1. Bækur og afþreying
  2. Bækur og kort
  3. Námsbækur

Health Economics and Financing

Veldu vöru

Rafræn bók. Uppl. sendar á netfangið þitt eftir kaup
Rafbók til leigu í 120 daga. Útgáfa: 5
Get the product now

Efnisyfirlit

  • Front Matter
    • PREFACE
      • CHANGES FOR THE FIFTH EDITION
    • ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
    • ABOUT THE AUTHOR
    • FOREWORD
  • CHAPTER 1: CHOICES: MONEY, MEDICINE, AND HEALTH
    • QUESTIONS
    • 1.1: WHAT IS ECONOMICS?
      • FUNDAMENTAL THEOREM OF EXCHANGE
      • Terms of Trade
      • Value
      • Can We Pay Somebody to Care?
      • Financing Health Care
      • Full Cost: Paying for Medical Care
        • TABLE 1.1: Monthly Household “Out-Of-Pocket” Spending
    • 1.2: THE FLOW OF FUNDS
      • FIGURE 1.1: Two-Party Transaction
      • FIGURE 1.2: Derived Demand between Firms
      • FIGURE 1.3: Circular Flow of Funds
      • Health Care Spending in the United States
      • Sources of Financing
        • TABLE 1.2: U.S. Health Care Spending, 2012
        • FIGURE 1.4: Sources and Uses of Health Care Funds, United States, 2012
        • TABLE 1.3: Sources of Financing 1929,1970, and 2012
        • FIGURE 1.5: Health Care Flow of Funds, circa 1900
        • FIGURE 1.6: Health Care Flow of Funds, circa 2012
      • Health Care Providers: The Uses of Funds
        • TABLE 1.4: Changes in the Use of Health Care Funds over 80 Years
    • 1.3: ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES AS CONCEPTUAL TOOLS
      • Scarcity (Budget Constraints)
      • Opportunity Cost
      • Willingness to Pay
      • Trade
      • Money Flows in a Circle
      • The Margin: What Matters?
      • Maximization: Marginal Costs and Marginal Benefits
      • Choice: Are Benefits Greater than Costs?
      • Investment
      • Contracts: Complex Exchanges to Deal with Timing and Risk
      • Organizations Adapt and Evolve
      • Distribution: Who Gets What
    • 1.4: HEALTH DISPARITIES
      • TABLE 1.5: Annual Mortality Rate among Middle-Aged Men
    • 1.5: WHOSE CHOICES: PERSONAL, GROUP, OR PUBLIC?
      • DO YOU CHOOSE TO SMOKE? PERSONAL AND COLLECTIVE DECISIONS
    • 1.6: SOCIAL SCIENCE AND RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY
    • SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING
    • SUMMARY
    • PROBLEMS
    • ENDNOTES
  • CHAPTER 2: DEMAND AND SUPPLY
    • QUESTIONS
    • 2.1: THE DEMAND CURVE
      • FIGURE 2.1: Demand Curve for Artificial Hearts
      • The Diamonds–Water Paradox: An Example of Marginal Analysis
        • FIGURE 2.2: The Diamonds–Water Paradox
      • Consumer Surplus: Marginal versus Average Value of Medicine
        • Angioplasty and Aspirin
        • Perceptions: A Water–Water Paradox
      • Ceteris Paribus
      • Individual, Firm, and Market Demand Curves
    • 2.2: THE SUPPLY CURVE
      • Marginal Revenue
    • 2.3: PRICE SENSITIVITY
      • SUBSTITUTES: ANOTHER WATER PARADOX
      • FIGURE 2.3: Effect of Reducing Price on Total Revenue: Elastic, Unitary, and Inelastic Demand
      • Price Elasticity and Marginal Revenue
      • Price Discrimination
    • 2.4: IS MONEY THE ONLY PRICE?
    • 2.5: INPUTS AND PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS
      • Production Functions
      • Marginal Productivity
    • 2.6: MARKETS: THE INTERSECTION OF DEMAND AND SUPPLY
      • FIGURE 2.4: Shifting Demand and Supply
      • FIGURE 2.5: Fixed Supply and Fixed Demand
    • 2.7: NEED VERSUS DEMAND
      • How Much is a Doctor Visit Worth?
      • The Demand for Medical Care is Derived Demand
      • The Demand for Health: What Makes Medical Care Different
    • 2.8: DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH
    • 2.9: EFFICIENCY
      • TABLE 2.1: Efficiency: Steps in the Decision Process
    • SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING
    • SUMMARY
    • PROBLEMS
    • ENDNOTES
  • CHAPTER 3: COST–BENEFIT AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS
    • QUESTIONS
    • 3.1: COST–BENEFIT ANALYSIS IS ABOUT MAKING CHOICES
      • An Everyday Example: Knee Injury
        • TABLE 3.1: Cost–Benefit Analysis of Knee Injury (First Step)
        • TABLE 3.2: Knee Injury as an Example of Cost–Benefit Analysis
      • Stepwise Choices: Yes or No? How Much?
      • Calculating Marginal and Average Costs
        • TABLE 3.3: Calculating Marginal and Average Costs per Unit
      • Defining Marginal: What Is the Decision?
        • Quality Margin Example: What Treatment?
          • TABLE 3.4: Quality Margin Analysis: Which Treatment?
        • Severity Margin Example: Which Patients to Treat? How Many?
          • TABLE 3.5: Marginal Analysis: Severity (Which Patients to Treat? How Many?)
          • FIGURE 3.1: Cumulative Benefits of Treatment
          • IS IT BETTER TO LIVE NEAR A HIGH-TECH HOSPITAL?
            • Outcome of Treatment for MI by Distance from Hospital
          • ARE SOME GOOD TREATMENTS REALLY OF NO BENEFIT?
            • Arthroscopic Surgery for Osteoarthritis of the Knee
    • 3.2: MAXIMIZATION: FINDING THE OPTIMUM
      • Declining Marginal Benefits
      • Optimization: Maximum Net Benefits
        • FIGURE 3.2: Total, Net, and Marginal Benefits and Costs
      • Expected Value
    • 3.3: THE VALUE OF LIFE
      • FIGURE 3.3: Value of Life: Smoke Detector Study
    • 3.4: QUALITY-ADJUSTED LIFE YEARS (QALYs)
      • TABLE 3.6: Quality of Life Adjustment Factors
      • Discounting Over Time
      • QALY League Tables
        • TABLE 3.7: QALY Calculation: Hypothetical Example
        • TABLE 3.8: QALY League Table
    • 3.5: PERSPECTIVES: PATIENT, PROVIDER, PAYER, GOVERNMENT, SOCIETY
      • Distribution: Whose Costs and Whose Benefits?
      • CBA and Public Policy Decision Making
      • CBA Is a Limited Perspective
    • SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING
    • SUMMARY
    • PROBLEMS
    • ENDNOTES
  • CHAPTER 4: HEALTH INSURANCE: FINANCING MEDICAL CARE
    • QUESTIONS
    • 4.1: METHODS FOR COVERING RISKS
      • Savings
      • Family and Friends
      • Charity
      • Private Market Insurance Contracts
      • Social Insurance
        • WHY DO POLICE OFFICERS AND FIREFIGHTERS HAVE SUCH COMPREHENSIVE INSURANCE?
      • Strengths and Weaknesses of Different Forms of Risk Spreading
        • TABLE 4.1: Types of Risk Protection
    • 4.2: INSURANCE: THIRD-PARTY PAYMENT
      • Why Third-Party Payment?
        • TABLE 4.2: The Concentration of Personal Health Expenditures
        • FIGURE 4.1: Distribution of Individual Medical Care Expenditures
        • FIGURE 4.2: Variability Declines as the Size of the Risk-Sharing Pool Increases
      • Variability
      • Third-Party Transactions
        • FIGURE 4.3: Third-Party Contracting
        • Benefits from Exchange
      • Who Pays? How Much?
      • How Are Benefits Determined?
    • 4.3: RISK AVERSION
      • ARE YOU RISK AVERSE?
    • 4.4: ADVERSE SELECTION
      • ADVERSE SELECTION AT HARVARD: GETTING PUSHED OUT OF THE PPO
        • TABLE 4.3: Changes in Employee Premiums and Enrollment at Harvard
      • DO PEOPLE CHOOSE TO DIE?
    • 4.5: MORAL HAZARD
      • FIGURE 4.4: Moral Hazard
      • FIGURE 4.5: Amount of Moral Hazard Depends on Price
      • Welfare Losses Due to Moral Hazard
        • FIGURE 4.6: Welfare Loss due to Moral Hazard
        • WHAT HAPPENS WHEN YOUNG ADULTS LOSE HEALTH INSURANCE?
      • Ex Ante Moral Hazard
    • 4.6: TAX BENEFITS
      • TABLE 4.4: Tax Incentives for Health Benefits
    • 4.7: EFFECTS OF HEALTH INSURANCE ON LABOR MARKETS
      • FIGURE 4.7: Effect of Increased Benefits Cost on Price (Wages) and Quantity of Labor
    • 4.8: HISTORY OF HEALTH INSURANCE
    • SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING
    • SUMMARY
    • PROBLEMS
    • ENDNOTES
  • CHAPTER 5: INSURANCE CONTRACTS AND MANAGED CARE
    • QUESTIONS
    • 5.1: SOURCES OF INSURANCE
      • TABLE 5.1: Health Insurance Coverage of the U.S. Population
      • Employer-Based Group Health Insurance
        • TABLE 5.2: Annual Premiums for Employee Health Insurance Coverage, 2012
        • FIGURE 5.1: Percentage of Workers Insured by Size of Firm
      • Medicare
        • TABLE 5.3: The Twelve Standard Medicare Supplement Plans
      • Medicaid
      • State Children’s Health Insurance Program
      • Other Government Programs and Charity
      • The Uninsured
        • WHAT DO PEOPLE BUY WHEN THEY DON’T BUY HEALTH INSURANCE?
    • 5.2: CONTRACTING AND PAYMENTS
      • Insurance Companies are Financial Intermediaries
      • Risk Bearing: From Fixed Premiums to Self-Insurance
        • FIGURE 5.2: Range of Insurance Contracts
      • Purchasing Medical Care For Groups
        • Provider Payment Methods
      • Medical Loss Ratios
        • TABLE 5.4: Medical Loss Ratio (% of Premium)
      • Claim Processing
      • The Underwriting Cycle
        • FIGURE 5.3: The “Underwriting Cycle” of Health Insurance 1988–2011
      • ERISA, Taxes, and Mandated Benefits
      • Other People’s Money: Rising Costs and Mediocre Results
        • FIGURE 5.4: Real Per Capita Health Spending by Source 1960–2012
    • 5.3: CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH PLANS: HIGH DEDUCTIBLES AND HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNTS
      • SAMPLE CONSUMER-DRIVEN PLAN (CDHP/HD-HSA)
      • Defined Contribution Health Plans
    • 5.4: MANAGED CARE
      • Closed-Panel Group Practice HMOs
      • IPA-HMOs and Open Contracts
        • TABLE 5.5: Hypothetical PPO Payment
      • Managed Care Contract Provisions
        • MANAGING PHARMACY COSTS: CARVE-OUTS AND TRIPLE-TIER BENEFITS
      • The Range of Managed Care Contracts: POS, PPO, HMO
        • FIGURE 5.5: Range of Managed Care Plans
      • Management: The Distinctive Feature of Managed Care
      • Provider Networks and Legal Structure
        • FIGURE 5.6: Flow of Funds with Managed Care
      • Contractual Reforms to Control Costs
        • HOW MANAGED CARE CAN REDUCE TOTAL COSTS
    • 5.5: UNRESOLVED ISSUES: SPLIT INCENTIVES, DIVIDED LOYALTIES
    • SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING
    • SUMMARY
    • PROBLEMS
    • ENDNOTES
  • CHAPTER 6: PHYSICIANS
    • QUESTIONS
    • 6.1: FINANCING PHYSICIAN SERVICES: REVENUES
      • TYPES OF PHYSICIAN PAYMENT
      • RBRVS FEE SCHEDULE
        • Relative Value Scale
          • TABLE 6.1: Proposed Relative Value Units for Ten Physician Services, CY 2003
        • Conversion Factor
        • Fee Updates
      • Copayments, Assignment, and Balance Billing
      • Physician Payment in Managed Care Plans
      • Incentives: Why Differences in the Type of Payment Matter
      • A Progression: From Prices to Reimbursement Mechanisms
    • 6.2: PHYSICIAN INCOMES
      • TABLE 6.2: Physician Supply
      • TABLE 6.3: Physician Incomes
    • 6.3: PHYSICIAN FINANCING: EXPENSES
      • Physician Practice Expenses
        • TABLE 6.4: Physicians' Office Practice Income and Expenses
      • The Labor versus Leisure Choice
      • The Doctor’s Workshop and Unpaid Hospital Inputs
      • Malpractice
    • 6.4: THE MEDICAL TRANSACTION
      • Asymmetric Information
      • Agency: Whose Choices?
    • 6.5: UNCERTAINTY
      • FIGURE 6.1: Uncertainty in Medical Care
    • 6.6: LICENSURE: QUALITY OR PROFITS?
      • How Does Licensure Increase Physician Profits?
        • FIGURE 6.2: Demand and Supply with Licensure
      • Supply and Demand Response in Licensed versus Unlicensed Professions
        • FIGURE 6.3: Comparison of Demand Increase with and without Licensure
      • How Does Licensure Improve Quality?
      • A Test of the Quality Hypothesis: Strong versus Weak Licensure
        • TABLE 6.5: Weak versus Strong Licensure
    • SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING
    • SUMMARY
    • PROBLEMS
    • ENDNOTES
  • CHAPTER 7: MEDICAL EDUCATION, ORGANIZATION, AND BUSINESS PRACTICES
    • QUESTIONS
    • 7.1: MEDICAL EDUCATION
    • 7.2: THE ORIGINS OF LICENSURE AND LINKAGE TO MEDICAL EDUCATION
      • AMA Controls over Physician Supply, 1930–1965
        • FIGURE 7.1: Physician Supply per 1,000 Population
      • Breaking the Contract: The Great Medical Student Expansion of 1970–1980
        • FIGURE 7.2: Additions to Physician Supply, 1950–2010
      • Building Pressure: Fixed Domestic Graduation Rates, 1980–2010
    • 7.3: ADJUSTING PHYSICIAN SUPPLY
      • The Flow of New Entrants and the Stock of Physicians
        • FIGURE 7.3: Stock and Flow of Physicians
      • Immigration of International Medical Graduates
      • Growth in Non-MD Physicians
      • Balancing Supply and Incomes: Tracing the Past and Projecting the Future
    • 7.4: GROUP PRACTICE: HOW ORGANIZATION AND TECHNOLOGY AFFECT TRANSACTIONS
      • COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS
    • 7.5: KICKBACKS, SELF-DEALING, AND SIDE PAYMENTS
    • 7.6: PRICE DISCRIMINATION
      • FIGURE 7.4: Price Discrimination by Patient Type
      • FIGURE 7.5: Price Discrimination by Insurance Status
    • 7.7: PRACTICE VARIATIONS
      • FIGURE 7.6: Variation in Age-Adjusted Rates of Hospitalization for Different Diagnoses and Procedures
    • 7.8: INSURANCE, PRICE COMPETITION, AND THE STRUCTURE OF MEDICAL MARKETS
      • UNCERTAINTY REGARDING HORMONE REPLACEMENT THERAPY
      • NO MORE DR. WELBY
      • WHY THE HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET IS MORE PRICE COMPETITIVE
    • 7.9: CHOICES BY AND FOR PHYSICIANS
    • SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING
    • SUMMARY
    • PROBLEMS
    • ENDNOTES
  • CHAPTER 8: HOSPITALS
    • QUESTIONS
    • 8.1: FROM CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS TO CORPORATE CHAINS: DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN HOSPITAL
    • 8.2: HOSPITAL FINANCING: REVENUES
      • TABLE 8.1: Hospital Characteristics
      • Sources of Revenues
        • MAJOR TYPES OF HOSPITAL REIMBURSEMENT
        • Philanthropy and Grants
        • Global Budgets
        • Charges
        • Per Diem
        • Cost Reimbursement
        • Diagnostically Related Groups
        • Capitation
          • CASE RATES ADJUSTED FOR SPECIAL SITUATIONS *
            • Short-Stay Outliers
            • Transfers and Readmissions
            • Patients Who Die
            • High-Cost Outliers
        • Managed-Care Contracts
    • 8.3: HOSPITAL FINANCING: EXPENSES
    • 8.4: FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND COST SHIFTING
    • 8.5: HOW DO HOSPITALS COMPETE?
      • Competing for Patients
      • Competing for Physicians
      • Competing for Contracts
        • TABLE 8.2: Competition between Hospitals
      • Measuring Competitive Success
      • Measuring the Competitiveness of Markets
    • 8.6: ORGANIZATION: WHO CONTROLS THE HOSPITAL AND FOR WHAT ENDS?
      • Who Gets the Profits from a Nonprofit Hospital?
    • SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING
    • SUMMARY
    • PROBLEMS
    • ENDNOTES
  • CHAPTER 9: MANAGEMENT AND REGULATION OF HOSPITAL COSTS
    • QUESTIONS
    • 9.1: WHY DO SOME HOSPITALS COST MORE THAN OTHERS?
      • REASONS FOR DIFFERENCES IN HOSPITAL COSTS
    • 9.2: HOW MANAGEMENT CONTROLS COSTS
      • Short-Run versus Long-Run Cost Functions
        • FIGURE 9.1: Cost per Unit Varies with Plant Size
        • FIGURE 9.2: Long-Run Average Cost Curve
      • Uncertainty and Budgeting
        • FIGURE 9.3: How Organizations Deal with Change
    • 9.3: CONFLICT BETWEEN ECONOMIC THEORY AND ACCOUNTING MEASURES OF PER UNIT COST
      • Timing
        • TABLE 9.1: Accounting versus Economic Cost per Unit with Short-Run Fluctuations
        • FIGURE 9.4: Accounting versus Economic Costs
        • FIGURE 9.5: A Specialized Plant Has Lower Cost within a Narrow Range, but the Flexible Plant Has Wider Range
      • Whose Costs?
    • 9.4: ECONOMIES OF SCALE
      • TABLE 9.2: Average Cost per Adjusted Patient-Day by Hospital Size
      • The Hospital Is a Multiproduct Firm
      • Contracting Out
    • 9.5: QUALITY AND COST
      • Technology: Cutting Costs or Enhancing Quality?
      • Improved Efficiency May Raise Total Spending
        • TABLE 9.3: Total Spending Can Rise Even as Greater Efficiency Reduces Costs per Unit
    • 9.6: HOSPITAL CHARGES, COSTS, AND PRICES: CONFUSION AND CHAOS
      • TABLE 9.4: State Variations in Payments to Five Different Hospitals by One Insurance Company
      • TABLE 9.5: National Range of Insurance Payments for Diagnostic Imaging
      • Chargemaster and Negotiated Fees
      • Cost Finding: Gross Revenues and the RCCAC
      • Medicare as a Standard for Pricing
        • REASONS CHARGES (AND AMOUNTS PAID) VARY AMONG HOSPITALS
    • 9.7: CONTROLLING HOSPITAL COSTS THROUGH REGULATION
      • TABLE 9.6: Hospital Costs per Patient-Day, 1950–2009
      • FIGURE 9.6: Hospital Costs per Patient-Day 1950–2009
      • TYPES OF REGULATION TO CONTROL HOSPITAL COSTS
    • SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING
    • SUMMARY
    • PROBLEMS
    • ENDNOTES
  • CHAPTER 10: LONG-TERM CARE
    • QUESTIONS
    • 10.1: DEVELOPMENT OF THE LONG-TERM CARE MARKET
      • TABLE 10.1: Changes in the Long-Term Care Market
      • TABLE 10.2: Percentage of Population in a Nursing Home, by Age
    • 10.2: AGE AND HEALTH CARE SPENDING
      • TABLE 10.2: Per Capita Personal Health Expenditures * by Age Group, 1953–2004
      • FIGURE 10.1: Health Care Spending Ratio: Old vs. Average vs. Young, 1953–2004
    • 10.3: DEFINING LTC: TYPES OF CARE
      • TABLE 10.4: Dimensions of Long-Term Care Need
      • TABLE 10.5: Activities of Daily Living (ADL) Evaluation Form
      • TABLE 10.6: Breakdown of Nursing Home Costs
    • 10.4: MEDICAID: NURSING HOMES AS A TWO-PART MARKET
      • FIGURE 10.2: Nursing Home Sources and Uses of Funds
      • FIGURE 10.3: Two-Part Nursing Home Market
    • 10.5: CERTIFICATE OF NEED: WHOSE NEEDS?
      • Money and Quality
      • Competing for Certificates of Need, Not for Patients
        • Who Gets to Build?
        • Who Pays?
      • Evidence on the Effects of Certificates of Need
    • 10.6: COST CONTROL BY SUBSTITUTION
    • 10.7: CASE-MIX REIMBURSEMENT
      • HOW MANY VISITS? GAMING THE MEDICARE PAYMENT SYSTEM
        • FIGURE 10.4: Unusual Distribution of Home Health Therapy Visits, 2007
    • 10.8: LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE
      • Is Long-Term Care “Medical”?
        • REASONS THAT LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE IS NOT POPULAR
    • 10.9: RETIREMENT, ASSISTED LIVING, AND THE WEALTHY ELDERLY
      • TABLE 10.7: Average Income and Wealth for Different Age Categories
    • 10.10: FINANCIAL REIMBURSEMENT CYCLES
      • STAGES IN THE REIMBURSEMENT CYCLE
    • SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING
    • SUMMARY
    • PROBLEMS
    • ENDNOTES
  • CHAPTER 11: PHARMACEUTICALS
    • QUESTIONS
    • 11.1: PHARMACEUTICAL REVENUES: SOURCES OF FINANCING
      • TABLE 11.1: Sources of Funds for Pharmaceuticals Products
      • TABLE 11.2: Pharmaceutical Sales, R&D, and Profits
      • Inpatient Pharmaceuticals
    • 11.2: USES OF FUNDS
      • Retail Pharmacies
        • FIGURE 11.1: Flow of Pharmaceutical Funds
      • Wholesalers
      • Insurance Companies and PBMs
      • Pharmaceutical Firms
        • TABLE 11.3: Uses of Funds for Pharmaceutical Products
      • Cost Structure
    • 11.3: HISTORY AND REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTICALS
      • TABLE 11.4: Major Legislation Affecting Pharmaceuticals
    • 11.4: RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
      • FIGURE 11.2: Stages of Drug Testing
    • 11.5: PHARMACOECONOMICS AND TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
    • 11.6: INDUSTRY STRUCTURE AND COMPETITION
      • STRATEGIC PROTECTION OF PATENTS ... AND PROFITS
      • Value, Cost, and Marketing
      • The Role of Middlemen: Distribution versus Marketing
        • STEPPING UP IN PRICE: PROVIGIL TO NUVIGIL
      • Research Productivity
        • CLARITIN: DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING, OVER-THE-COUNTER MEDICATION, AND PRICING
    • SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING
    • SUMMARY
    • PROBLEMS
    • ENDNOTES
  • CHAPTER 12: FINANCING AND OWNERSHIP OF HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS
    • QUESTIONS
    • 12.1: WHAT IS FINANCING?
    • 12.2: VALUE AND RATE OF RETURN
      • The Time Value of Money
      • Interest Rates and Present Value
      • IRR: The Internal Rate of Return
        • SPREADSHEET TIMELINE FOR NPV AND INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN
          • TABLE 12.1: Spreadsheet Timeline for NPV and IRR
      • Human Capital: Medical Education as an Investment
        • TABLE 12.2: Returns on Investment for a Professional Education
      • Risk
        • SPREADSHEET FOR EXPECTED NPV AND RISKY RETURNS
          • TABLE 12.3: Spreadsheet Timeline for Expected NPV and Risky Rates of Return
      • Valuing Assets
    • 12.3: UNCORRELATED (INDEPENDENT) AND CORRELATED (SYSTEM) RISKS
      • Which Is Riskier: Nursing Homes or Drug Companies?
      • Assessing Business Risk
    • 12.4: OWNERSHIP AND AGENCY
      • Equity and Debt
      • Who Owns the Business? Who Owns the Patient? Agency Issues
      • The Role of Financial Intermediaries
    • 12.5: CAPITAL FINANCING: HOSPITALS
      • THE ALLEGHENY BANKRUPTCY *
    • 12.6: HMO OWNERSHIP AND CAPITAL MARKETS: SUCCESS AND FAILURE
      • Business Risks for an HMO
      • Kaiser Health Plan: The Evolution of an HMO
      • Group Health Association: A Consumer Co-op Gets Bought Out by a Franchise Chain
    • 12.7: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND PROFITS
      • U.S. Healthcare: A Profitable Growth Company
    • 12.8: HEALH CARE FOR PROFIT, OR NOT
      • Differences Between For-Profit and Nonprofit Behavior
      • Charity Care: For Real or for Show?
      • For-Profit or Not-for-Profit: Which is Better?
      • Medical Care is Difficult: Risk, Information Asymmetry, Social Justice
    • SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING
    • SUMMARY
    • PROBLEMS
    • ENDNOTES
  • CHAPTER 13: MACROECONOMICS OF MEDICAL CARE
    • QUESTIONS
    • 13.1: WHAT IS MACRO?
      • Health System Properties
      • Micro and Macro Perspectives on Spending
        • FIGURE 13.1: U.S. Income per Capita and Health Expenditures per Capita, 1950–2005
    • 13.2: THE CONSUMPTION FUNCTION
      • INCOME ELASTICITY
      • The Permanent Income Hypothesis
      • Shared Income
      • Public and Private Decisions
      • Budget Constraints: Borders that Matter
    • 13.3: ADJUSTING TO CHANGE: DYNAMICS
      • Permanent Income and Adjustment of Health Spending to GDP
        • FIGURE 13.2: Annual Percentage Change in Employment, United States, 2005–2012
      • Adjustment to Inflation
        • TABLE 13.1: Adjustment to Inflation
        • ARE RECESSIONS GOOD FOR YOUR HEALTH?
        • TABLE 13.2: How Inflation Distorts Reported Health Expenditures
      • Adjustment to GDP: Rates of Change and Time Series Analysis
        • FIGURE 13.3: Annual Percentage Rates of Change
        • FIGURE 13.4: Annual Percentage Rates of Change (Lagged Moving Average)
    • 13.4: FORECASTING FUTURE HEALTH EXPENDITURES
    • 13.5: COST CONTROLS: SPENDING GAPS AND THE PUSH TO REGULATE
      • FIGURE 13.5: Macroeconomic Shock
      • Capacity Constraints and Budget Constraints
    • 13.6: WORKFORCE DYNAMICS: “SPENDING” IS MOSTLY LABOR
      • Employment
        • TABLE 13.3: U.S. Health Care Employment, 1850–2000
        • TABLE 13.4: Trends in Employment in the Health Care Sector
        • FIGURE 13.6: U.S. Employment 1990–2012
        • FIGURE 13.7: Health Employment Adjusts Slowly
      • Wages
        • FIGURE 13.8: Effect of Medicare on Health Employment in Subsequent Years
        • THE IRON LAW: MEDICAL COSTS = MEDICAL INCOMES
    • SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING
    • SUMMARY
    • PROBLEMS
    • ENDNOTES
  • CHAPTER 14: THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC GOODS
    • QUESTIONS
    • 14.1: THE ROLES OF GOVERNMENT
      • Markets are Perfectly Efficient, but Only with Perfect Competition
      • Government in a Mixed Economy
        • TABLE 14.1: Varieties of Government Action
      • How Government Works
      • The Voluntary Sector
      • Government is Necessary, and Costly
      • Markets are Costly, Limited, and Always Regulated
    • 14.2: GOVERNMENT HEALTH FINANCING
      • FIGURE 14.1: Sources of Health Financing (% of GDP)
      • TABLE 14.2: Distribution of Government Funds
    • 14.3: LAW AND ORDER
    • 14.4: PUBLIC GOODS AND EXTERNALITIES
      • Privatizing Public Goods
      • Insurance Makes Any Good More Public
      • Externalities
      • The Coase Theorem: Transaction Costs and Property Rights
    • 14.5: MONOPOLY AND MARKET FAILURE
      • FIGURE 14.2: Welfare Loss Due to Monopoly Pricing
    • 14.6: INFORMATION
      • Rational Consumer Ignorance
      • Social Costs Depend on the Number of People
      • Milk or Bread: Which Is More Public?
      • Infectious Disease Externalities
      • Epidemics
      • The Sanitary Revolution: A Moral Campaign for Public Health
      • Formation of the U.S. Public Health Service
    • 14.7: DRUGS, SEX, AND WAR: PUBLIC HEALTH IN ACTION
      • Addiction
      • Sexual Behavior
      • Who Counts as a Citizen? Abortion and Other Dilemmas
      • War and Public Health
    • 14.8: POLITICS, REGULATION, AND COMPETITION
      • Politicians: Entrepreneurs Who Try to Get Votes
      • Government as the Citizen’s Agent
        • Public Welfare Maximization
        • Regulatory Capture
        • Bureaucratic Objectives
        • Political Interest Group Balance
      • Public Goods Make Almost Everybody Better Off But Nobody Happy
      • Winners and Losers
    • 14.9: TRUST, CARE, AND DISTRIBUTION
    • SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING
    • SUMMARY
    • PROBLEMS
    • ENDNOTES
  • CHAPTER 15: HISTORY, DEMOGRAPHY, AND THE GROWTH OF MODERN MEDICINE
    • QUESTIONS
    • 15.1: ECONOMIC GROWTH HAS DETERMINED THE SHAPE OF HEALTH CARE
    • 15.2: BIRTH RATES, DEATH RATES, AND POPULATION GROWTH
    • 15.3: THE STONE AGE
    • 15.4: THE AGRICULTURAL AGE
      • Investment and Trade
      • Civilization, War, and Government
      • The Decline of Civilizations Leads to Population Declines
        • IMPLOSION OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY CAUSES DRAMATIC DECLINES IN LIFE EXPECTANCY
      • The Plague
      • Food Supply Determines Population
      • The Rise of Economics
      • The Malthusian Hypothesis
        • ECONOMIC MODELING
    • 15.5: THE INDUSTRIAL AGE
      • Why Malthus Was Wrong
      • Demographic Transition
        • FIGURE 15.1: Demographic Transition
      • Demographic Change, Income Distribution, and the Rise of the Middle Classes
        • FIGURE 15.2: Distribution of Income at Different Stages of Development
    • 15.6: THE INFORMATION AGE
    • 15.7: INCOME AND HEALTH
      • TABLE 15.1: Timeline: Economic History, Population Growth, and Medical Care
      • TABLE 15.2: Mortality Ratios by Social Class 1931–1981
    • 15.8: REDUCING UNCERTAINTY: THE VALUE OF LIFE AND ECONOMIC SECURITY
      • The Value of Risk Reduction
        • TABLE 15.3: Changes in the Estimated Value of Life, 1900–2000
      • Social Security and Health Insurance
    • 15.9: THE RISE OF MODERN MEDICINE
      • Preconditions for Change
      • The Growth of Medical Science and Technology
      • Did Better Medical Care Increase Life Expectancy?
    • SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING
    • SUMMARY
    • PROBLEMS
    • ENDNOTES
  • CHAPTER 16: INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF HEALTH AND HEALTH EXPENDITURES
    • QUESTIONS
    • 16.1: WIDE DIFFERENCES AMONG NATIONS
      • TABLE 16.1: Comparison of Health and Expenditures across Nations, 2006
      • Size of the Market
        • FIGURE 16.1: International Comparisons of Market Sizes
    • 16.2: MICRO VERSUS MACRO ALLOCATION: HEALTH AS A NATIONAL LUXURY GOOD
      • FIGURE 16.2: Per-Capita Health Expenditures Related to Income
      • FIGURE 16.3: Micro and Macro Determinants of Health Spending
    • 16.3: CAUSALITY: DOES MORE SPENDING IMPROVE HEALTH?
      • FIGURE 16.4: Life Expectancy and Income per Capita
    • 16.4: LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES
      • Health Care in Ghana*
        • TABLE 16.2: Health Economic Indicators for Ghana
      • Sudan*
    • 16.5: MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES
      • China*
        • FIGURE 16.5: Trends in Total Expenditure on Health in China, 1978–2010
        • FIGURE 16.6: Composition of Total Expenditure on Health in China, 1978–2010, Using International Calculation Methods
        • TABLE 16.3: Types and Numbers of Health Facilities in China, 2010
        • TABLE 16.4: Health Professionals and Beds per Thousand Population in China, 1980–2010
        • FIGURE 16.7: China’s Major National Health Protection Schemes
      • The Health Care System of Mexico
        • TABLE 16.5: Health Insurance Coverage in Mexico
      • Poland
    • 16.6: HIGH-INCOME COUNTRIES
      • FIGURE 16.8: Health Expenditures and Life Expectancy across Countries
      • TABLE 16.6: Japan’s Health Expenditures in 2010 by Type of System and by Fund
      • Health Care in Japan*
        • Japan’s Health Expenditures by Types and by Fund
          • TABLE 16.7: Characteristics of Health Insurance Plans in Japan
        • Copayment System Based on Age Group
        • Biannual Fee Schedule Review for Medical Treatment and Reimbursement Price
        • Many Challenges Ahead from Demographic Changes
          • Limited Generics Penetration.
          • Financial Adjustment among Insurers and Introduction of the Public Long-Term Care Insurance Program.
          • Introduction of the Advanced Elderly Medical Service System.
          • Cost Containment Implementation at Hospitals.
      • The Health System in Germany*
      • The Expensive Exception: The United States
        • FIGURE 16.9: Female Life Expectancy at Age 50 Years: United States Compared to 20 Countries 1980–2005
        • TABLE 16.8: Procedure Prices Compared: Canada, Germany, United States
    • 16.7: INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN HEALTH CARE
      • People and Ideas
      • Services
      • Equipment
      • Pharmaceuticals
    • SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING
    • SUMMARY
    • PROBLEMS
    • ENDNOTES
  • CHAPTER 17: ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF HEALTH POLICY: THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT OF 2010
    • QUESTIONS
    • 17.1: PPACA 2010: DESCRIPTION OF MAIN ELEMENTS
      • TABLE 17.1: Health Insurance Coverage by Category, 2012 and 2021
      • Coverage Rules
        • Nondiscrimination
        • Comprehensive Benefits
        • Limited Deductibles
        • No Dollar Limit on Benefits
        • Guaranteed Renewal
        • Dependents
        • Mandated Coverage (Penalty Tax)
        • Premium Rating Bands
        • Medical Loss Ratios
        • Uniform Benefit Descriptions
        • Eligibility and Electronic Claims Submission
        • Other
      • State Health Insurance Exchanges
        • TABLE 17.2: Examples of Differences in Estimated Percentage of Actuarial Cost Covered
      • Individuals
        • CREDITS AND SUBSIDIES ON THE PPACA INSURANCE EXCHANGES
        • TABLE 17.3: Exchanges: Premiums (net of subsidy) and Maximums
      • Employers: Positive and Negative Incentives to Provide Benefits
        • WILL MEDIUM INC. CHOOSE TO PROVIDE HEALTH BENEFITS UNDER PPACA?
      • Medicare: ACOs, IPAB, Bundled Payments, and the Donut Hole
      • Medicaid: Major Expansions with Federal Funding
      • Prevention and Other Provisions of PPACA
      • Still Uninsured: The Undocumented and Some Other Outsiders
    • 17.2: STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM: AFFORDABILITY
      • Rising Costs Slowly Create a Crisis
      • The Middle Class Gets Stretched: A Leveraged Gap in Coverage
        • FIGURE 17.1: Affordability of Medical Care, 1960 to 2012
        • TABLE 17.4: A Widening Gap Between Medical Costs and Household Income
      • Macro Affordability: The Growth Gap
    • 17.3: USING EXISTING PLANS AS MODELS
      • States
      • The Federal Employees Health Benefits Plan
    • 17.4: UNRESOLVED ISSUES
      • Equity
      • Defining Essential Benefits
      • The OPM Legacy: Third-Party Payment and Cost Shifting
      • Price Transparency: A Conspiracy of Silence
      • The Uninsured: Still There, Still Have to be Paid For
        • UPDATE: AFTER THE SCOTUS DECISION
      • Unfunded Health and Retirement Benefits
      • Defined Benefits, Defined Services, or Defined Contribution
      • Who Bears the Risk?
    • SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING
    • SUMMARY
    • PROBLEMS
    • ENDNOTES
  • CHAPTER 18: VALUE FOR MONEY IN THE FUTURE OF HEALTH CARE
    • QUESTIONS
    • 18.1: FORCING THE QUESTION: WHO GETS HEALTHY AND WHO GETS PAID?
      • BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS: RATIONAL CHOICE WITH A NUDGE
    • 18.2: SPENDING MONEY OR PRODUCING HEALTH?
    • 18.3: DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY
      • THE VALUE OF MEDICAL PROGRESS
        • TABLE 18.1: Costs and Gains of Medical Technology
    • 18.4: DISTRIBUTION, DISTRIBUTION, DISTRIBUTION
    • 18.5: PATH DEPENDENCE AND THE POSSIBILITIES FOR REFORM
      • How Did We Get Here?
      • What Did Medicine Miss?
      • What Went Wrong? Notable Failures and Unresolved Dilemmas
    • 18.6: THE PATH FORWARD: STEP BY STEP
    • 18.7: THE SHAPE OF HEALTH CARE SPENDING TO COME
      • FIGURE 18.1: Growth Curve: Health Share of GDP 1850–2099?
    • 18.8: THE LONG RUN: 2050 AND BEYOND
      • FUTURE TRENDS
    • SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING
    • SUMMARY
    • PROBLEMS
    • ENDNOTES
  • Back Matter
    • GLOSSARY
    • INDEX

    UM RAFBÆKUR Á HEIMKAUP.IS

    Bókahillan þín er þitt svæði og þar eru bækurnar þínar geymdar. Þú kemst í bókahilluna þína hvar og hvenær sem er í tölvu eða snjalltæki. Einfalt og þægilegt!

    Þú kemst í bækurnar hvar sem er
    Þú getur nálgast allar raf(skóla)bækurnar þínar á einu augabragði, hvar og hvenær sem er í bókahillunni þinni. Engin taska, enginn kyndill og ekkert vesen (hvað þá yfirvigt).

    Auðvelt að fletta og leita
    Þú getur flakkað milli síðna og kafla eins og þér hentar best og farið beint í ákveðna kafla úr efnisyfirlitinu. Í leitinni finnur þú orð, kafla eða síður í einum smelli.

    Glósur og yfirstrikanir
    Þú getur auðkennt textabrot með mismunandi litum og skrifað glósur að vild í rafbókina. Þú getur jafnvel séð glósur og yfirstrikanir hjá bekkjarsystkinum og kennara ef þeir leyfa það. Allt á einum stað.

    Hvað viltu sjá? / Þú ræður hvernig síðan lítur út
    Þú lagar síðuna að þínum þörfum. Stækkaðu eða minnkaðu myndir og texta með multi-level zoom til að sjá síðuna eins og þér hentar best í þínu námi.



    Fleiri góðir kostir
    - Þú getur prentað síður úr bókinni (innan þeirra marka sem útgefandinn setur)
    - Möguleiki á tengingu við annað stafrænt og gagnvirkt efni, svo sem myndbönd eða spurningar úr efninu
    - Auðvelt að afrita og líma efni/texta fyrir t.d. heimaverkefni eða ritgerðir
    - Styður tækni sem hjálpar nemendum með sjón- eða heyrnarskerðingu
Eiginleikar
Vörumerki: John Wiley
Vörunúmer: 9781118633878
Taka af óskalista
Setja á óskalista

Umsagnir

Engar umsagnir
Lesa fleiri umsagnir

Health Economics and Financing

Vörumerki: John Wiley
Vörunúmer: 9781118633878
Rafræn bók. Uppl. sendar á netfangið þitt eftir kaup

Veldu vöru

4.790 kr.
Get the product now
4.790 kr.