Industrial Organization

Höfundar: Paul Belleflamme, Martin Peitz
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Industrial Organization

Rafræn sending. Upplýsingar verða sendar á netfangið þitt eftir kaup
Rafbók til eignar. Rafbók til eignar þarf að hlaða niður á þau tæki sem þú vilt nota innan eins árs frá því bókin er keypt. Útgáfa: 2

Efnisyfirlit

  • Cover
  • Half title
  • Endorsement
  • Title
  • Copyright
  • Table of Contents
  • List of Figures
  • List of Tables
  • List of Cases
  • Preface to the second edition
  • Preface from the first edition
  • Part I Getting started
    • Introduction to Part I
    • 1 What is Markets and Strategies?
      • 1.1 Markets
      • 1.2 Strategies
      • 1.3 Models and material of Markets and Strategies
      • 1.4 Level, scope and organization of the book
    • 2 Firms, consumers and the market
      • 2.1 Firms and consumers
        • 2.1.1 The firm
        • 2.1.2 Looking inside the black box of a firm
        • 2.1.3 Consumers and rational man
        • 2.1.4 Welfare analysis of market outcomes
      • 2.2 Market interaction
        • 2.2.1 The perfectly competitive paradigm
        • 2.2.2 Strategies in a constant environment (‘monopoly’)
        • 2.2.3 Dominant firm model
        • 2.2.4 Imperfect competition
      • 2.3 Market definition and market performance
        • 2.3.1 How to define a market?
        • 2.3.2 How to assess market power?
        • References for Part I
  • Part II Market power
    • Introduction to Part II
    • 3 Static imperfect competition
      • 3.1 Price competition
        • 3.1.1 The standard Bertrand model
        • 3.1.2 Price competition with uncertain costs
        • 3.1.3 Price competition with differentiated products
        • 3.1.4 Asymmetric competition with differentiated products
      • 3.2 Quantity competition
        • 3.2.1 The linear Cournot model
        • 3.2.2 Implications of Cournot competition
      • 3.3 Price vs. quantity competition
        • 3.3.1 Limited capacity and price competition
        • 3.3.2 Differentiated products: Cournot vs. Bertrand
        • 3.3.3 What is the appropriate modelling choice?
      • 3.4 Strategic substitutes and strategic complements
      • 3.5 Estimating market power
    • 4 Dynamic aspects of imperfect competition
      • 4.1 Sequential choice: Stackelberg
        • 4.1.1 One leader and one follower
        • 4.1.2 One leader and an endogenous number of followers
        • 4.1.3 Commitment
      • 4.2 Free entry: endogenous number of firms
        • 4.2.1 Properties of free-entry equilibria
        • 4.2.2 Welfare properties of the Cournot model with free entry
        • 4.2.3 Welfare properties of price competition with free entry
        • 4.2.4 Welfare properties of monopolistic competition
      • 4.3 Industry concentration and firm turnover
        • 4.3.1 Exogenous vs. endogenous sunk costs
        • 4.3.2 Dynamic firm entry and exit
        • References for Part II
  • Part III Sources of market power
    • Introduction to Part III
    • 5 Product differentiation
      • 5.1 Views on product differentiation
      • 5.2 Horizontal product differentiation
        • 5.2.1 A simple location model
        • 5.2.2 The linear Hotelling model
        • 5.2.3 The quadratic Hotelling model
      • 5.3 Vertical product differentiation
        • 5.3.1 Quality choice
        • 5.3.2 Natural oligopolies
      • 5.4 Empirical analysis of product differentiation
        • 5.4.1 Probabilistic choice and the logit model
        • 5.4.2 Empirical analysis of horizontal product differentiation
        • 5.4.3 Empirical analysis of vertical product differentiation
        • 5.4.4 Nested logit and other extensions
    • 6 Advertising and related marketing strategies
      • 6.1 Views on advertising
      • 6.2 Price and non-price strategies in monopoly
        • 6.2.1 Price–advertising decisions: Dorfman–Steiner model
        • 6.2.2 A closer look at how advertising affects demand
      • 6.3 Some welfare economics of advertising
      • 6.4 Advertising and competition
        • 6.4.1 Informative advertising
        • 6.4.2 Persuasive advertising
    • 7 Consumer inertia
      • 7.1 Uninformed consumers and search costs
        • 7.1.1 Price dispersion
        • 7.1.2 Consumer search with homogeneous products
        • 7.1.3 Empirical investigation of price dispersion
        • 7.1.4 Sequential search and differentiated products
      • 7.2 Switching costs
        • 7.2.1 Competitive effects of switching costs
        • 7.2.2 Coupons and endogenous switching costs
        • 7.2.3 Estimating switching costs
        • References for Part III
  • Part IV Pricing strategies and market segmentation
    • Introduction to Part IV
    • 8 Group pricing and personalized pricing
      • 8.1 Price discrimination
        • 8.1.1 Price discrimination: a typology
        • 8.1.2 ‘Know thy customers’
      • 8.2 Group and personalized pricing in monopolies
      • 8.3 Group and personalized pricing in oligopolies
        • 8.3.1 Group pricing and localized competition
        • 8.3.2 Personalized pricing and location decisions
        • 8.3.3 Geographic price discrimination
    • 9 Menu pricing
      • 9.1 Menu pricing vs. group pricing
      • 9.2 A formal analysis of monopoly menu pricing
        • 9.2.1 Quality-dependent prices
        • 9.2.2 Information goods and damaged goods
        • 9.2.3 Extension to time- and quantity-dependent prices
      • 9.3 Menu pricing under imperfect competition
        • 9.3.1 Competitive quality-based menu pricing
        • 9.3.2 Competitive quantity-based menu pricing
    • 10 Intertemporal price discrimination
      • 10.1 Durable-good monopoly without commitment
        • 10.1.1 Small number of consumers
        • 10.1.2 Large number of consumers
      • 10.2 Durable-good monopoly with commitment
        • 10.2.1 Fixed capacity
        • 10.2.2 Flexible capacity
        • 10.2.3 Intertemporal pricing and demand uncertainty
      • 10.3 Behaviour-based price discrimination
        • 10.3.1 Behaviour-based price discrimination by a monopolist
        • 10.3.2 Customer poaching
    • 11 Bundling
      • 11.1 A formal analysis of monopoly bundling
        • 11.1.1 Pure bundling as a device to offer a discount
        • 11.1.2 Mixed bundling
        • 11.1.3 Extensions
      • 11.2 Tying and metering
      • 11.3 Competitive bundling
        • 11.3.1 Bundling as a way to soften price competition
        • 11.3.2 When bundling intensifies price competition
        • References for Part IV
  • Part V Product quality and information
    • Introduction to Part V
    • 12 Asymmetric information, price and advertising signals
      • 12.1 Asymmetric information problems
        • 12.1.1 Hidden information problem
        • 12.1.2 Hidden action problem
      • 12.2 Advertising and price signals
        • 12.2.1 Advertising signals
        • 12.2.2 Price signals
        • 12.2.3 Joint price and advertising signals
      • 12.3 Price signalling under imperfect competition
    • 13 Marketing tools for experience goods
      • 13.1 Warranties
        • 13.1.1 Warranties as a reliability signal
        • 13.1.2 Warranties and investment in quality control
      • 13.2 Branding
        • 13.2.1 Intertemporal branding and reputation
        • 13.2.2 Reputation and competition
        • 13.2.3 Umbrella branding
        • References for Part V
  • Part VI Theory of competition policy
    • Introduction to Part VI
    • 14 Cartels and tacit collusion
      • 14.1 Formation and stability of cartels
        • 14.1.1 Simultaneous cartel formation
        • 14.1.2 Sequential cartel formation
        • 14.1.3 Network of market-sharing agreements
      • 14.2 Sustainability of tacit collusion
        • 14.2.1 Tacit collusion: the basics
        • 14.2.2 Optimal punishment of deviating firms
        • 14.2.3 Collusion and multimarket contact
        • 14.2.4 Tacit collusion and cyclical demand
        • 14.2.5 Tacit collusion with unobservable actions
      • 14.3 Detecting and fighting collusion
        • 14.3.1 The difficulty in detecting collusion
        • 14.3.2 Leniency and whistleblowing programmes
    • 15 Horizontal mergers
      • 15.1 Profitability of simple Cournot mergers
        • 15.1.1 Mergers between two firms
        • 15.1.2 Mergers between several firms
        • 15.1.3 Efficiency-increasing mergers
      • 15.2 Welfare analysis of Cournot mergers
        • 15.2.1 Linear Cournot model with synergies
        • 15.2.2 General welfare analysis
      • 15.3 Beyond simple Cournot mergers
        • 15.3.1 Successive mergers
        • 15.3.2 Mergers and entry
        • 15.3.3 Mergers under price competition
        • 15.3.4 Coordinated effects
      • 15.4 Empirical merger analyses
        • 15.4.1 Event studies and direct price comparisons
        • 15.4.2 Merger simulations
    • 16 Strategic incumbents and entry
      • 16.1 Taxonomy of entry-related strategies
        • 16.1.1 Entry deterrence
        • 16.1.2 Entry accommodation
      • 16.2 Strategies affecting cost variables
        • 16.2.1 Investment in capacity as an entry deterrent
        • 16.2.2 Investment as an entry deterrent reconsidered
        • 16.2.3 Raising rivals’ costs
      • 16.3 Strategies affecting demand variables
        • 16.3.1 Brand proliferation
        • 16.3.2 Bundling and leverage of market power
        • 16.3.3 Switching costs as an entry deterrent
      • 16.4 Limit pricing under incomplete information
      • 16.5 Entry deterrence and multiple incumbents
    • 17 Vertically related markets
      • 17.1 The double-marginalization problem
        • 17.1.1 Linear pricing and double marginalization
        • 17.1.2 Contractual solutions to the double-marginalization problem
        • 17.1.3 Double marginalization and retail services
      • 17.2 Resale-price maintenance and exclusive territories
        • 17.2.1 Resale-price maintenance
        • 17.2.2 Exclusive territories
      • 17.3 Exclusive dealing
        • 17.3.1 Anticompetitive effects of exclusive dealing contracts? The Chicago critique
        • 17.3.2 Vertical integration and long-term contracts as partial deterrence devices
        • 17.3.3 Full exclusion and multiple buyers
        • 17.3.4 Vertical foreclosure and secret contracts
        • 17.3.5 Exclusive contracts and investment incentives
      • 17.4 Vertical oligopoly and vertical mergers
        • 17.4.1 Vertical oligopoly
        • 17.4.2 Exclusionary effects of vertical mergers
        • 17.4.3 Coordinated effects of vertical mergers
        • References for Part VI
  • Part VII R&D and intellectual property
    • Introduction to Part VII
    • 18 Innovation and R&D
      • 18.1 Market structure and incentives to innovate
        • 18.1.1 Monopoly vs. perfect competition: the replacement effect
        • 18.1.2 Incentives to innovate in oligopolies
        • 18.1.3 Patent licensing
        • 18.1.4 Licensing by an outside innovator
        • 18.1.5 Licensing by an inside innovator
      • 18.2 When innovation affects market structure
        • 18.2.1 Monopoly threatened by entry: the efficiency effect
        • 18.2.2 Asymmetric patent races: replacement and efficiency effects
        • 18.2.3 Socially excessive R&D in a patent race
      • 18.3 R&D cooperation and spillovers
        • 18.3.1 Effects of strategic behaviour
        • 18.3.2 Effects of R&D cooperation
        • 18.3.3 Further analysis of R&D cooperation
    • 19 Intellectual property
      • 19.1 Innovation and IP: basics
        • 19.1.1 Information and appropriability
        • 19.1.2 Intellectual property rights
        • 19.1.3 Alternative incentive mechanisms: rewards and secrecy
        • 19.1.4 Protection of IP in practice
      • 19.2 Protecting innovations
        • 19.2.1 Optimal design of IP rights
        • 19.2.2 Rewards vs. patents
        • 19.2.3 Secrecy vs. patents
      • 19.3 Cumulative innovations
        • 19.3.1 Sequential innovations and holdup
        • 19.3.2 Complementary innovations and anticommons
      • 19.4 Intellectual property in the digital economy
        • 19.4.1 End-user piracy
        • 19.4.2 Software protection
        • References for Part VII
  • Part VIII Networks, standards and systems
    • Introduction to Part VIII
    • 20 Markets with network goods
      • 20.1 Network effects
        • 20.1.1 Direct and indirect network effects
        • 20.1.2 Network effects and switching costs
        • 20.1.3 Empirical evidence on network effects
      • 20.2 Markets for a single network good
        • 20.2.1 Modelling the demand for a network good
        • 20.2.2 Provision of a network good
      • 20.3 Markets for several network goods
        • 20.3.1 Demand for incompatible network goods
        • 20.3.2 Oligopoly pricing and standardization
    • 21 Strategies for network goods
      • 21.1 Choosing how to compete
        • 21.1.1 A simple analysis of standardization
        • 21.1.2 A full analysis of standardization
      • 21.2 Strategies in standards wars
        • 21.2.1 Building an installed base for pre-emption
        • 21.2.2 Backward compatibility and performance
        • 21.2.3 Expectations management
      • 21.3 Public policy in network markets
        • 21.3.1 Ex ante interventions
        • 21.3.2 Ex post interventions
        • References for Part VIII
  • Part IX Market intermediation
    • Introduction to Part VIII
    • 22 Markets with intermediated goods
      • 22.1 Intermediaries as dealers
        • 22.1.1 Intermediated vs. non-intermediated trade
        • 22.1.2 Dealer vs. pure platform operator
      • 22.2 Intermediaries as matchmakers
        • 22.2.1 Divide-and-conquer strategies
        • 22.2.2 Sorting by an intermediary in a matching market
      • 22.3 Intermediaries as two-sided platforms
        • 22.3.1 The price structure for intermediation services
        • 22.3.2 Competing intermediaries
        • 22.3.3 Implications for antitrust and regulation
    • 23 Information and reputation in intermediated product markets
      • 23.1 Intermediation and information
        • 23.1.1 Information overload
        • 23.1.2 ‘Infomediaries’ and competition in search markets
        • 23.1.3 Information and recommendation networks
      • 23.2 Intermediation and reputation
        • 23.2.1 Certifying intermediaries
        • 23.2.2 Reputation systems
        • References for Part IX
  • A Game theory
    • A.1 Games in normal form and Nash equilibrium
    • A.2 Games in extensive form and subgame perfection
    • A.3 Static asymmetric-information games and Bayesian Nash equilibrium
    • A.4 Dynamic asymmetric-information games and perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium
  • B Competition policy
    • B.1 A brief historical perspective
    • B.2 Competition laws
      • B.2.1 Antitrust legislation in the USA
      • B.2.2 Competition legislation in the EU
    • B.3 Competition policy in the EU and in the USA
      • References for Appendices
  • Solutions to end-of-chapter exercises
  • Index

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