  • A.14 Optimization
  • A.15 Constrained Optimization
• Answers
• Index

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