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- LÖG106F Samkeppnisréttur I
Ensk lýsing:
Whish and Bailey's Competition Law is the definitive textbook on this subject. An authoritative treatment of competition law is paired with an easy-to-follow writing style to make this book a comprehensive guide to the subject; essential reading for law students, practitioners, and officials. The authors explain the purpose of competition policy, introduce the reader to key concepts and techniques in competition law and provide insights into the numerous different issues that arise when analysing market behaviour.
Describing the law in its economic and market context, they particularly consider the competition law implications of business phenomena, including distribution agreements, licences of intellectual property rights, cartels, joint ventures, and mergers. The book assimilates a wide variety of resources, including judgments, decisions, guidelines, and periodical literature. An authoritative treatment of competition law is paired with an easy-to-follow writing style to make this book a comprehensive guide to the subject, regularly used in universities, law firms, economic consultancies, competition authorities, and courts.
Lýsing:
Whish and Bailey's Competition Law is the definitive textbook on this subject. An authoritative treatment of competition law is paired with an easy-to-follow writing style to make this comprehensive guide essential reading for law students, practitioners, and officials. The authors explain the purpose of competition policy, introduce the reader to key concepts and techniques in competition law, and provide insights into the numerous issues that arise when analysing market behaviour.
Describing the law in its economic and market context, they particularly consider the competition law implications of business phenomena such as distribution agreements, licences of intellectual property rights, cartels, joint ventures, and mergers. The book assimilates a wide variety of resources, including judgments, decisions, guidelines, and periodical literature. This definitive guide to competition law is regularly used in universities, law firms, economic consultancies, competition authorities and courts.
Annað
- Höfundar: Richard Whish, David Bailey
- Útgáfa:10
- Útgáfudagur: 2021-08-26
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- Format:ePub
- ISBN 13: 9780192607133
- Print ISBN: 9780192607126
- ISBN 10: 0192607138
Efnisyfirlit
- Cover
- Title Page
- Copyright page
- Preface to the tenth edition
- New to this edition
- Table of treaties and conventions
- Table of EU legislation
- Regulations
- Decisions
- Directives
- Rules
- Table of statutes and statutory instruments
- National Legislation
- Australia
- Austria
- Canada
- France
- Germany
- Hungary
- India
- Ireland
- Italy
- Mexico
- Poland
- South Africa
- United Kingdom
- United States
- Secondary Legislation
- National Legislation
- Table of CMA reports, decisions and publications
- Decisions
- Publications
- Reports
- Table of guidelines, guidance and other publications
- International Bodies
- European Union
- National Bodies
- Australia
- Canada
- Singapore
- United Kingdom
- United States, 520
- International Bodies
- Table of European Cases
- Commission Decisions
- European Court of Justice
- Numerical Table of General Court Cases
- Alphabetical Table of General Court Cases
- Numerical Table of Court of Justice Cases
- Alphabetical Table of Court of Justice Cases
- European Ombudsman
- Opinions of the Court of Justice
- International Courts and Tribunals
- European Court of Human Rights
- EFTA
- National courts and tribunals
- Australia
- Austria
- Belgium
- Bulgaria
- Canada
- Denmark
- France
- Germany
- Hong Kong
- Hungary
- Ireland
- Italy
- Lithuania
- Netherlands
- Portugal
- Russia
- Serbia
- Singapore
- Spain
- United Kingdom
- Competition Appeal Tribunal
- FCA
- OFCOM
- Office of Rail and Road (ORR)
- OFGEM
- OFT
- OFTEL
- OFWAT
- United States
- 1. Introduction
- (A) The growth of competition law
- (B) Competition law and economics
- (C) Plan of this chapter
- 2. Overview of the Practices Controlled by Competition Law
- 3. The Theory of Competition
- (A) The benefits of competition
- (i) Allocative efficiency
- (ii) Productive efficiency
- (iii) Dynamic efficiency
- (B) The harmful effects of monopoly
- (C) Limits to the benefits of competition
- (i) The model of perfect competition is based on assumptions unlikely to be observed in practice
- (ii) Competition is not a panacea to cure all problems
- (iii) Agreements to restrict competition may be beneficial
- (iv) Natural monopolies: economies of scale and scope
- (v) Network effects and tipping
- (a) Network effects
- (b) Tipping
- (c) Competition policy implications
- (A) The benefits of competition
- (D) Competition policy in times of crisis
- (E) Competitions are there to be won
- (F) Empirical evidence
- (G) Effective competition
- (H) Conclusion
- (A) The consumer welfare standard
- (B) The Chicago School and consumer welfare
- (C) The Neo-Brandeisian School
- (D) Consumer welfare in the EU and the UK
- (A) Market definition
- (B) The purpose of market definition
- (C) Circumstances in which it is necessary to define the relevant market
- (i) EU competition law
- (ii) UK competition law
- (D) The relevant product market
- (i) The legal test
- (ii) Measuring interchangeability
- (iii) The Commission’s Notice on the Definition of the Relevant Market for the Purposes of [EU] Competition Law
- (iv) Demand-side substitutability and the SSNIP test
- (v) The ‘Cellophane Fallacy’
- (vi) Supply-side substitutability
- (vii) Evidence relied on to define relevant markets
- (viii) Examples of evidence that may be used in defining the relevant product market
- (a) Evidence of substitution in the recent past
- (b) Quantitative tests
- (c) Views of customers and competitors
- (d) Marketing studies and consumer surveys
- (e) Barriers and costs associated with switching demand to potential substitutes
- (f) Different categories of customers and price discrimination
- (ix) Some specific problems of market definition
- (a) Spare parts and the aftermarket
- (b) Procurement markets
- (c) Innovation markets
- (d) Two-sided and the economics of ‘free’
- (i) The legal test
- (ii) The Commission’s Notice on Market Definition
- (iii) Examples of evidence that may be used in defining the relevant geographic market
- (a) Past evidence of diversion of orders to other areas
- (b) Basic demand characteristics
- (c) Views of customers and competitors
- (d) Current geographic pattern of purchases
- (e) Trade flows/patterns of shipments
- (f) Barriers and switching costs associated with the diversion of orders to companies located in other areas
- (i) The relevance of market power
- (ii) The meaning of market power
- (iii) The assessment of market power
- (iv) Actual competitors
- (a) Market shares
- (b) Market concentration and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
- Example 1
- Example 2
- Example 3
- 1. Introduction
- 2. EU Law
- (A) The EU Treaties
- (i) The competition chapter in the TFEU
- (ii) The single market imperative
- (iii) Economic and monetary union
- (iv) The modernisation of EU competition law
- (v) The coronavirus crisis
- (B) Institutions
- (i) Council of the European Union
- (ii) European Commission
- (iii) General Court
- (iv) Court of Justice
- (v) Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions
- (vi) Advisory Committee on Concentrations
- (vii) National competition authorities
- (viii) National courts
- (ix) European Parliament
- (C) European Economic Area
- (D) Modelling of domestic competition law on Articles 101 and 102
- (A) The EU Treaties
- 3. UK Law
- (A) Competition Act 1998
- (B) Enterprise Act 2002
- (C) Changes to domestic law as a result of Regulation 1/2003
- (D) Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013
- (E) Consumer Rights Act 2015
- (F) Brexit
- (G) Reform
- (H) Institutions
- (i) Secretary of State and the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
- (a) Appointments
- (b) Amendment of legislation, the adoption of delegated legislation and the making or approval of guidance
- (c) Receipt of performance report
- (d) Involvement in individual cases
- (ii) The Lord Chancellor
- (iii) The CMA
- (a) Establishment of the CMA
- (b) The CMA Board
- (c) The CMA Panel
- (d) The staff of the CMA
- (e) The CMA’s strategy
- (f) Performance framework
- (g) Annual Reports on performance and concurrency
- (h) Functions of the CMA
- (i) Rules
- (j) Publications, information, guidance etc
- (iv) Serious Fraud Office
- (v) Sectoral regulators
- (vi) Competition Appeal Tribunal
- (a) Establishment of the CAT
- (b) Functions of the CAT
- (c) Rules
- (vii) Civil courts
- (viii) Criminal courts
- (i) Secretary of State and the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
- (A) Introduction
- (B) Regulation 1/2003
- (i) Obligation to apply Articles 101 and 102
- (ii) Conflicts: Article 101
- (iii) Conflicts: Article 102
- (iv) Protection of ‘other legitimate interests’
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Undertakings and Associations of Undertakings
- (A) Meaning of undertaking
- (i) Need to adopt a functional approach
- (ii) ‘Engaged in an economic activity’
- (a) Offering goods or services on a given market is an economic activity
- (b) No need for a profit-motive or economic purpose
- (c) ‘Regardless of the legal status of the entity and the way in which it is financed’
- (iii) Activities that are not economic
- (a) Solidarity
- (b) Activities connected with the exercise of the powers of a public authority are not economic
- (c) Procurement that is ancillary to a non-economic activity is not economic
- (iv) The professions
- (v) Employees, trades unions and collective labour relations
- (a) Employees
- (b) Trades unions
- (c) Collective labour relations
- (A) Meaning of undertaking
- (B) ‘Associations of undertakings’
- (i) Meaning of association of undertakings
- (ii) Need to adopt a functional approach
- (C) The ‘single economic entity’ doctrine
- (i) Meaning of single economic entity
- (ii) The Viho judgment
- (iii) The test of decisive influence
- (a) Parent and wholly owned subsidiaries
- (b) Majority shareholders
- (c) Minority shareholders
- (d) Parents of a joint venture
- (iv) Decisions where the single economic entity doctrine did not apply
- (v) Implications of the economic entity doctrine
- (D) Corporate reorganisation
- (E) Liability for competition law infringements when one business is sold to another
- (A) Agreements
- (i) Examples of agreements
- (ii) Factors that do not affect the existence of an agreement
- (iii) Agreement ‘and/or’ concerted practice
- (iv) Single and continuous infringement
- (a) Introduction
- (b) Conditions for establishing an SCI
- (c) Implications of a finding of an SCI
- (d) Partial liability for an SCI
- (e) Single and repeated infringement
- (v) ‘Unilateral’ conduct and Article 101(1) in vertical cases
- (a) AEG-Telefunken v Commission; Ford v Commission
- (b) Subsequent cases prior to Bayer
- (c) Bayer v Commission
- (d) Cases following Bayer
- (e) Comment
- (i) Meaning of concerted practice
- (ii) Must a concerted practice have been put into effect? The need for a ‘causal connection’
- (iii) Proof of a concerted practice
- (iv) Concluding comment on concerted practices
- (A) Horizontal and vertical agreements
- (B) Horizontal agreements: actual and potential competition
- (i) Paroxetine: the meaning of potential competition
- (ii) Cases on potential competition
- (C) The ‘object or effect’ of preventing, restricting or distorting competition
- (i) ‘Object or effect’ to be read disjunctively
- (ii) The ‘object’ and ‘effect’ boxes
- (iii) Why does Article 101(1) prohibit object restrictions without proof of anti-competitive effects?
- (D) Agreements that have as their object the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition
- (i) Meaning of ‘object’
- (ii) The legal test for identifying restrictions by object
- (a) Introduction
- (b) Groupement des Cartes Bancaires
- (c) Comment on the Cartes Bancaires judgment
- (iii) How much analysis is required to allocate cases to the object box?
- (iv) Object restrictions and the de minimis doctrine
- (v) Is it possible to justify object restrictions under Article 101(3)?
- (vi) Object restrictions and per se rules under the Sherman Act
- (vii) The contents of the object box
- (a) Price fixing and exchanges of information about prices
- (b) Market sharing, quotas, collective exclusive dealing
- (c) Pay for delay agreements
- (d) Controlling outlets; export bans
- (e) Allianz Hungária Biztosító
- (f) Benchmark manipulation
- (i) Meaning of ‘effect’
- (ii) The need to establish a ‘counterfactual’
- (iii) Effects analysis
- (i) Jurisprudence on objective necessity
- (ii) The objective necessity defence and the rule of reason
- (i) Notice on sub-contracting agreements
- (ii) Notice on the application of the competition rules to cross-border credit transfers
- (iii) Notice on the application of the competition rules to the postal sector
- (iv) Notice on the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the telecommunications sector
- (v) Notice regarding restrictions directly related and necessary to the concentration
- (vi) Notice on agreements of minor importance
- (vii) Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in Articles [101 and 102 TFEU]
- (viii) Guidelines on the application of Article [101(3) TFEU]
- (ix) Guidelines on the application of Article 101 TFEU to technology transfer agreements
- (x) Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice
- (xi) Guidelines on vertical restraints
- (xii) Guidelines on horizontal cooperation agreements
- (A) Introduction
- (B) The Commission’s Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance
- (i) Part I of the Notice: introductory paragraphs
- (ii) Part II of the Notice: the threshold
- (iii) Part II of the Notice: the treatment of object restrictions
- (C) Other examples of non-appreciability
- (A) The effect on trade criterion
- (i) General principles
- (ii) The concept of ‘trade between Member States’
- (iii) The notion ‘may affect’
- (iv) The concept of appreciability
- (a) Small and medium-sized businesses
- (b) A negative rebuttable presumption of non-appreciability
- (c) A positive rebuttable presumption of appreciability
- 1. Introduction
- (A) Burden and standard of proof
- (B) The relationship between Article 101(1) and 101(3)
- (C) The conditions of Article 101(3) are cumulative
- (D) Any type of anti-competitive agreement can be defended under Article 101(3)
- (i) Restrictions of competition by object and Article 101(3)
- (ii) Fixing prices and Article 101(3)
- (A) First condition of Article 101(3): an improvement in the production or distribution of goods or in technical or economic progress
- (i) The agreement must produce objective advantages
- (ii) The benefits must be substantiated
- (iii) Economic and non-economic benefits
- (iv) A narrow view of Article 101(3)
- (v) A broader view of Article 101(3)
- (vi) Comment
- (vii) The Commission’s approach in the Article 101(3) Guidelines
- (a) Cost efficiencies
- (b) Qualitative efficiencies
- (i) The efficiencies must be specific to the agreement
- (ii) The indispensability of individual restrictions
- (i) Cost efficiencies
- (ii) Qualitative efficiencies
- (i) The relationship between Article 101(3) and Article 102
- (ii) Determining whether competition will be substantially eliminated
- (A) The Commission’s former monopoly over the grant of individual exemptions
- (B) The end of the system of notification for individual exemption
- (C) Self-assessment
- (D) Application of Article 101(3) in practice
- (i) Article 9 commitments
- (ii) Article 10 declarations of inapplicability
- (iii) Informal guidance
- (iv) The non-prosecution of beneficial agreements
- (E) Notification and individual exemptions under domestic law
- (A) Role of block exemptions
- (B) Vires and block exemptions currently in force
- (i) Council Regulation 19/65
- (ii) Council Regulation 2821/71
- (iii) Council Regulation 1534/91
- (iv) Council Regulation 169/2009
- (v) Council Regulation 246/2009
- (vi) Council Regulation 487/2009
- (C) The format of block exemptions
- (D) Expiry of block exemptions
- (E) Future of block exemptions
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Undertakings
- 3. The Effect on Inter-State Trade
- 4. Dominant Position
- (A) Market definition
- (B) Measuring market power
- (C) Actual competitors
- (i) Statutory monopolies
- (ii) The relevance of market shares
- (a) The Court of Justice’s judgment in Hoffmann-La Roche
- (b) The AKZO presumption of dominance where an undertaking has a market share of 50 per cent or more
- (c) Findings of dominance below a market share of 50 per cent
- (D) Potential competitors
- (i) Legal barriers
- (ii) Economic advantages
- (iii) Switching costs and network effects
- (iv) Conduct
- (v) Performance
- (E) Countervailing buyer power
- (F) Previous findings of dominance
- (G) The degree of market power and super-dominance
- (A) Preliminary comments
- (i) Article 102 applies to the unilateral behaviour of dominant firms
- (ii) The high profile of many Article 102 cases
- (iii) The frequent application of Article 102 to abusive conduct in utility sectors
- (B) The ‘special responsibility’ of dominant firms
- (C) There is no exhaustive list of abusive conduct
- (D) Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission
- (i) Objective concept
- (ii) Recourse to methods different from those which condition normal competition
- (iii) Exploitative and exclusionary abuses
- (E) Does Article 102 protect competitors or the process of competition?
- (i) The criticism
- (ii) The response of the Commission and the Court of Justice to the criticism
- (iii) Protecting the competitive structure of the market
- (F) Administrable rules, legal formalism and effects analysis
- (i) False positives and false negatives
- (ii) Legal formalism: are there any per se rules under Article 102?
- (iii) Is it possible for conduct to be abusive ‘by object’?
- (iv) What type of effects analysis should be undertaken to find an exclusionary abuse?
- (v) What evidence is required to prove an abuse of dominance?
- (vi) What is the standard of proof?
- (G) De minimis doctrine under Article 102?
- (H) Single and continuous abuse
- (I) Speed of intervention
- (J) Judicial review
- (K) Exploitative, exclusionary and single market abuses
- (A) Continental Can v Commission
- (B) Causation
- (C) The Commission’s Guidance on Article 102 Enforcement Priorities
- (D) Horizontal and vertical foreclosure
- (E) The dominant position, the abuse and the effects of the abuse may be in different markets
- (i) Michelin v Commission
- (ii) Commercial Solvents
- (iii) Télémarketing
- (iv) Sealink/B&I—Holyhead: Interim Measures
- (v) British Gypsum v Commission
- (vi) Tetra Pak II
- (F) Examples of exclusionary abuses
- (A) Objective justification
- (B) Efficiencies
- (C) Abuse of dominance and property rights
- (D) Burden and standard of proof
- (A) Public enforcement
- (B) Private enforcement
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Article 4(3) TEU—Duty of Sincere Cooperation
- (A) The relationship between Article 4(3) TEU and Articles 101 and 102 TFEU
- (B) The case-law predominantly concerns Article 4(3) TEU in conjunction with Article 101 TFEU
- (C) The case-law on Article 4(3) and the competition rules
- (i) The INNO doctrine
- (ii) Unsuccessful application of the INNO doctrine
- (iii) Successful application of the INNO doctrine
- (a) BNIC v Yves Aubert
- (b) Vlaamse Reisbureaus v Sociale Dienst
- (c) Ahmed Saeed
- (d) Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi
- (e) Synthesis
- (iv) INNO doctrine applies only where there is an infringement of Article 101
- (D) Application of the case-law to lawyers’ fees
- 3. Article 106 TFEU—Compliance with the Treaties
- (A) Article 106(1)
- (i) Undertakings
- (ii) Public undertakings
- (iii) Undertakings with ‘special or exclusive rights’
- (a) Exclusive rights
- (b) Special rights
- (iv) ‘Measures’
- (v) The obligations on Member States under Article 106(1)
- (vi) The judgments of 1991
- (a) Höfner & Elser v Macrotron
- (b) ERT v Dimotiki
- (c) Merci Convenzionali Porto di Genova v Siderurgica Gabrielli
- (d) RTT v GB-Inno-BM
- (vii) The Corbeau judgment
- (viii) Making sense of the case-law on Article 102 in conjunction with Article 106(1)
- (a) Manifest inability to meet demand
- (b) Conflict of interest
- (c) Reservation of an ancillary activity
- (d) Corbeau
- (e) Discrimination
- ( f) Excessive pricing
- (ix) NCAs’ application of Article 106(1) in conjunction with Articles 101 and/or 102
- (x) Remedies and direct effect
- (B) Article 106(2)
- (i) Services of general economic interest
- (ii) Undertakings having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly
- (iii) Scope of the exception: obstruction of the performance of the tasks assigned
- (a) Unsuccessful claims based on Article 106(2)
- (b) Successful claims based on Article 106(2)
- (iv) Adverse development of trade
- (v) Direct effect
- (C) Article 106(3)
- (i) Decisions
- (ii) Directives
- (iii) Judicial review of the Commission’s powers under Article 106(3)
- (A) Article 106(1)
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Overview of Regulation 1/2003
- (A) Overview of Regulation 1/2003
- (B) Supporting measures
- 3. The Commission’s Enforcement Powers under Regulation 1/2003
- (A) Burden and standard of proof
- (B) Chapter II: powers
- (i) Article 4: powers of the Commission
- (ii) Article 5: powers of the NCAs
- (iii) Article 6: powers of the national courts
- (C) Chapter III: Commission decisions
- (i) Article 7: finding and termination of an infringement
- (a) Behavioural remedies
- (b) Structural remedies
- (c) Past infringements
- (d) Complainants
- (ii) Article 8: interim measures
- (iii) Article 9: commitments
- (a) Article 9: substantive rules
- (b) Article 9: procedure
- (c) Article 9: effect of commitment decisions
- (d) Article 9: appeals
- (e) Comment
- (iv) Article 10: finding of inapplicability
- (v) Informal guidance
- (vi) Settlement of cartel cases
- (a) Introduction
- (b) Benefits of a system of settlements
- (c) Settlement procedure
- (d) Appealing settlement decisions
- (e) Hybrid settlements
- (f) Settlement procedure in practice
- (vii) Settlement of non-cartel cases
- (i) Article 7: finding and termination of an infringement
- (D) Chapter IV: cooperation
- (i) Article 11: cooperation between the Commission and the NCAs
- (ii) Article 12: exchange of information
- (a) Free movement of information
- (b) Restrictions on the use of information
- (c) The exchange of information with third countries
- (iii) Article 13: suspension or termination of proceedings
- (iv) Article 14: Advisory Committee
- (v) Article 15: cooperation with national courts
- (vi) Article 16: uniform application of EU competition law
- (E) Chapter V: powers of investigation
- (i) Article 17: investigations into sectors of the economy and into types of agreements
- (ii) Article 18: requests for information
- (a) The Commission’s powers
- (b) Privilege against self-incrimination
- (c) Legal professional privilege
- (iii) Article 19: power to take statements
- (iv) Article 20: the Commission’s powers of inspection
- (a) Voluntary investigations
- (b) Mandatory investigations
- (c) Penalties for obstructing inspections
- (d) The involvement of Member States
- (v) Article 21: inspection of other premises
- (vi) Article 22: investigations by NCAs
- (F) Chapter VI: penalties
- (i) Article 23: fines
- (ii) The Commission’s guidelines on the method of setting fines
- (a) Basic amount of the fine
- (b) Adjustments to the basic amount
- (iii) The Commission’s Leniency Notice
- (a) Section I: introduction
- (b) Section II: immunity from fines
- (c) Section III: reduction of fines
- (d) Section IV: corporate statements
- (e) Appeals by leniency applicants
- (iv) Article 24: periodic penalty payments
- (G) Chapter VII: limitation periods
- (i) Article 25: limitation periods for the imposition of penalties
- (ii) Article 26: limitation period for the enforcement of penalties
- (H) Chapter VIII: hearings and professional secrecy
- (i) Article 27: hearing of the parties, complainants and others
- (a) The provisions of Article 27
- (b) The conduct of proceedings
- (c) European Ombudsman
- (d) A typical case
- (e) The position of complainants
- (ii) Article 28: professional secrecy
- (i) Article 27: hearing of the parties, complainants and others
- (I) Chapter IX: block exemption regulations
- (J) Chapter X: general provisions
- (i) Article 30: publication of decisions
- (ii) Article 31: review by the EU Courts
- (K) Chapter XI: transitional, amending and final provisions
- (i) Article 34: transitional provisions
- (ii) Article 35: designation of competition authorities of Member States
- (iii) Articles 36–42: miscellaneous amendments
- (iv) Article 43: repeal of Regulations 17 and 141
- (v) Article 44: Report on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003
- (A) The European Competition Network
- (B) Case allocation under Regulation 1/2003
- (C) ‘Soft’ convergence
- (D) Leniency
- (E) Ten years of Regulation 1/2003
- (F) The ECN+ Directive
- (A) Article 265: failure to act
- (B) Article 263: action for annulment
- (i) Standing
- (ii) Acts
- (iii) Grounds of review
- (iv) Actions for damages
- (C) Article 261: penalties
- (D) Expedited procedure
- (E) Interim measures
- 1. Introduction
- 2. EU Law: Actions for Damages
- (A) Private enforcement prior to the Directive
- (B) The movement towards reform
- (C) The Damages Directive
- (i) A right to full compensation
- (ii) Quantum
- (iii) Passing on
- (iv) Disclosure of evidence
- (a) Article 5: disclosure of evidence
- (b) Article 6: disclosure of evidence in the file of a competition authority
- (c) Articles 7 and 8: limits on the use of evidence and penalties
- (v) Effect of national decisions, limitation periods and joint and several liability
- (a) Article 9: effect of national decisions
- (b) Article 10: limitation rules
- (c) Article 11: joint and several liability
- (D) The relationship between the Commission and domestic courts
- (i) Article 6: powers of the national courts
- (ii) Article 15: cooperation with national courts
- (a) Requests by national courts for information or an opinion
- (b) Submission of judgments to the Commission
- (c) Observations by national competition authorities and the Commission
- (d) Wider national powers
- (iii) Article 16: uniform application of EU competition law
- (a) The effect of Commission decisions
- (b) Parallel proceedings
- (i) The Brussels Regulation
- (a) Anchor defendants
- (b) Article 29: lis pendens and the ‘Italian torpedo’
- (ii) Rome II
- (A) The availability of damages in the UK courts
- (B) Implementation of the Damages Directive in the UK
- (C) Brexit
- (D) The cause of action
- (E) Burden and standard of proof
- (F) Disclosure
- (G) Damages claims may be brought in the High Court or the Competition Appeal Tribunal
- (i) High Court proceedings
- (ii) CAT proceedings
- (iii) Which forum to choose?
- (H) Decisions of competition authorities
- (i) Section 58A Competition Act
- (ii) Decisions of NCAs prior to 1 January 2021
- (iii) Section 58: findings of fact by the CMA
- (I) Contribution
- (J) Collective redress in the UK
- (i) High Court: group litigation orders and representative actions
- (ii) CAT: collective proceedings
- (a) Opt-in and opt-out collective proceedings
- (b) Collective proceedings orders
- (c) Damages in collective proceedings
- (d) Settlements and redress schemes
- (i) Interim relief
- (ii) Damages
- (iii) Declarations and other relief
- (iv) Unsuccessful claims
- (A) Article 101(2)
- (i) The sanction of voidness
- (ii) Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v Benetton
- (B) The ‘problem’ of Article 101(3) and the Commission’s former role in relation to individual exemptions
- (C) The classic ‘Euro-defence’
- (D) Severance
- (E) Void or illegal?
- (F) Transient voidness
- (G) Article 102
- (H) Third party as defendant
- 1. Introduction
- 2. The Competition Act 1998—Overview
- (A) Outline of the Act
- (i) Part I: the Chapter I and Chapter II prohibitions
- (ii) Part II: European investigations
- (iii) Part III: amendments to the Fair Trading Act 1973
- (iv) Part IV: miscellaneous amendments
- (B) CMA guidelines
- (C) Other information about the Competition Act
- (D) Delegated legislation under the Competition Act
- (E) Literature
- (A) Outline of the Act
- 3. The Chapter I Prohibition
- (A) Section 2(1): the Chapter I prohibition
- (i) ‘Subject to section 3’
- (ii) Agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings or concerted practices
- (iii) ‘Undertakings’
- (a) Basic definition
- (b) Need to adopt a functional approach
- (c) Economic activity
- (d) Non-economic activity
- (e) Undertaking as a single economic entity
- (f) Undertakings, not persons
- (iv) ‘Agreements’
- (v) ‘Decisions by associations of undertakings’
- (vi) ‘Concerted practices’
- (a) Basic definition
- (b) Direct contact between competitors
- (c) Indirect contact between competitors
- (vii) ‘Agreement and/or concerted practice’
- (viii) ‘Single and continuous infringement’
- (a) Conditions for finding a single and continuous infringement
- (b) Single and repeated infringement
- (c) Decisions where there was no SCI
- (ix) ‘Object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the UK’
- (a) General comments
- (b) Restriction of competition by object
- (c) Restriction of competition by effect
- (d) Objective necessity
- (x) Appreciability
- (a) Object restrictions
- (b) Effect restrictions
- (xi) Applicable law and territorial scope
- (B) Section 2(2): illustrative list
- (C) Section 2(3): extraterritorial application
- (D) Section 2(4): voidness
- (i) Severance
- (ii) Void or illegal?
- (iii) Transient voidness
- (E) Sections 2(5) and 2(6): interpretation
- (F) Section 2(7): the UK
- (G) Section 2(8): the ‘Chapter I prohibition’
- (H) The Chapter I prohibition: excluded agreements
- (i) Schedule 1: mergers and concentrations
- (a) Relationship of the Chapter I and Chapter II prohibitions with UK merger control
- (b) Newspaper mergers
- (c) Clawback
- (d) Protected agreements
- (e) Relationship of the Chapter I and Chapter II prohibitions with EU merger control
- (ii) Schedule 2: competition scrutiny under other enactments
- (a) Communications Act 2003
- (b) Financial Services and Markets Act 2000
- (c) Legal Services Act 2007
- (iii) Schedule 3: general exclusions
- (a) Planning obligations
- (b) Section 21(2) Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1976
- (c) EEA regulated markets
- (d) Services of general economic interest
- (e) Compliance with legal requirements
- (f) Avoidance of conflict with international obligations
- (g) Public policy
- (h) Coal and steel
- (i) Agricultural products
- (iv) Professional rules
- (v) Section 50: vertical agreements
- (vi) Section 50: land agreements
- (i) Schedule 1: mergers and concentrations
- (I) The Chapter I prohibition: exemptions
- (i) Introduction
- (ii) Exemption criteria
- (a) Burden of proof
- (b) Standard of proof
- (c) Scope of section 9(1)
- (d) The application of section 9(1) to restrictions by object
- (e) The application of section 9(1) to restrictions by effect
- (iii) Block exemptions
- (iv) Parallel exemptions
- (v) Retained exemptions
- (A) Section 2(1): the Chapter I prohibition
- (A) The prohibition
- (i) Section 18
- (ii) ‘The Chapter II prohibition’
- (iii) ‘Undertakings’
- (iv) Affecting trade within the UK
- (v) Voidness
- (vi) Market size
- (vii) The relevant market
- (viii) Assessing dominance
- (a) Market shares
- (b) Entry barriers
- (c) Other factors in the assessment of market power
- (d) Super-dominance
- (ix) Abuse
- (a) Assessing abuse
- (b) Objective justification
- (c) Efficiencies
- (d) Conduct of minor significance
- (i) Exclusions for mergers subject to UK merger control
- (ii) Financial Services and Markets Act 2000
- (iii) Other exclusions
- (A) Scope of section 60A
- (i) ‘Persons’ subject to section 60A
- (ii) ‘Questions arising … in relation to competition’
- (B) Duty under section 60A(2)
- (i) ‘So far as is compatible’ with Part 1 of the Act
- (ii) Duty of consistency
- (iii) ‘Any corresponding question’
- (C) Exceptions to the duty of consistency
- (D) Having regard to decisions or statements of the Commission
- (A) Total number of infringement decisions
- (B) Findings of infringement by the CAT
- (C) Appeals against infringement decisions
- (D) Appeals against non-infringement and case-closure decisions
- (E) Decisions of sectoral regulators
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Inquiries and Investigations
- (A) Opening a formal investigation
- (B) Power to require documents and information
- (i) Written inquiries
- (ii) Power to ask questions
- (C) Power to enter premises without a warrant
- (D) Power to enter premises with a warrant
- (E) Powers of surveillance
- (F) Access to lawyers
- (G) Limitation on the use of the powers of investigation
- (i) Legal professional privilege
- (ii) Self-incrimination
- (iii) Confidentiality
- (iv) Human Rights Act 1998 and the burden and standard of proof
- (v) Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (‘PACE’)
- (H) Sanctions
- (i) Penalties: failure to comply with requirements
- (ii) Offences
- (I) EU investigations
- 3. Complaints
- 4. Opinions, Informal Advice and Warning Letters
- (A) Opinions
- (B) Informal advice
- (C) Warning and advisory letters
- 5. Enforcement
- (A) Procedure
- (i) Statement of objections
- (ii) Procedural Officer
- (iii) Subsequent procedure
- (B) Commitments
- (C) Interim measures
- (D) Directions
- (i) Can directions be structural?
- (ii) The directions provisions in practice
- (iii) Persons who may be the subject of directions
- (iv) Enforcement of compliance with directions
- (E) Penalties
- (i) Maximum amount of a penalty
- (ii) The Guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty
- (iii) The CMA’s six-step approach
- (iv) Immunity for small agreements and conduct of minor significance
- (F) Leniency
- (i) Terminology
- (ii) Key features of the UK leniency system
- (iii) Eligibility for leniency
- (a) Type A immunity
- (b) Type B immunity/leniency
- (c) Type C leniency
- (d) The coercer test
- (iv) Actions before applying for leniency
- (v) Checking the availability of leniency and initial application
- (vi) Cooperation throughout investigation
- (vii) Leniency and no-action agreements
- (viii) Disclosure and information
- (ix) Other issues relating to criminal proceedings
- (x) Other procedural issues: leniency plus/penalties
- (xi) Bad faith/withdrawal of leniency/revocation of no-action letters
- (G) Settlements
- (H) The penalty provisions in practice
- (i) Statistical analysis
- (ii) Appeals against decisions imposing penalties
- (iii) Aggravating factors
- (iv) Infringement decisions in which no penalty was imposed
- (A) Procedure
- (A) The cartel offence
- (i) Definition of the cartel offence
- (ii) Prosecution guidance
- (a) Evidential stage
- (b) Public interest stage
- (iii) Circumstances in which the cartel offence is not committed
- (iv) Defences
- (v) Powers of investigation and search
- (a) Powers to require information and documents
- (b) Power to enter premises under a warrant
- (vi) Powers of surveillance
- (a) Enterprise Act: intrusive surveillance and property interference
- (b) Further powers: directed surveillance, covert human intelligence sources and access to communications data
- (c) Codes of Practice
- (vii) Prosecution and penalty
- (viii) Parallel CMA criminal and civil investigations
- (ix) No-action letters
- (x) Extradition
- (xi) The cartel offence in practice
- (xii) Possible reform
- (B) Conspiracy to defraud at common law
- (A) Grounds for disqualification
- (B) Procedure
- (C) Length of disqualification
- (D) Consequences of disqualification
- (E) Company director disqualification in practice
- (A) The Duty of Primacy
- (B) The Concurrency Regulations and the Concurrency Guidance
- (C) UK Competition Network
- (D) The concurrency arrangements in practice
- (E) Annual concurrency reports
- (F) Review
- (A) ‘Appealable decisions’
- (i) Appeals against infringement decisions
- (ii) Appeals against explicit non-infringement decisions
- (iii) Appeals against implicit non-infringement decisions
- (B) The Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015
- (C) Procedure before the CAT
- (D) Appeal on the merits
- (E) The powers of the CAT
- (F) Costs
- (G) Appeals from the CAT to the Court of Appeal and from the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Gathering Information about Markets
- 3. Super-Complaints
- (A) Purpose of super-complaints
- (B) Super-complainants
- (C) Guidance
- (D) Procedure
- (E) Outcomes of super-complaints
- 4. Market Studies
- (A) Guidance
- (B) Purpose of market studies
- (C) Procedure
- (i) Identifying markets to study
- (ii) Market study notice
- (iii) Stages of a market study
- (iv) Market study report
- (D) Outcomes of market studies
- (E) Examples of recent market studies
- 5. Market Investigations
- (A) Overview of the system of market investigations
- (B) Guidelines and other relevant publications
- (C) The making of references
- (i) Power to make ordinary references
- (ii) Power to make cross-market references
- (iii) Ministerial power to make references
- (iv) The discretion of the CMA whether to make a reference
- (a) Relationship between the Competition Act and market investigations
- (b) Relationship with Regulation 1/2003
- (c) Scale of the problem
- (d) Availability of remedies
- (v) Consultation before making a reference
- (vi) Content and variation of references
- (vii) Restrictions on the ability to make a reference
- (D) The determination of references
- (i) The CMA Panel and market reference groups
- (ii) Questions to be decided
- (a) Ordinary references
- (b) Cross-market references
- (iii) Procedure
- (iv) Investigations and reports
- (v) Duty to remedy adverse effects
- (A) Issuing intervention notices
- (B) Restricted public interest references
- (C) Full public interest references
- (A) Undertakings and orders
- (i) Undertakings in lieu of a reference
- (ii) Interim undertakings and orders
- (iii) Final powers
- (B) Review of enforcement undertakings and orders
- (A) Regulated markets
- (B) Consultation, information and publicity
- (C) Powers of investigation and penalties
- (D) Reports
- (E) Review of decisions under Part 4 of the Enterprise Act
- (A) Meaning of ‘adverse effect on competition’
- (i) Market definition
- (ii) Counterfactual
- (iii) Theories of harm
- (iv) Performance and prices
- (B) Findings of adverse effects on competition
- (C) Remedies
- (D) Evaluation of the system
- 1. Introduction
- 2. International Competition Law Institutions
- (A) ICN
- (B) OECD
- (C) UNCTAD
- 3. Extraterritoriality: Theory
- (A) Subject-matter jurisdiction
- (B) Enforcement jurisdiction
- 4. The Extraterritorial Application of US Antitrust Law
- (A) The Alcoa, Hartford Fire Insurance and Empagran cases
- (B) Comity
- 5. The Extraterritorial Application of EU Competition Law
- (A) Articles 101 and 102: subject-matter jurisdiction
- (i) The single economic entity doctrine
- (ii) The implementation doctrine
- (iii) The qualified effects doctrine
- (B) Articles 101 and 102: enforcement jurisdiction
- (i) Initiating proceedings
- (ii) Information and investigations
- (iii) Final decisions
- (C) EU Merger Regulation
- (i) The jurisdictional criteria in the EUMR
- (ii) Gencor v Commission
- (D) The EU’s dedicated cooperation agreements on competition enforcement
- (i) The EU/US Cooperation Agreement of 23 September 1991
- (ii) The Positive Comity Agreement of 4 June 1998
- (iii) The cooperation agreements in practice
- (iv) Memoranda of Understanding on Cooperation
- (A) Articles 101 and 102: subject-matter jurisdiction
- (A) Competition Act 1998
- (i) Chapter I prohibition
- (ii) Chapter II prohibition
- (B) Enterprise Act 2002
- (i) Market studies and market investigations
- (ii) Mergers
- (iii) The cartel offence
- (A) Introduction
- (B) Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Widespread Consensus that Cartels Should be Prohibited
- (A) The global agenda
- (B) The OECD and the fight against cartels
- (C) The ICN and the fight against cartels
- (D) Recent action against cartels around the world
- 3. EU Policy Towards Cartels
- (A) Statistics
- (B) Concealment of cartels
- (C) Proof of participation in a cartel
- (D) Facilitators
- (E) Single and continuous infringement
- (F) Public distancing from a cartel
- (G) Recent decisions against cartels
- (H) Coronavirus crisis
- (I) Judicial review
- 4. Horizontal Price Fixing
- (A) Article 101(1)
- (i) Price fixing in any form is caught
- (ii) Price fixing in any context is caught
- (iii) Price signalling
- (iv) Hub-and-spoke conspiracies
- (v) Algorithmic collusion
- (vi) Blockchains
- (vii) Horizontal price fixing in conjunction with other infringements of Article 101(1)
- (viii) Buyers’ cartels
- (ix) Joint selling agencies
- (B) Article 101(3)
- (C) Collective dominance
- (A) Article 101(1)
- 5. Horizontal Market Sharing
- (A) Article 101(1)
- (i) Market sharing in any form is caught
- (ii) Market sharing in any context is caught
- (iii) Market sharing in conjunction with other infringements of Article 101(1)
- (B) Article 101(3)
- (A) Article 101(1)
- 6. Quotas and Other Restrictions on Production
- (A) Article 101(1)
- (B) Article 101(3)
- 7. Collusive Tendering
- (A) Collusive tendering takes many forms
- (B) Article 101(1)
- (C) Article 101(3)
- 8. Agreements Relating to Terms and Conditions
- (A) Article 101(1)
- (B) Article 101(3)
- 9. Exchanges of Information
- (A) Introduction
- (B) Arguments for and against exchanges of information
- (C) Types of exchange of information
- (i) Information exchange in support of a horizontal cooperation agreement
- (ii) Information exchange in support of a cartel
- (D) Agreement and/or concerted practice to exchange information
- (E) Assessment under Article 101(1)
- (i) Restriction of competition by object
- (ii) Restrictions of competition by effect
- (iii) The economic conditions on the relevant markets
- (iv) Characteristics of the information exchanged
- (F) Assessment under Article 101(3)
- 10. Advertising Restrictions
- (A) Article 101(1)
- (B) Article 101(3)
- 11. Anti-Competitive Horizontal Restraints
- (A) Collective exclusive dealing
- (B) Other exclusionary practices
- 12. UK Law
- (A) Competition Act 1998 in practice
- (B) Horizontal price fixing
- (C) Agreements relating to terms and conditions
- (D) Horizontal market sharing
- (E) Quotas and other restriction on production
- (F) Collusive tendering
- (G) Exchanges of information
- (H) Advertising restrictions
- (I) Anti-competitive horizontal restraints
- 1. Introduction
- 2. The Theory of Oligopolistic Interdependence
- (A) Outline of the theory
- (i) The meaning of oligopoly and a warning about the term
- (ii) The oligopoly problem
- (iii) Terminology: ‘tacit collusion’; ‘conscious parallelism’; ‘tacit coordination’; ‘coordinated effects’
- (iv) ‘Non-collusive oligopoly’
- (v) The conditions for tacit coordination
- (B) Criticisms of the theory
- (i) How interdependent are oligopolists?
- (ii) Does the theory of oligopolistic interdependence reflect markets in the real world?
- (iii) Why are some oligopolistic markets competitive?
- (iv) How do oligopolists achieve a supra-competitive price?
- (v) Why is a market oligopolistic in the first place?
- (A) Outline of the theory
- (A) A structural approach
- (B) A behavioural approach
- (C) A regulatory approach
- (D) A market investigation approach
- (A) Does parallel behaviour amount to a concerted practice under Article 101?
- (i) Dyestuffs
- (ii) Further cases prior to Wood Pulp
- (iii) Wood Pulp
- (iv) Cases following Wood Pulp
- (v) Comment
- (B) Article 101(1), the exchange of information and other facilitating practices
- (C) Price signalling
- (D) Article 101(3)
- (A) The linguistic background
- (B) The definition of collective dominance under Article 102
- (i) Società Italiana Vetro v Commission
- (ii) Further cases prior to Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports v Commission
- (iii) Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports v Commission
- (iv) Cases following Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports v Commission
- (C) Abuse of collective dominance under Article 102
- (i) Exploitative abuse of a collective dominant position
- (ii) Exclusionary abuse of a collective dominant position
- (iii) Individual abuse of a collective dominant position
- (A) Competition Act 1998
- (B) Market studies and market investigations under the Enterprise Act 2002
- (i) Market studies
- (ii) Market investigations
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Full-Function Joint Ventures
- 3. The Application of Article 101 to Horizontal Cooperation Agreements and the Commission’s Guidelines on Horizontal Cooperation Agreements
- (A) Introduction
- (B) Case-law, decisions and informal guidance on horizontal cooperation agreements
- (C) The Guidelines on Horizontal Cooperation Agreements
- (i) Actual and potential competitors
- (ii) Purpose and scope of the Guidelines on Horizontal Cooperation Agreements
- (iii) Basic principles for the assessment of horizontal cooperation agreements under Article 101
- (a) Article 101(1)
- (b) Article 101(3)
- (A) Market definition
- (i) Existing product and technology markets
- (ii) Competition in innovation (R&D efforts)
- (iii) Market shares
- (B) The application of Article 101(1) to R&D agreements
- (i) R&D agreements that normally fall outside Article 101(1)
- (ii) Main competition concerns
- (iii) Restrictions by object
- (iv) Restrictions by effect
- (C) The application of Article 101(3) to R&D agreements
- (D) The block exemption for R&D agreements: Regulation 1217/2010
- (i) Article 1: definitions
- (ii) Article 2: exemption
- (iii) Article 3: conditions for exemption
- (iv) Article 4: duration of exemption and the market share threshold
- (v) Article 5: hard-core restrictions
- (vi) Article 6: excluded restrictions
- (vii) Article 7: application of the market share threshold
- (viii) Article 8: transitional period
- (ix) Article 9: period of validity
- (x) Withdrawal of the block exemption
- (xi) Reform
- (A) The application of Article 101(1) to production agreements
- (i) Main competition concerns
- (ii) Restrictions by object
- (iii) Restrictions by effect
- (B) The application of Article 101(3) to production agreements
- (C) The block exemption for specialisation agreements: Regulation 1218/2010
- (i) Article 1: definitions
- (ii) Article 2: exemption
- (iii) Article 3: the market share threshold
- (iv) Article 4: hard-core restrictions
- (v) Article 5: application of the market share threshold
- (vi) Article 6: transitional period
- (vii) Article 7: period of validity
- (viii) Withdrawal of the block exemption
- (ix) Reform
- (A) Application of Article 101(1) to joint purchasing agreements
- (i) Main competition concerns
- (ii) Restrictions by object
- (iii) Restrictions by effect
- (B) Application of Article 101(3) to joint purchasing agreements
- (A) The application of Article 101(1) to commercialisation agreements
- (i) Main competition concerns
- (ii) Restrictions by object
- (iii) Restrictions by effect
- (B) The application of Article 101(3) to commercialisation agreements
- (A) The application of Article 101(1) to standardisation agreements
- (i) Main competition concerns
- (ii) Restrictions by object
- (iii) A (fairly) safe harbour
- (iv) Restrictions by effect
- (B) The application of Article 101(3) to standardisation agreements
- (C) The application of Article 101(1) to standard terms
- (i) Restrictions by object
- (ii) Restrictions by effect
- (D) The application of Article 101(3) to standard terms
- (E) Article 102 and standards
- (A) The application of Article 101(1) to sustainability agreements
- (i) Restrictions by object
- (ii) Restrictions by effect
- (B) The application of Article 101(3) to sustainability agreements
- (A) Restructuring agreements
- (B) Banking sector
- (C) Transport
- (D) Coronavirus crisis
- (A) Introduction
- (B) The Chapter I prohibition in practice
- (C) Exemption in individual cases
- (D) Block exemption for ticketing agreements
- (E) Coronavirus crisis
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Distribution Chains in the Modern Economy
- 3. Vertical Integration
- (A) Non-application of Article 101 to agreements within a single economic entity
- (B) Application of Article 102 to firms within a single economic entity
- (C) Application of the EU Merger Regulation to vertical integration
- 4. Commercial Agency
- (A) Non-application of Article 101 to agency agreements
- (B) EU jurisprudence and the Vertical Guidelines
- (i) The criterion of risk
- (ii) Non-application of Article 101(1) to agency agreements
- (iii) Application of Article 101(1) to agency agreements
- (C) Application of Article 102 to agency agreements
- (D) Sub-contracting agreements
- 5. Vertical Agreements: Competition Policy Considerations
- (A) Introduction
- (B) Vertical restraints: possible detriments to competition
- (i) Inter-brand and intra-brand competition
- (ii) Consten and Grundig v Commission
- (iii) The single market imperative and intra-brand competition
- (iv) The commentary in the Vertical Guidelines on the negative effects of vertical restraints
- (C) Vertical restraints: possible benefits to competition
- (i) The free-rider problem
- (ii) Opening up and entering new markets
- (iii) The certification free-rider issue
- (iv) The hold-up problem
- (v) The hold-up problem where know-how is transferred
- (vi) The ‘vertical externality issue’
- (vii) Economies of scale in distribution
- (viii) Capital market imperfections
- (ix) Uniformity and quality standardisation
- (A) Introduction
- (B) The case-law of the Court of Justice on vertical agreements
- (C) The combined effect of the De Minimis Notice and the block exemption
- (D) The methodology for the analysis of vertical agreements in the Vertical Guidelines
- (i) The four steps involved in assessing vertical agreements under Article 101
- (ii) Relevant factors for the assessment under Article 101(1)
- (iii) Relevant factors for the assessment under Article 101(3)
- (iv) Application of the methodology to particular types of agreement
- (E) Direct and indirect export bans
- (i) Direct export bans
- (ii) Indirect export bans
- (iii) Export bans falling outside Article 101(1) or satisfying Article 101(3)
- (F) Exclusive distribution
- (i) Application of Article 101(1) to exclusive distribution agreements
- (ii) Application of the block exemption to exclusive distribution agreements
- (iii) Individual application of Article 101(3) to exclusive distribution agreements
- (G) Single branding
- (i) Application of Article 101(1) to single branding agreements
- (ii) Application of the block exemption to single branding agreements
- (iii) Individual application of Article 101(3) to single branding agreements
- (H) Selective distribution
- (i) Purely qualitative selective distribution systems normally fall outside Article 101(1)
- (ii) Selective distribution systems that may fall within Article 101(1)
- (iii) Application of the block exemption to selective distribution systems
- (iv) Individual application of Article 101(3)
- (I) Franchising
- (i) Application of Article 101(1) to franchising
- (ii) Application of the block exemption to franchising
- (iii) Individual application of Article 101(3) to franchising
- (J) Pricing restrictions
- (i) Application of Article 101(1) to minimum and fixed prices
- (ii) Application of Article 101(1) to recommended and maximum prices
- (iii) Application of the block exemption to recommended and maximum prices
- (iv) Individual application of Article 101(3) to pricing restrictions
- (K) Parity provisions
- (i) Terminology
- (ii) Possible detriments to competition
- (iii) Possible benefits to competition
- (iv) Enforcement activity
- (L) Other types of vertical agreements
- (A) Article 1: definitions
- (B) Article 2: scope of the block exemption
- (i) Article 2(1): block exemption for vertical agreements
- (ii) Many vertical agreements do not infringe Article 101(1)
- (iii) If it is not forbidden, it is permitted
- (iv) The definition of a vertical agreement
- (v) The exempted agreement may be multilateral
- (vi) ‘For the purposes of the agreement’
- (vii) Agreements with final consumers would not be vertical agreements
- (viii) ‘Relating to the conditions under which the parties may purchase, sell or resell certain goods or services’
- (ix) Interconnection agreements
- (x) Agency
- (xi) Article 2(2): associations of retailers
- (xii) Article 2(3): ancillary provisions in relation to intellectual property rights
- (xiii) Article 2(3) is applicable only where there is a vertical agreement
- (xiv) The IPR provisions must be for the use of the buyer
- (xv) The IPR provisions must not be the object of the agreement
- (xvi) The IPR provisions must be directly related to the use, sale or resale of goods or services by the buyer or its customers
- (xvii) The IPR provisions must not have an illegitimate object or effect
- (xviii) Article 2(4): agreements between competing undertakings
- (xix) Article 2(5): agreements within the scope of another block exemption
- (C) Article 3: the market share cap
- (i) Why a market share test?
- (ii) What market share?
- (iii) Whose market share?
- (iv) The Vertical Guidelines
- (v) Article 6
- (D) Article 4: hard-core restrictions
- (i) Article 4(a): resale price maintenance
- (ii) Article 4(b): territorial and customer restrictions
- (a) Article 4(b): the hard-core restriction
- (b) Article 4(b): exceptions
- (iii) Article 4(c): the restriction of active or passive sales to end-users by members of a selective distribution system operating at the retail level of trade
- (iv) Article 4(d): restrictions on cross-supplies within a selective distribution system
- (v) Article 4(e): restrictions on the supplier’s ability to supply components to third parties
- (E) Article 5: obligations in vertical agreements that are not exempt
- (i) Article 5(1)(a): non-compete obligations
- (ii) Article 5(1)(b): post-term non-compete obligations
- (iii) Article 5(1)(c): competing products in a selective distribution system
- (F) Withdrawal of the block exemption by the Commission or by a Member State
- (i) Article 29(1) of Regulation 1/2003: withdrawal by the Commission
- (ii) Article 29(2) of Regulation 1/2003: withdrawal by a Member State
- (G) Article 6: disapplication of the block exemption by Commission Regulation
- (H) Articles 7 and 8: market share and turnover
- (I) Articles 9 and 10: transitional provisions and entry into force
- (J) Reform
- (A) Vertical agreements under the Competition Act 1998
- (i) The exclusion of vertical agreements from the Chapter I prohibition until 30 April 2005
- (ii) The parallel exemption of vertical agreements from the Chapter I prohibition until 31 December 2020
- (iii) The retained exemption of vertical agreements from the Chapter I prohibition until 31 May 2022
- (iv) Guidance on Vertical Agreements
- (v) The Competition Act 1998 in practice
- (a) Pricing restrictions
- (b) Non-price restrictions
- (i) Vertical agreements
- (ii) Vertical integration
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Exclusive Dealing Agreements
- (A) EU law
- (i) The application of Article 102 to exclusive purchasing agreements
- (a) Meaning of exclusivity
- (b) Judgments of the EU Courts
- (c) The Commission’s approach to exclusive purchasing agreements
- (d) The Commission’s approach to exclusive supply agreements
- (ii) Article 102 applies to de facto as well as to contractual exclusivity
- (iii) Is there an objective justification for a long-term supply agreement?
- (i) The application of Article 102 to exclusive purchasing agreements
- (B) UK law
- (i) The UK courts’ approach to exclusive purchasing agreements
- (ii) The UK competition authorities’ approach to exclusive purchasing agreements
- (A) EU law
- (A) Terminology and illustrations of tying
- (B) Policy considerations: arguments for and against tying
- (C) EU law
- (i) Does the accused undertaking have a dominant position?
- (ii) Has the dominant undertaking tied two distinct products?
- (a) Hilti
- (b) Tetra Pak
- (c) Microsoft
- (d) Google Android
- (iii) Was the customer coerced to purchase both the tying and the tied products?
- (iv) Is the tie capable of having an anti-competitive foreclosure effect?
- (v) Is there an objective justification for the tie?
- (D) UK law
- (i) The UK courts’ approach to tying
- (ii) The UK competition authorities’ approach to tying
- (A) Preliminary comments
- (B) EU law
- (i) Vertical foreclosure: competitive harm in a downstream market
- (a) Is there a refusal to supply?
- (b) Does the accused undertaking have a dominant position in an upstream market?
- (c) Is the product to which access is sought indispensable to someone wishing to compete in the downstream market?
- (d) Would a refusal to grant access lead to the elimination of effective competition in the downstream market?
- (e) Is there an objective justification for the refusal to supply?
- (f) Remedies
- (ii) Horizontal foreclosure
- (a) Refusal to supply a distributor as a disciplining measure
- (b) Refusal to supply a potential competitor in the supplier’s market
- (c) Refusal to supply an existing competitor in the supplier’s market
- (iii) Refusal to supply on the basis of nationality
- (iv) Refusal to supply to prevent parallel imports and exports
- (i) Vertical foreclosure: competitive harm in a downstream market
- (C) UK case-law
- (A) Harming the competitive structure of the market
- (B) Vexatious litigation
- (C) Settling litigation
- (D) Trading conditions
- (E) Preferential treatment
- (F) Other cases
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Cost Concepts
- (A) Fixed costs and sunk costs
- (B) Marginal cost
- (C) Variable costs
- (D) Avoidable costs
- (E) Average variable cost (‘AVC’)
- (F) Average avoidable cost (‘AAC’)
- (G) Long-run incremental cost (‘LRIC’)
- (H) Long-run average incremental cost (‘LRAIC’)
- (I) Average total cost (‘ATC’)
- (J) Stand alone cost
- 3. Excessive Pricing
- (A) Arguments against direct control
- (B) When might it be legitimate for a competition authority to investigate excessive prices?
- (i) Imperfect markets
- (ii) Excessive prices that are exclusionary or harmful to the single market
- (C) When is an excessive price abusive?
- (i) The price must be excessive and unfair
- (ii) Is the price excessive?
- (iii) Is the excessive price unfair?
- (iv) EU cases on excessive pricing
- (a) Commission cases
- (b) Article 267 references to the Court of Justice
- (c) NCA cases
- (v) UK cases on excessive pricing
- (a) Decisions of competition authorities
- (b) Private litigation and excessive pricing
- (A) Why is the law on conditional rebates controversial?
- (i) Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission
- (ii) Terminology
- (iii) The controversy
- (B) Intel v Commission
- (i) The Commission’s decision
- (ii) The judgment of the General Court
- (iii) The judgment of the Court of Justice
- (iv) Remittal to the General Court
- (C) Intel and the Commission’s Guidance on Article 102 Enforcement Priorities
- (D) Unanswered questions after Intel
- (i) The application of the as-efficient competitor test
- (ii) Could a rebate above cost be unlawful?
- (iii) Intel and the de minimis test
- (iv) When might a rebate be objectively justified?
- (E) UK law
- (A) EU law
- (i) Rebates having a tying effect
- (ii) ‘Across-the-board’ rebates
- (iii) Delivered pricing as a tie-in
- (iv) Bundling
- (B) UK law
- (A) Introduction
- (B) The Areeda and Turner test
- (C) EU law
- (i) The rule in AKZO v Commission and subsequent cases
- (ii) Intention to eliminate competition
- (iii) Is it necessary to show the possibility of recoupment?
- (iv) Defences
- (v) Are the standards of AVC and ATC always appropriate?
- (vi) The Commission’s approach to predation in its Guidance on Article 102 Enforcement Priorities
- (vii) Predatory price cutting and cross-subsidisation
- (viii) Selective price cutting but not below cost
- (a) Eurofix-Bauco/Hilti
- (b) Irish Sugar v Commission
- (c) Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports v Commission
- (d) Post Danmark I
- (i) Findings of predatory pricing
- (ii) Cases where predatory pricing was not established
- (A) The economic phenomenon
- (B) EU law
- (i) Is the accused undertaking operating on an upstream and a downstream market?
- (ii) Does the accused undertaking hold a dominant position in the upstream market?
- (iii) Do the dominant firm’s upstream and downstream prices allow an undertaking as efficient as the dominant firm to compete on the downstream market?
- (iv) Is the margin squeeze capable of producing anti-competitive effects?
- (v) Is there an objective justification for the margin squeeze?
- (vi) The Commission’s decisional practice
- (C) UK law
- (i) Findings of unlawful margin squeeze
- (ii) Rejections of complaints about margin squeezes
- (A) The meaning of price discrimination
- (B) EU law
- (i) Does the accused undertaking have a dominant position?
- (ii) Has the dominant undertaking entered into equivalent transactions with other trading parties?
- (iii) Is the dominant undertaking guilty of applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions?
- (iv) Could the discrimination place other trading parties at a competitive disadvantage?
- (v) Is there an objective justification for the discrimination?
- (C) UK law
- (A) Excessive pricing that impedes parallel imports and exports
- (B) Geographic price discrimination
- (C) Rebates that impede imports and exports
- 1. Introduction
- (A) Definitions
- (B) Intellectual property rights and the single market
- (C) Is there an inevitable tension between intellectual property rights and competition law?
- 2. Licences of Intellectual Property Rights: Article 101
- (A) Introduction
- (B) Typical terms in licences of intellectual property rights
- (i) Territorial exclusivity
- (ii) Royalties
- (iii) Duration
- (iv) Field of use restrictions
- (v) Best endeavours and non-competition clauses
- (vi) No-challenge clauses
- (vii) Improvements
- (viii) Tying and bundling
- (ix) Prices, terms and conditions
- (C) The application of Article 101(1) to licences of intellectual property rights
- (i) Patent licences: territorial exclusivity
- (ii) Patent licences: non-territorial restrictions
- (iii) Know-how licences
- (iv) Copyright licences
- (v) Software licences
- (vi) Trade mark licences
- (vii) Licences of plant breeders’ rights
- (viii) Sub-contracting agreements
- (D) The application of Article 101(3) to licences of intellectual property rights
- 3. Technology Transfer Agreements: Regulation 316/2014
- (A) Article 1: definitions
- (B) Article 2: block exemption
- (i) Many technology transfer agreements do not infringe Article 101(1)
- (ii) If it is not forbidden, it is permitted
- (iii) The exempted agreement must be bilateral
- (iv) Duration
- (v) Ancillary provisions in relation to other intellectual property rights
- (vi) Relationship with other block exemptions
- (C) Article 3: the market share cap
- (i) Horizontal agreements
- (a) Technology markets
- (b) Product markets
- (ii) Vertical agreements
- (iii) Technology markets
- (iv) Product markets
- (v) Article 8: calculation of market shares and marginal relief
- (vi) Examples
- (i) Horizontal agreements
- (D) Article 4: hard-core restrictions
- (i) Agreements between competing undertakings: horizontal agreements
- (a) Prices
- (b) Output
- (c) The allocation of markets and customers
- (d) Exploitation by the licensee
- (ii) Agreements between non-competing undertakings: vertical agreements
- (a) Prices
- (b) Territories and customer groups
- (c) Restrictions in selective distribution systems
- (i) Agreements between competing undertakings: horizontal agreements
- (E) Article 5: excluded restrictions
- (F) Article 6: withdrawal in individual cases
- (i) Article 6(1): withdrawal by the Commission in individual cases
- (ii) Article 6(2): withdrawal by an NCA
- (G) Article 7: non-application of the Regulation
- (H) Article 8: application of the market share thresholds
- (I) Articles 9 to 11: other block exemptions, transitional period and period of validity
- (A) Technology pools
- (i) Effects of technology pools
- (a) Pro-competitive effects
- (b) Anti-competitive effects
- (c) Regulation 316/2014
- (ii) Assessment of the formation and operation of technology pools
- (a) Open participation
- (b) Selection and nature of the pooled technologies
- (c) Selection and function of independent experts
- (d) Exchange of sensitive information
- (iii) A safe harbour
- (iv) Assessment of individual restraints in agreements between the pool and its licensees
- (i) Effects of technology pools
- (B) Copyright pools
- (C) Settlements of litigation
- (i) Settlement agreements
- (a) ‘Pay-for-delay’ agreements
- (b) Cross-licensing
- (c) No-challenge clauses
- (ii) Trade mark settlements
- (i) Settlement agreements
- (D) Concerted refusal to license intellectual property rights
- (A) Compulsory licences
- (i) The Renault and Volvo judgments
- (ii) The Magill case
- (iii) IMS Health
- (iv) The Microsoft case
- (a) The Commission and the General Court assumed that Microsoft enjoyed intellectual property protection
- (b) The General Court’s summary of the applicable law
- (c) The General Court’s benign application of the ‘new product’ requirement
- (d) Remedy
- (i) Unlawful acquisition of technology
- (ii) Demanding excessive royalties
- (iii) Seeking an injunction to enforce standard-essential patents
- (iv) FRAND licences for standard-essential patents
- (v) Patent assertion entities
- (vi) Patent ambush
- (vii) Vexatious behaviour and abuse of process
- (A) Licences of intellectual property rights: the Chapter I prohibition
- (B) Settlement agreements
- (C) The Chapter II prohibition
- (D) Market investigations
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Terminology
- (A) The meaning of ‘merger’ and ‘concentration’
- (B) The horizontal, vertical and conglomerate effects of mergers
- (i) Horizontal effects
- (ii) Vertical effects
- (iii) Conglomerate effects
- (A) Economies of scale and scope
- (B) Other efficiencies
- (C) National champions
- (D) Management efficiency and the market for corporate control
- (E) Exiting an industry
- (F) Greed, vanity, fear and drugs
- (G) Increasing market power
- (A) Is merger control necessary?
- (B) Assessing the competitive effects of mergers
- (i) Theories of harm
- (a) Unilateral or non-coordinated effects
- (b) Coordinated effects
- (c) Vertical effects
- (d) Conglomerate effects
- (e) Killer acquisitions
- (ii) Evidence
- (iii) The counterfactual
- (i) Theories of harm
- (C) The substantive test: SLC, dominance, SIEC
- (D) Guidelines
- (E) Remedies
- (F) Merger control and the public interest
- (i) Loss of efficiency and ‘short-termism’
- (ii) Concentration of wealth
- (iii) Unemployment and regional policy
- (iv) Overseas control
- (v) Special sectors
- (vi) Sustainability
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Overview of EU Merger Control
- (A) Brief description of the EU system of merger control
- (B) Institutional arrangements
- (C) The Implementing Regulation and the Commission’s Notices and Guidelines
- (i) The Implementing Regulation
- (ii) Commission Notices and Guidelines
- (iii) Best Practice Guidelines
- (D) Access to the Commission’s decisions
- (E) Foreign direct investment
- 3. Jurisdiction
- (A) Article 3: meaning of a concentration
- (i) Article 3(1)(a): mergers
- (ii) Article 3(1)(b): acquisition of control
- (a) The concept of control
- (b) Sole control
- (c) Joint control
- (iii) Changes in the quality of control
- (iv) Joint ventures—the concept of full functionality
- (a) Operational autonomy
- (b) Activities beyond one specific function for the parents
- (c) Sale/purchase relations between the joint venture and its parents
- (d) Operation on a lasting basis
- (e) Implications of full functionality
- (v) Exceptions
- (B) Article 1: concentrations having a Union dimension
- (i) Thresholds
- (a) Article 1(2)
- (b) Article 1(3)
- (c) Possible reform
- (ii) Notion of undertaking concerned
- (iii) Relevant date for establishing jurisdiction
- (iv) Turnover
- (v) Geographic allocation of turnover
- (vi) Conversion of turnover into euros
- (vii) Provisions for credit and other financial institutions and insurance undertakings
- (viii) Illustrations
- (i) Thresholds
- (C) Article 21: one-stop merger control
- (i) The benefits of one-stop merger control
- (ii) The benefits of more flexible jurisdictional rules
- (D) Article 4(4) and Article 9: referral of concentrations having a Union dimension to the competent authorities of the Member States
- (i) Pre-notification referrals: Article 4(4)
- (ii) Post-notification referrals: Article 9
- (a) Article 9(2)(a)
- (b) Article 9(2)(b)
- (iii) Statistics
- (iv) Article 4(4) and Article 9 in practice
- (E) Article 4(5) and Article 22: referral of concentrations not having a Union dimension by Member States to the Commission
- (i) Pre-notification referrals: Article 4(5)
- (ii) Post-notification referrals: Article 22
- (iii) Statistics
- (iv) Article 4(5) and Article 22 in practice
- (F) Article 21(4): legitimate interest clause
- (i) Authorised applications of Article 21(4)
- (ii) Prohibited applications of Article 21(4)
- (G) Defence
- (A) Article 3: meaning of a concentration
- 4. Notification, Suspension of Concentrations, Procedural Timetable and Powers of Decision
- (A) Notification
- (i) Form CO
- (ii) Short Form CO
- (iii) Reasoned submissions
- (iv) Incomplete notifications
- (v) Fines for incorrect or misleading information
- (vi) Fines for failing to notify
- (B) Suspension of concentrations
- (i) ‘Implementation’
- (ii) Fines for ‘gun-jumping’
- (iii) Derogations
- (C) Procedural timetable and powers of decision of the Commission
- (i) Phase I investigations
- (a) Possible decisions at the end of Phase I
- (b) Timetable
- (ii) Phase II investigations
- (a) Possible decisions at the end of Phase II
- (b) Timetable
- (c) Phase II procedure
- (iii) ‘Phase III’
- (i) Phase I investigations
- (A) Notification
- (A) The ‘significant impediment to effective competition’ test
- (i) The dominance/SIEC debate
- (ii) The non-collusive oligopoly gap
- (iii) The solution: ‘SIEC’
- (iv) The need for a causal link between the concentration and the SIEC
- (v) The ‘counterfactual’
- (vi) Article 2(1): the appraisal criteria
- (B) Publication of merger guidelines
- (C) Competition policy and industrial policy
- (D) Market definition
- (i) Form CO: ‘affected markets’
- (ii) Commission decisions
- (iii) Effect of decisions on market definition
- (iv) Quantitative tests
- (E) Horizontal mergers
- (i) Market shares and concentration levels
- (a) Market shares
- (b) Concentration levels
- (ii) Possible anti-competitive effects of horizontal mergers
- (a) Non-coordinated effects
- (b) Coordinated effects
- (c) Mergers with a potential competitor
- (d) Mergers creating or strengthening buyer power
- (iii) Countervailing buyer power
- (iv) Entry
- (v) Efficiencies
- (vi) The ‘failing firm’ defence
- (i) Market shares and concentration levels
- (F) Non-horizontal mergers
- (i) Overview
- (ii) Market shares and concentration levels
- (iii) Vertical mergers
- (a) Non-coordinated effects: foreclosure
- (b) Other non-coordinated effects
- (c) Coordinated effects
- (iv) Conglomerate mergers
- (a) Non-coordinated effects
- (b) Coordinated effects
- (c) Increased interest in conglomeracy—digital/platform markets
- (v) Cases on non-horizontal mergers
- (G) Articles 2(4) and 2(5) of the EUMR: full-function joint ventures and ‘spillover effects’
- (i) A practical example
- (ii) Articles 2(4) and 2(5) in practice
- (H) Contractual restrictions directly related and necessary to a merger: ‘ancillary restraints’
- (i) Introduction
- (ii) General principles
- (iii) Principles applicable in cases of the acquisition of an undertaking
- (iv) Principles applicable in cases of full-function joint ventures
- (A) The legal basis for commitments
- (B) Form RM
- (C) The Commission’s Notice on remedies
- (i) General principles
- (ii) Different types of remedies
- (a) Divestiture of a business to a suitable purchaser
- (b) Removal of links with competitors
- (c) Other remedies
- (d) Review clauses
- (iii) Procedural issues
- (iv) Implementation of commitments
- (v) Review of commitments
- (D) Remedies in practice
- (A) Acts
- (B) Standing
- (i) The parties to the transaction
- (ii) Third parties
- (C) The approach to evidence
- (D) The expedited procedure
- (E) Examples of third party appeals
- (i) Appeals against the Commission’s refusal to take jurisdiction
- (ii) Appeals against Article 9 references
- (iii) Appeals against unconditional clearances
- (iv) Appeals against conditional clearances
- (v) Appeals seeking access to information
- (F) Damages claims against the Commission
- (A) Close and constant liaison with Member States
- (B) Relations with non-EU countries
- (i) Reciprocity
- (ii) The international dimension
- (A) Statistics
- (B) Table of Phase II investigations
- (C) Comment
- (i) Outright prohibitions: horizontal non-coordinated effects
- (ii) Outright prohibitions: horizontal coordinated effects
- (iii) Outright prohibitions: vertical effects
- (iv) Outright prohibitions: conglomerate effects
- (v) Prohibition decisions annulled on appeal
- (vi) Unconditional clearances
- (vii) Conditional clearances
- (a) Clearances subject to commitments: horizontal non-coordinated effects
- (b) Clearances subject to commitments: horizontal coordinated effects
- (c) Clearances subject to commitments: vertical effects
- (d) Clearances subject to commitments: conglomerate effects
- (viii) Withdrawal of notifications
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Overview of UK Merger Control
- (A) Part 3 of the Enterprise Act 2002
- (B) Brief description of the system of merger control in the UK
- (C) Institutional arrangements
- (D) Guidelines, rules of procedure and other relevant publications
- 3. The CMA’s Duty to Make References: Phase 1 Investigations
- (A) Duty to make references: completed mergers
- (i) Duty to refer
- (a) The CMA’s approach to the duty to refer
- (b) Gathering information in relation to a possible reference
- (ii) Discretion not to refer
- (a) Markets of insufficient importance
- (b) Customer benefits
- (iii) Circumstances in which a reference cannot be made
- (i) Duty to refer
- (B) Duty to make references: anticipated mergers
- (C) Relevant merger situations
- (i) Enterprises ceasing to be distinct
- (a) ‘Enterprises’
- (b) ‘Cease to be distinct’
- (ii) The turnover test
- (iii) The share of supply test
- (iv) Time limits and prior notice
- (i) Enterprises ceasing to be distinct
- (D) CMA procedure in Phase 1
- (i) Notifying mergers to the CMA
- (a) No duty to notify
- (b) Submitting a merger notice
- (c) Fast-track references
- (ii) The assessment process
- (iii) Procedural timetable
- (iv) Ancillary restraints
- (v) Undertakings in lieu of a reference
- (a) Legal basis
- (b) Guidance on undertakings in lieu
- (c) Procedure
- (d) Effect of accepting undertakings in lieu
- (e) Examples
- (vi) Communication and publication of Phase 1 decisions
- (vii) Fees
- (i) Notifying mergers to the CMA
- (A) Duty to make references: completed mergers
- (A) The Phase 2 Inquiry Group and case team
- (B) Questions to be decided in relation to completed mergers
- (C) Questions to be decided in relation to anticipated mergers
- (D) Investigations and reports
- (E) Duty to remedy the anti-competitive effects of mergers
- (F) Time limits for the implementation of remedies
- (G) CMA procedure in Phase 2
- (A) Introduction
- (B) A substantial lessening of competition
- (i) What is an SLC?
- (ii) How an SLC might arise
- (iii) How the CMA assesses evidence
- (C) The counterfactual
- (i) What is the counterfactual?
- (ii) The approach to the counterfactual
- (iii) Entry or expansion by one of the merging firms
- (iv) The exiting firm scenario
- (D) Horizontal unilateral effects
- (i) Differentiated products
- (ii) Two-sided platforms
- (iii) Local mergers
- (iv) Undifferentiated products
- (E) Potential and dynamic competition
- (F) Coordinated effects
- (G) Vertical and conglomerate effects
- (H) Countervailing factors
- (i) Merger efficiencies
- (a) Rivalry-enhancing efficiencies
- (b) Relevant customer benefits
- (ii) Entry and expansion
- (i) Merger efficiencies
- (I) The market in which an SLC arises
- (A) Interim measures
- (i) Initial enforcement orders: Phase 1 investigations
- (ii) Interim restrictions and powers: Phase 2 investigations
- (a) Statutory restrictions on dealings
- (b) Interim undertakings and orders to prevent pre-emptive action
- (iii) Initial enforcement orders, interim orders and undertakings: penalties
- (iv) Unwinding orders
- (B) ‘Final powers’ or ‘remedies’
- (i) Schedule 8 to the Enterprise Act
- (ii) General restrictions on conduct
- (iii) General obligations to be performed
- (iv) Acquisitions and divisions
- (v) Supply and publication of information
- (vi) National security, media and financial stability mergers
- (vii) Monitoring compliance and determination of disputes
- (viii) The CMA’s approach to remedies
- (ix) Examples of Phase 2 remedies
- (C) Enforcement functions of the CMA
- (A) Investigation powers and penalties
- (B) Review of decisions under Part 3 of the Enterprise Act
- (A) Basic statistical analysis
- (B) Abandoned mergers
- (C) Completed mergers
- (D) The number of findings of an SLC
- (E) The number of outright prohibitions of anticipated mergers
- (F) Relationship with the Chapter II prohibition
- (G) Healthcare
- (A) Public interest cases
- (i) Public interest considerations
- (ii) Procedure in public interest cases: Phase 1
- (iii) Procedure in public interest cases: Phase 2
- (iv) The public interest provisions in practice
- (B) ‘Special public interest cases’
- (i) Procedure in special public interest cases
- (ii) The special public interest provisions in practice
- (C) European mergers
- (D) Mergers in the water industry
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Nuclear Energy
- 3. Military Equipment
- 4. Agriculture
- (A) Council Regulations 1184/2006 and 1308/2013
- (B) Annex I products
- (C) The first derogation: national market organisations
- (D) The second derogation: common market organisations
- 5. Coal and Steel
- 6. Transport
- (A) Inland transport
- (i) Legislative regime
- (ii) Practical application of the competition rules to inland transport
- (B) Maritime transport
- (i) Legislative regime
- (a) Procedural rules
- (b) Substantive rules
- (c) Block exemption for shipping consortia
- (ii) Practical application of the competition rules to maritime transport
- (i) Legislative regime
- (C) Air transport
- (i) Legislative regime
- (ii) Practical application of the competition rules to air transport
- (A) Inland transport
- (A) Demonopolisation, liberalisation and privatisation
- (B) EU law and the liberalisation of markets
- (C) Regulatory systems in the UK for utilities
- (A) EU law
- (i) Legislation
- (a) European Electronic Communications Code
- (b) Article 106(3) TFEU
- (c) Net neutrality and the open internet
- (ii) Application of EU competition law
- (i) Legislation
- (B) UK law
- (i) Competition Act 1998
- (ii) Enterprise Act 2002
- (A) EU law
- (i) Legislation
- (ii) Application of EU competition law
- (a) The Corbeau case and the universal service obligation
- (b) The Commission’s Notice on competition in the postal sector
- (c) Article 102
- (A) EU law
- (i) Legislation
- (ii) Application of EU competition law
- (B) UK law
- (i) Competition Act 1998
- (ii) Enterprise Act 2002
- (A) Competition Act 1998
- (B) Enterprise Act 2002
- (A) Policy reports on digital platforms
- (B) Competition problems
- (C) Competition law enforcement
- (i) Enforcement in the EU
- (ii) Enforcement in the UK
- (D) Legislative initiatives
- (i) The EU
- (ii) The UK
UM RAFBÆKUR Á HEIMKAUP.IS
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- Möguleiki á tengingu við annað stafrænt og gagnvirkt efni, svo sem myndbönd eða spurningar úr efninu
- Auðvelt að afrita og líma efni/texta fyrir t.d. heimaverkefni eða ritgerðir
- Styður tækni sem hjálpar nemendum með sjón- eða heyrnarskerðingu
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